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CHAPTER 4 
Criminal Practice and Procedure 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 4.1. Note Taking By Jurors.* Prior to 19SO, the Supreme Judicial 
Court had addressed the issue of juror note taking on only one occasion, in 
a case decided at the turn of the century. 1 In Commonwealth v. Tucker, 2 the 
defendant, convicted of murder in the first degree, moved for a new trial 
because one of the jurors had taken notes during the trial. 3 Although the 
Tucker Court observed that note taking by jurors might not be a "commend-
able practice," it nevertheless declared that note taking was not illegal and 
did not require setting aside the verdict. 4 The propriety of juror note taking, 
the Court ruled, was an issue properly left to the discretion of the trial 
court. 5 Absent any showing that the juror's conduct prejudiced the defend-
ant, the Court concluded, the verdict should not be disturbed on appeal. 6 
Against this rather meager common law background, the superior court 
promulgated 7 Rule SA in 197S. 8 Rule SA provides that trial judges may, in 
t Marco Adelfio, Jonathan M. Albano, Kevin M. Carome, Frederick F. Eisenbiegler, 
William A. Fragetta, Peter E. Gelhaar, Donald M. Keller, Jr., Thomas J. Raubach. 
* By Frederick F. Eisenbiegler, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 4.1 ' See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 1S9 Mass. 457, 76 N.E.2d 127 (1905). In Randolf v. 
O'Riorden, 155 Mass. 331, 29 N.E. 5S3 (1S92), the issue of juror note taking was raised, but 
the Court dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds. The defendant in Randolf raised his ob-
jection to juror note taking at his trial for the first time on appeal. Id. at 338, 29 N.E. at 584. 
The Court deemed the defendant's failure to make a timely objection to the note taking at trial 
to be a waiver of the objection, however, and thus did not address the propriety of the practice. 
/d., 29 N.E. at 5S4. 
' 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127 (1905). 
' /d. at 496, 76 N.E. at 142. 
• /d. at 497, 76 N.E. at 142. 
l /d. 
6 /d. 
' G.L. c. 213, § 3 authorizes the superior courts of the Commonwealth to make and prom-
ulgate uniform rules for regulating the practice of such courts. Pursuant to this rule making 
power, the superior court promulgated Rule SA. The relevant text of section 3 is as follows: 
§ 3. Rules; power to make and promulgate. 
The courts shall, respectively, make and promulgate uniform codes of rules, consis-
tent with law, for regulating the practice and conducting the business of such courts in 
cases not expressly provided for by law. 
• • • 
The rules of the superior court, promulgated under the authority of this section, shall 
be subject to the approval of the supreme judicial court. 
G.L. c. 213, § 3. 
• Superior Court Rule SA became effective May 6, 197S. Massachusetts Rules of Court 318 
(West Pamph. 19S1). 1
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their discretion, permit jurors to take notes during the presentation of 
evidence and during the judge's instructions to the jury on the laws. 9 The 
rule, however, also requires the trial judge to precede the amiouncement of 
permission to take notes with "appropriate guidelines." 10 The superior 
court's rulemaking power is also subject to the limitation that such rules 
"shall be subject to the approval of the supreme judicial court."" 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court had occasion in 
Commonwealth v. St. Germain 12 to address the general issue of juror note 
taking and the more specific issue of the validity of juror note taking in-
itiated by a judge pursuant to Rule SA. The Court held that by permitting 
the jurors to take notes pursuant to Rule SA, and by accompanying the an-
nouncement of permission to take notes with additional instructions, the 
trial judge committed no error .13 In sanctioning juror note taking under the 
guidelines established by Rule SA, the Court ruled that whether to permit or 
to prohibit the practice was an issue properly left to the discretion of the 
trial court. 14 The opinion left no guidelines, however, as to when a trial 
judge might abuse his discretion under Rule SA, or as to when note taking 
would be improper. The Court also entered a caveat to its holding, stating 
that although it approved note taking by jurors in St. Germain, it recognized 
that "experience or empirical evidence may suggest a need to modify or 
eliminate the procedures now specified in Rule SA.'' 15 
The defendant in St. Germain was convicted of murder in the first degree 
for the slaying of an elderly couple at their home in Newton. 16 At trial, the 
' As originally promulgated and effective on May 6, 197S, Superior Court Rule SA also em-
powered judges to permit jurors to take notes "during summation by counsel." The rule was 
amended, however, effective July 1, 197S, to provide for note taking only during the presenta-
tion of evidence and during the judge's instructions to the jury. J. Smith & H. Zobel, 6 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACfiCE 1 (Supp. 19SO). As amended, the rule reads as follows: 
/d. 
In any case where the court, in its discretion, permits jurors to make written notes 
concerning testimony and other evidence, the trial judge shall precede the announce-
ment of permission to make notes with appropriate guidelines. Upon the recording of 
the verdict or verdicts, the notes of the jurors shall be destroyed by direction of the trial 
judge. Jurors m~y also be granted l'ermission by the trial judge to make notes during 
the judge's instructions to the jury on the laws. 
Amended and effective July 1, 197S. 
10 Super. Ct. R. SA. See note 9 supra for the text of Rule SA. 
" G.L. c. 213, § 3. See note 7 supra for the text of § 3. 
12 19SO Mass. Adv. Sh. 1S07, 40S N.E.2d 135S (19SO). 
" /d. at 1S17, 40S N.E.2d at 1366. The original version of Rule SA, which permitted note 
taking during "summation by counsel," was in effect at the time of St. Germain's trial. See 
note 9 supra. 
14 /d. at 1S20, 40S N.E.2d at 136S. 
" /d. 
16 Id. at 1S07, 40S N.E.2d at 1360. The defendant St. Germain was convicted on two counts 
of murder in the first degree, one count of armed assault in a dwelling house, and two counts 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. /d., 40S N.E.2d at 1360. 
2
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judge permitted jurors to take notes throughout the presentation of 
evidence, during the opening and closing arguments of counsel, and during 
the judge's charge. 17 On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, St. Germain 
contended that such note taking constituted prejudicial error and deprived 
him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 18 The Court quickly disposed 
of St. Germain's constitutional argument, stating that it could find no 
authority for the proposition that juror note taking was unconstitutional. 19 
Rather, the Court observed, to the extent the rule against juror note taking 
still survives in other jurisdictions, it is a creation of the common law. 20 
Turning to St. Germain's assertion that granting permission to take notes 
was prejudicial error, the Court ruled first that the trial judge had complied 
carefully with the requirements of Rule SA. 21 Rule SA leaves the question 
whether note taking will be permitted to the trial court's discretion, but re-
quires the trial judge to ''precede the announcement of permission to make 
notes with appropriate guidelines. " 22 The Court found the guidelines set by 
the trial judge to be entirely appropriate. 23 The Court noted that the trial 
judge had explained carefully that no juror was required to take notes. 24 
The judge further had cautioned the jurors to keep "brief" any notes they 
might wish to take, in order to better assess each witness' credibility by 
observing the manner in which he testified. 25 Each juror's notes, the judge 
had stressed, were to serve only as ''the notes of the individual juror.'' 26 It 
would be improper, the judge had added, for "one juror [who] has more 
training in the taking of notes than the other[s]" to argue, "this is the 
testimony because it is my notes. " 27 Rather, the judge had emphasized, the 
"collective memory of the jury" should control. 28 
After ruling that the requirements of Rule SA had been satisfied by the 
trial court in St. Germain, the Court then upheld the validity of juror note 
taking pursuant to Rule SA as a matter of Massachusetts law. 29 The Court 
noted that it previously had considered the general issue of juror note taking 
in Commonwealth v. Tucker. 30 The Court observed that although the 
Tucker Court had left open the question whether note taking by jurors was 
" /d. at 1816-17, 408 N.E.2d at 1365-66. 
" /d. at 1817, 408 N.E.2d at 1366. 
19 /d. at 1817 & n.l7, 408 N.E.2d at 1366 & n.17. 
" /d. at 1817 n.l7, 408 N.E.2d at 1366 n.l7. 
" /d. at 1817, 408 N.E.2d at 1366. 
" Super. Ct. R. SA. 






" /d. at 1818, 408 N.E.2d at 1366. 
30 /d. 
3
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a ''commendable practice,'' that Court, nevertheless, had declared that by 
''the great weight of authority [such note taking] is not illegal; and as a mat-
ter of law it does not require the setting aside of the verdict." 31 The Court 
further noted the Tucker Court's ruling that the question of note taking was 
one properly "left to the discretion of the [trial] court. " 32 The Court in St. 
Germain expanded on the observation of the Tucker Court by stating that 
the note taking permitted under Rule SA, as accompanied by the trial 
judge's instructions, "also conforms to the 'great weight' of current 
authority. " 33 The Court observed that note taking is universally permitted 
in federal courts at the discretion of the trial judge. 34 The majority rule in 
state courts, the Court added, also permits note taking by jurors as a matter 
of the trial judge's discretion. 35 
Having held that juror note taking pursuant to Rule SA neither denied the 
defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial nor constituted prej-
udicial error under Massachusetts law, the Court then disposed of the 
defendant's contention that note taking would disrupt the proper function-
ing of the jury fact-finding process. St. Germain had argued on several 
grounds that juror note taking was improper. 36 He contended first that ''the 
best note taker will invariably dominate the jury"; second, tj:lat since most 
jurors are not trained in the art of note taking, they will take down trivial 
points and overlook vital facts; third, that "a dishonest juror may falsify 
his notes"; fourth, that the jurors' notes, rather than their independent 
recollections, would receive "undue attention during delibc:trations"; and 
fifth, that note taking would distract the jurors' attention from observing 
the witnesses' demeanor, or result in them missing other testimony. 37 The 
Court responded by noting first that St. Germain's arguments were virtually 
identical to those considered and rejected by the American Bar Association 
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. 38 The Court, 
however, was unwilling to enter into a substantive discussion concerning the 
presumed advantages and disadvantages of note taking. 39 Rather, St. Ger-
main's claims were dismissed because they rested on "speculation rather 
than [on] empirical data. " 40 In the absence of empirical data to support 
such claims, the Court was "inclined to permit the issue of juror note taking 
to be a matter of judicial discretion. " 41 
" !d. (quoting Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 497, 76 N.E.127, 142 (1905)). 
" !d. (quoting Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. at 497, 76 N.E. at 142). 
33 !d. 
34 !d. at 1818 & n.20, 408 N.E.2d at 1366-67 & n.20. 
" !d. at 1819, 408 N.E.2d at 1367. 
" !d. at 1819-20, 408 N.E.2d at 1367-68. 
37 !d. 
" !d. at 1819 n.22, 408 N.E.2d at 1367 n.22. See A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, Comment to Standard 4.2 (Approved Draft, 1968). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1820, 408 N.E.2d at 1368. 
40 !d. 
" !d. 4
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The Court's approval of juror note taking in St. Germain was 
acknowledged to be tentative, and essentially uninformed. 42 Just as St. Ger-
main's objections to juror note taking failed because they lacked empirical 
support, the Court indicated that other claims might succeed if buttressed 
by such evidence. The Court noted that "experience or empirical data may 
suggest a need to modify or eliminate the procedures now specified in Rule 
SA. " 43 The Court indicated that as more information becomes available, it 
should be used to determine whether juror note taking should be subject to 
greater constraints than those imposed by Rule SA, or, in contrast, whether 
jurors should be permitted to take notes as a matter of right in all cases. 44 
The Court concluded its opinion, however, by expressing its fundamental 
trust in the jury as an institution. 45 It was stated that this confidence in the 
jury's ability to decide cases fairly on the evidence presented at trial should 
apply as well to the ability of a jury to take and use notes "without losing 
sight of their obligations and the gravity of their responsibilities. " 46 
In ruling that jurors may take notes at the trial court's discretion, provid-
ed that the jurors are given appropriate instructions, the St. Germain Court 
reached an appropriate compromise position on the note taking issue. The 
decision is certainly in accord with the great weight of authority and learned 
commentary. 47 Moreover, in the absence of reliable empirical evidence in-
dicating an adverse effect of note taking on jury decisionmaking, entrusting 
the matter to the trial court's discretion is more appropriate than either pro-
hibiting the practice or permitting the practice as a matter of right in all 
cases. As trial judges in the commonwealth acquire more experience with 
juror note taking under Rule SA, it may be assumed they will be in the best 
position to determine whether note taking is appropriate in individual cases. 
In addition, given variations in the character and complexity of different 
trials, it is difficult to appreciate the wisdom of either a flat ban on note tak-
ing or a blanket approval of note taking in all cases. 
The courts and commentators who have considered the issue of juror 
note taking usually enumerate several substantive arguments for and 
against the practice. 48 The most frequently encountered arguments against 
jurors taking notes are that the practice exaggerates the layman's "undue 
42 !d. 
43 /d. 
" /d. The practice of permitting jurors to take notes as a matter of right in all cases is now in 
effect in several states, and is advocated by the American Bar Association. !d. at 1820-21 & nn. 
23-24, 408 N.E.2d at 1368 & nn. 23-24. 
" !d. at 1821, 408 N.E.2d at 1368 . 
.. /d. 
" See id. at 1819-20 & n.20, 408 N.E.2d at 1366-67 & n.20; Note, Taking Note of Note Tak-
ing, 10 CoLUM. J. OF L. AND Soc. PROB. 565, 587 (197*> [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; 
Note, The Problem of Note Taking by Jurors, IS U. PITT. L. REv. 800, 801, 803, 806-07 (1957) 
[hereinafter cited as Pittsburg Note]. 
" Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 574. 
5
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reverence for the written word," thus making it possible for a case to turn 
on an imperfectly written note; 49 that jurors will take down trivial matters 
and overlook vital facts, thus laying undue emphasis on one feature of the 
case over others; 50 that taking notes will distract the juror, rendering him 
unable to assess accurately the demeanor of witnesses; 51 and that dishonest 
jurors may falsify their notes. 52 Finally, it is asserted that skilled note taking 
jurors will overreach their peers and exert undue influence on the jury's 
deliberations. 53 These arguments all reflect a basic lack of confidence in the 
jury's ability to incorporate note taking into the fact-finding process. 
In contrast, arguments in favor of note taking have as their foundation a 
basic confidence in the jury as an institution 54 and the belief that notes can 
be a valuable aid in recollecting evidence. 55 Moreover, proponents of the 
practice argue that the possibility of undue influence by note taking jurors is 
unlikely today when the vast majority of jurors are literate. 56 In contrast to 
a former era, when illiteracy was prevalent, today each juror could support 
his own position by reference to his own notes. 57 In any event, proponents 
contend, certain jurors are always likely to be more influential than 
others. 58 As to the contention that cases might turn on an imperfectly writ-
ten note, one commentator has observed that "this argument begs the ques-
tion."59 A case might likewise turn on imperfect memory. 60 Similarly, while 
it is claimed that note taking will result in jurors emphasizing one feature of 
the case over others, this danger is inherent in the jury system, and is not in-
creased by jurors taking notes. 61 Jurors, it is argued, necessarily must em-
phasize certain facts or versions of facts in order to arrive at a conclusion. 62 
Doing so by means of notes no more distorts a view of the whole picture 
than if the conclusion is reached solely by recourse to memory. 63 Pro-
ponents continue by asserting that, rather than distracting the juror, note 
taking focuses attention on relevant testimony. 64 Finally, as to the conten-
•• See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 574; Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 808. 
,. See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 575; Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 808-09. 
" See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 575-76. 
" See Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 809. 
" See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 576-77, 603. 
'
4 See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 579-80, 603. 
" See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 
26 F.R.D. 409, 458 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Conference Report]. 
" See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 578; Judicial Conference Report, supra note 55, at 
459; Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 811. 
" See Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 809, 811. 
" See 32 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 57, 58 (1948). 





•• Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 578. 
6
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tion that dishonest jurors may falsify notes, proponents respond that in-
fluence may be exerted by a juror for a corrupt purpose equally well by 
means of the spoken word as by means of a written memo. 65 Given the basic 
trust we must place on the jury as an institution, the proponents of note tak-
ing effectively rebut the arguments raised against the practice. The Court's 
ruling in St. Germain, therefore, enjoys the support of the better reasoned 
arguments in the debate on the issue of juror note taking. 
There is also merit in the Court's decision in St. Germain to allow its rul-
ing to stand vulnerable to attack by empirical evidence. If studies show that 
the results of cases in which notes are taken are somehow impermissibly 
skewed, the practice of note taking should be discontinued. If studies show 
to the contrary that the practice uniformly results in a more accurate assess-
ment of the evidence by juries, then note taking should be allowed as a mat-
ter of right in all cases. 
In upholding the validity of Rule SA, the Court in St. Germain sanctioned 
juror note taking at the trial court's discretion. Although the court did not 
provide any guidelines in its opinion as to when note taking would be allowed 
properly, several types of cases would appear to be particularly appropriate 
contexts in which to permit note taking. For example, if a case involved 
complex fact patterns, or many figures, such as in a civil damage action, 
then counsel would be well advised to request that the judge permit jurors to 
take notes during the presentation of evidence. Likewise, where the ap-
plicable law was complicated, counsel might move that the judge permit 
note taking during the judge's instructions to the jury. 
The above suggestions are premised on the notion that a more precise 
understanding of the facts or the law by the jury would help counsel's case. 
Where the emotional appeal of a case is in counsel's favor, however, so that 
a more technical reading of the facts and law might hurt his case, then juror 
note taking would not be desirable. Counsel might object in such cases that 
granting permission to take notes constitutes an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion, arguing that the case is not complex enough to warrant note tak-
ing. Counsel also should take care to object at trial if he thinks note taking 
is improper. Under Commonwealth v. Tucker, 66 failure to object to note 
taking at trial may be deemed a waiver of the right to object on appeal, 
unless counsel satisfies the appellate court that he had been reasonably 
diligent in observing juror conduct but still had failed to notice that jurors 
were taking notes. 67 Because Rule SA requires that a trial judge announce 
his permission to take notes and precede the announcement with "ap-
propriate guidelines, " 68 it would seem impossible for counsel to avoid 
" Pittsburg Note, supra note 47, at 809. 
66 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127 (1905). 
6
' I d. at 496-97, 76 N .E. at 142. 
68 Super. Ct. R. SA. 
7
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waiver by satisfying the diligence requirement without first raising his ob-
jection at trial. Counsel also should be aware that note taking under Rule 
SA is permitted in both civil and criminal trials. 69 
As a final matter, it should be noted that the Court left open the issue of 
what might constitute an "abuse of discretion" when a judge permits jurors 
to take notes pursuant to Rule SA. Indeed, the St. Germain Court did not 
even address the issue whether the trial judge had exercised his discretion 
properly in permitting jurors to take notes. The Court did emphasize, 
however, the "additional instructions" given by the trial judge to the jury 
concerning the purpose and function of note taking. 70 Several of those in-
structions and admonitions were designed to obviate the dangers that critics 
of note taking find objectionable about the practice. 71 Under the prevailing 
view in states which permit note taking at the trial court's discretion, the ex-
ercise of that discretion will be upheld on appeal unless it has prejudiced 
"the substantive rights involved. " 72 It is likely that the Court in St. Ger-
main, in conformity with this standard, reasoned that the instructions pro-
vided by the trial judge to the jury concerning their taking of notes obviated 
any chance of prejudice to the defendant. Thus, there could be no finding 
of abuse of discretion. 73 In conclusion, the St. Germain Court indicated 
that it would grant wide discretionary powers to trial judges acting pursuant 
to Rule SA, provided that their "additional instructions" to the jury were at 
least as adequate as were those of the trial judge in St. Germain. 
§ 4.2. Peremptory Juror Challenges on Racial Grounds.* Prior to the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court had addressed the constitutionality 
of using peremptory juror challenges by a prosecutor to exclude members of 
.. /d. 
•• 19SO Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1S17, 40S N.E.2d at 1366. 
" See id. at 1S17, 1S1S & n.21, 40S N.E.2d at 1366-67 & n.21; see also notes and text at notes 
49-54. 
" See Columbia Note, supra note 47, at 590. 
" Although this reasoning is implicit, rather than explicit, in the Court's opinion, it parallels 
the Court's reasoning with regard to the issue whether the trial judge committed reversible er-
ror in permitting jurors to take notes during opening statements by counsel. At the time of the 
defendant's trial, Rule SA permitted note taking by jurors during "summation by counsel." 
See note 9 supra. The trial judge interpreted "summation by counsel" to include opening 
statements as well as closing arguments. 19SO Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1S16 n.16, 40S N.E.2d at 1366 
n.16. On appeal the Court noted that "it is possible" that the rule was not intended to 
authorize note taking during opening statements. /d. Nevertheless it concluded that in view of 
the judge's cautionary instructions that the opening statements were not evidence, "even if the 
rule is read as not specifically authorizing note taking during opening statements, we find no 
error." /d. Subsequent to the trial, Rule SA was amended, effective July 1, 197S, to permit 
note taking at the trial court's discretion only during the presentation of evidence and the 
judge's instructions to the jury on the laws. See note 9 supra. Thus, the issue addressed by the 
St. Germain Court in footnote 16 of its opinion is now moot. 
8
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a specific racial group. In Commonwealth v. Soares,' decided in 1979, the 
Court ruled that such a pattern of challenges was impermissible under the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 2 The Soares Court 
established a standard to which both prosecution and defense attorneys 
were to conform in making peremptory juror challenges. During the Survey 
year, in Reddick v. Commonwealth, a question arose as to whether the 
Court should apply the Soares standard retroactively by allowing post-
conviction challenges to jury selection procedures. 
The Soares case involved the stabbing murder of a white Harvard foot-
ball player, Andy Puopolo, following a post-season "celebration" in 
Boston's "Combat Zone." 3 Three black men, Soares, Allen, and Easter-
ling, were charged with first-degree murder. • The prosecution advanced the 
theory that the three defendants had "engaged in a joint enterprise to com-
mit murder with deliberate premeditation and malice aforethought." 5 To 
support this argument, the prosecution demonstrated that all three defend-
ants had participated in a melee with the victim and a group of other Har-
vard students just prior to the fatal stabbing, and that they all had assaulted 
and threatened Puopolo and his friends. 6 
The three defendants went to trial in the Superior Court of Suffolk Coun-
ty.' Under Massachusetts law, each defendant was entitled to sixteen 
peremptory juror challenges while the prosecution was entitled to forty-
eight such challenges. 8 The Soares prosecutor used twelve of these 
challenges to dismiss ninety-two percent-all but one-of the potential 
black jurors in the pool, but used challenges of this type to dismiss only 
thirty-four percent of the available white jurors. 9 The defendants Easterling 
and Allen, through their attorneys, complained of the prosecutor's 
systematic rejection of black jurors, but their objection was to no avail. The 
predominantly white jury eventually found all of the defendants guilty of 
first-degree murder. ' 0 On appeal, the defendants again attacked the jury 
selection process, arguing that it had, for all practical purposes, deprived 
* By William A. Fragetta, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.2 ' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499. 
'Id. at 627,387 N.E.2d at 516. 
' /d. at 596-601, 387 N.E.2d at 503-505. 
' Id. at 593, 387 N.E.2d at 502. 
' /d. at 602, 387 N.E.2d at 506. 
• /d. at 596-601, 387 N.E.2d at 503-05. The Harvard students had been pursuing a prostitute 
who allegedly had stolen one of the student's wallets. Allen, a "bouncer" at a local establish-
ment, had blocked their pursuit at one point, and Soares and Easterling alternately had cursed 
at and fought with the white athletes. /d. at 596-99, 387 N.E.2d at 503-505. 
' Id. at 593, 387 N.E.2d at 499. 
• The prosecutor was allowed sixteen challenges for each defendant. /d. at 607 n.6, 387 
N.E.2d at 508 n.6 (citing G.L. c. 234, § 29). 
' /d. at 608, 387 N.E.2d at 508. 
" Id. at 594, 608 n.8, 387 N.E.2d at 502, 508 n.8. 
9
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them of their right to a fair trial and to a trial before an impartial jury, in 
violation of articles 12 and 15 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachu-
setts Constitution. 11 
In response to the defendants' appeals, the commonwealth argued that 
the standard developed by the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama12 should 
be incorporated, in effect, into the Massachusetts Constitution. 13 In Swain, 
the Supreme Court had held that in most cases, the striking of black jurors 
did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 14 
Under this standard, it was presumed that a prosecutor, in exercising his 
peremptory challenges, was "acting on acceptable considerations related to 
the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular 
crime charged." 15 In order to successfully attack the prosecution's peremp-
tory challenges on this basis, then, it was necessary to rebut this presump-
tion, which at the time of the Soares appeal no defendant had done suc-
cessfully. 16 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the Soares defendants did not rely 
solely on rebutting this Swain presumption but instead preseJ}ted alternate 
grounds of relief. 17 The defendants argued that the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude ninety-two percent of the eligible black jurors in this 
case violated Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, by denying the defendants their right to a trial before a jury of 
their peers. 18 The Court accepted this argument, stressing that a fair jury 
must represent a true cross-section of the community, and that the jury 
selection process must not be in the least tainted by discrimination. 19 In ad-
dition, the Soares opinion relied upon and cited extensively the case of Peo-
ple v. Wheeler, 20 in which the California Supreme Court had invalidated 
racially-based juror challenges as violative of the state Constitution. 21 
Similarly, the Massachusetts Court recognized the necessity of maintaining 
a cross-section of the community in the jury room, and to achieve that end 
it could not permit an attorney to exercise the peremptory challenge "with 
absolute and unbridled discretion. " 22 
" /d. at 608, 387 N.E.2d at 508. 
12 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 609, 387 N.E.2d at 509. 
14 380 U.S. at 221-22. 
" Id. at 223. 
•• 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611 n.10, 387 N.E.2d at 509 n.10. 
" Id. at 612, 387 N.E.2d at 510. 
II /d. 
" /d. at 614, 387 N.E.2d at 510-511. The Court cited several decisions to demonstrate this 
interest in a fairly selected jury. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 300 N.E.2d 192 
(1973); Commonwealth v. Martin, 357 Mass. 190, 257 N.E.2d 444 (1970); Commonwealth v. 
Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969). 
•• 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
" Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623, 387 N.E.2d at 514. 10
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In order to achieve the desired representation on Massachusetts juries, 
the Court held that it would not permit the "exercise of peremptory 
challenges to exclude members of discrete groups, solely on the basis of bias 
presumed to derive from that individual's membership in the group. " 23 
Thus, group membership, i.e. sex, race, color, creed, or national origin, 
could not be used as the sole basis for exclusion from a jury. 24 A defendant 
could rebut the presumption of the proper use of peremptory challenges by 
demonstrating a "pattern of conduct" and a "likelihood" 25 that the 
dismissal of a body of jurors was based on their membership in one of these 
discrete groups. 
In the Soares case, the Court concluded that the large percentage of black 
jurors challenged and the disparity between that percentage and the ratio of 
eligible white jurors discharged showed that this ''pattern of conduct'' and 
"likelihood" were indeed present. 26 Thus, the Court, noting the 
defendant's timely request at trial to forbid this pattern of challenges, set 
aside the convictions and ordered a new trial to be conducted under the 
revised standard of jury selections. 27 The Court was to face difficulties, 
however, in applying this standard in instances where a defendant had not 
entered such a "timely" challenge of the jury selection procedure at his 
trial. This problem was demonstrated in a subsequent Supreme Judicial 
Court case, Commonwealth v. Reddick, 28 decided during the Survey year. 
In Reddick, a defendant convicted of murder attempted to challenge his 
conviction by invoking the newly-created Soares principle. 29 Reddick peti-
tioned the Supreme Judicial Court for a writ of error on the basis of the 
allegedly unconstitutional exclusion of blacks from his trial jury. 30 The 
defendant had not raised these arguments on direct appeal of his convic-
tion. 31 Nevertheless, he claimed that the Soares holding operated retroac-
tively so as to invalidate his 1970 conviction by a purportedly unconstitu-
tionally selected jury. 32 
The Court proceeded with the assumption that the prosecution's juror 
challenges had indeed been racially motivated. It then defined the primary 
issue in the case as being "whether the rule announced in the Soares opinion 
should be applied to [a] trial that took place almost nine years before the 
" Id. at 627, 387 N.E.2d at 516. 
24 /d. at 628, 387 N.E.2d at 516. The Court adopted these "group classifications" from the 
Equal Rights Amendment. /d. 
" Id. at 629, 387 N.E.2d at 517. 
" /d. at 629-30, 387 N.E.2d at 517. The Court also indicated that "common group member-
ship of a defendant and those jurors excluded ... is a factor to be considered by the judge 
when he assesses whether the presumption of propriety has been rebutted." /d. 
" /d. at 633, 387 N.E.2d at 518. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1959, 409 N.E.2d 764. 
" See text at notes 23-25, supra. 
" Id. at 1959, 409 N.E.2d at 765. 
31 /d. 
" /d. at 1960, 409 N.E.2d at 765. 11
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Soares opinion was released.'' 33 The Court decided that the Soares holding 
should not be applied retroactively as a general rule and cited language from 
the opinion itself to support its conclusion. 34 In particular, the Court felt 
that it would be inappropriate to overturn a conviction such as Reddick's. 
The Court determined that race was not proved a factor at his trial, while 
racial considerations conceivably could have played a part in the Soares ver-
dict. 35 The Court then dealt with the applicability of Soares to the type of 
attack mounted in the Reddick case. 
The Reddick Court first cited the Supreme Court's decision in Linkletter 
v. Walker6 to demonstrate that, generally, newly created constitutional 
principles should not be applied automatically in cases of postconviction or 
collateral attack. 37 It embraced the Supreme Court's idea that the most im-
portant aspect of a new rule, in deciding whether to apply it in a case of col-
lateral attack, is the extent to which the new rule is designed "to improve 
the integrity of the fact-finding process. " 38 The Reddick Court noted that 
only in a few specialized instances had the Supreme Court given full retroac-
tive effect to a newly expounded constitutional rule. 39 In determining 
whether to give retroactive effect to the new decision on peremptory juror 
challenges, the Reddick Court looked to see whether the chall~nges at Red-
dick's trial severely impaired the court's truth-finding function, and 
whether "the clear danger of convicting the innocent" 40 was present. The 
Supreme Judicial Court found that such threats to the defendant did not ex-
ist in the Reddick case. Thus, it was not appropriate to give retroactive ef-
fect to the Soares ruling for Reddick's benefit. 41 
The Court found it important that the conduct of Reddick's trial had ex-
hibited no overt racial tensions or prejudices. 42 On appeal Reddick had 
made no explicit showing that the jurors eventually chosen for his trial had 
" ld. at 1960, 409 N.E.2d at 765-66. 
'
4 ld. at 1960, 409 N.E.2d at 766. The Court in Soares stated: "[t]he rule adopted today ap-
plies to the defendants in these cases and to the defendants in all cases now pending on direct 
appeal where the record is adequate to raise the issue." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 633 n.38, 387 
N.E.2d at 518 n.38. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1962-63, 409 N.E.2d at 767. In Reddick, the defendant and the 
victim were black, as were the majority of the prosecution witnesses. ld. at 1960 n.1, 409 
N.E.2d at 766 n.l. 
" 381 u.s. 618 (1965). 
" I d. at 627. 
" Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1966). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1961,409 N.E.2d at 766. These instances included a case involving 
an indigent's right to counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and the ac-
cused's right to exclude an involuntary confession from trial, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 
(1964). 
40 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1962, 409 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
u.s. 719, 728 (1966)). 
41 ld. at 1963,409 N.E.2d at 767. The Court believed that the "integrity of the fact-finding 
process was not affected." ld. 
42 ld. at 1963, 409 N.E.2d at 767. 12
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been incapable of reaching a fair and impartial verdict. 43 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that there was no reason to believe that the allegedly im-
proper make-up of the panel had increased the risk of an erroneous convic-
tion in any significant way. 44 As a result, the Court reasoned that the pros-
ecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black individuals had not 
impugned the integrity of the fact-finding process. 45 
Other factors also were relevant in determining whether to give retroac-
tive effect to the new constitutional rule, according to the Reddick Court. 
These included: "(a) the purpose of the new rule, (b) the extent of reliance 
by law enforcement authorities on the old rule, and (c) the effect that 
retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. " 46 The 
Court found in the Reddick case that all of these factors indicated that it 
should not give retroactive effect to the Soares holding in the instance of a 
postconviction attack. 
The Court reasoned that the primary design of the Soares rule was to 
deter attorneys from improperly influencing the composition of juries, and 
that making this principle retroactive would not further the goal of better-
ing future jury selections. 47 It acknowledged that the Soares holding also 
was intended to correct the unfairness of discriminatory prosecutorial ac-
tions. Because of the absence of racial "tensions" in Reddick's trial, 
however, no such concern was present there. 48 In addition, everyone includ-
ed in the original trial had relied upon the Court's holding in pre-Soares 
cases, 49 and the Reddick Court reasoned that it would be unfair to ''require 
clairvoyance on the part of the prosecutors." 5° Finally, the Court felt that 
an application of Soares principles in this case would affect adversely the 
administration of justice. It stressed that "[t]here must be a reasonable mo-
ment for a judgment to become final and a time beyond which further 
challenges must be barred. " 51 Thus, in a case in which the integrity of the 
fact-finding process was not affected, the Court expressly declined to apply 
the Soares principles to a post conviction collateral attack. 52 
Although the Reddick Court's decision to deny retroactive application of 
the Soares holding may be very practical, its reasoning does not reflect the 
profound concern for racially-balanced juries shown by the Soares opinion. 
The Court in Reddick adopted an appropriate standard for giving retroac-
.. /d . 
•• /d . 
• , /d. 
•• /d. (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 283, 297 (1967)) . 
• , /d. at 1%3, 409 N.E.2d at 767. 
" /d., 409 N.E.2d at 767-68. 
•• /d. at 1%3-64,409 N.E.2d at 768. The Court mentioned in particular, Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 367 Mass. 419, 326 N.E.2d 6 (1975), and Commonwealth v. King, 366 Mass. 6, 313 
N.E.2d 869 (1974). 
" Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 374 N.E.2d 87 (1978). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1964, 409 N.E.2d at 768. 
" /d. 
13
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
126 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 4.3 
tive effect to new constitutional rules by giving a rule such impact only if it 
was designed to improve the integrity of the fact-finding process. 53 The 
Court then indicated that the Soares rule does not bolster the process' in-
tegrity in cases such as Reddick, where the victim of a crime and the accused 
are both of the same color. 54 This reasoning is inconsistent with the Soares 
Court's emphasis upon obtaining the interaction of a cross-section of 
members of the community in the jury room. 55 Under the Soares rationale, 
the fact-finding process would be affected adversely by counsel's racially-
based challenges, regardless of the lack of other "racial tensions" in the 
trial. 56 
In addressing the other factors relevant to determining the retroactivity of 
Soares, the Reddick Court misinterpreted the thrust of the Soares opinion. 
It acknowledged that a major purpose of Soares may have been to correct 
the unfairness of discriminatory prosecutorial actions, 57 but saw no such 
unfairness in the Reddick procedures in the absence of any overt racial con-
flict at trial. Again, the Soares Court had stressed that the true unfairness in 
the unconstitutional use of peremptory challenges lay in the unrepresenta-
tive make-up of the jury panel. 58 Reddick's failure to press the jury selection 
issue at trial may indicate, however, that he did not feel that his rights were 
being violated. As the Reddick Court noted, the decision in a case must and 
should become final at some finite point after the defendant has exhausted 
his valid claims. 
It appears, then, that although the rationale used by the Reddick Court is 
not philosophically reconcilable with that behind the Soares decision, it may 
still possess some strengths from a purely practical viewpoint. In addition, 
the Reddick Court stands on firm ground when it demonstrated reliance by 
the prosecution at Reddick's trial upon prior juror challenge decisions 
which had not yet embraced the Soares approach. 59 In the final analysis, 
then, as a result of Reddick, only on direct appeal may a Massachusetts 
defendant validly attack the prosecution's use of peremptory juror 
challenges as a general rule. The result arrived at by the Reddick Court is 
practically justifiable, but not on the basis of the reasoning outlined in the 
Reddick opinion itself. 
§ 4.3. Prisoner's Dock.* The commonwealth's traditional practice of 
seating a criminal defendant in the prisoner's dock 1 during his or her trial 
was reevaluated by the Supreme Judicial Court in the recent case of Com-
" See text at note 37 supra. 
,. See note 34 supra. 
" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 621, 387 N.E.2d at 513. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1963, 409 N.E.2d at 768. 
" /d. at 1963, 409 N.E.2d at 767-68. 
" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 619, 387 N.E.2d at 512. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1963, 409 N.E.2d at 768. 
*By Kevin M. Carome, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.3 ' See Commonwealth v. Moore, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2334, 393 N.E.2d 904. Most 14
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monwealth v. Moore. 2 In Moore, the Court held that "ordinarily" a 
criminal defendant must be permitted to sit at counsel's table, rather than in 
the prisoner's dock. 3 During the Survey year, the Court suggested, in Com-
monwealth v. Lockley, 4 that seating options other than the prisoner's dock 
exist for the less docile defendant. This section will examine Moore and 
Lockley and the issues raised therein. This examination will include a 
discussion of the proper procedures to be followed by a trial judge in select-
ing seating arrangements for a criminal trial. 
The defendant in Moore was convicted of first degree murder.' During 
the defendant's two and one half week trial, he was confined to the 
prisoner's dock 6 despite the request of his counsel that he be permitted to sit 
at counsel's table. 7 In support of this request, the defendant argued both 
that a hearing condition required that he sit close to his counsel in order to 
communicate with his counsel during trial, 8 and that his placement in the 
dock eroded the presumption of innocence. 9 In reviewing the trial court's 
denial of the defendant's request, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that in 
several of its previous cases it held that such requests were to be left to the 
discretion of the trial court. ' 0 The Court was willing, however, to reexamine 
courtrooms in the commonwealth used for criminal sessions contain a prisoner's dock. !d. at 
2336, 393 N.E.2d at 906. The dock is a small wooden structure, four or five feet square, in 
which a criminal defendant may be seated during trial. !d. The dock is open at the top, and 
when a defendant is seated in it, his upper torso is visible to the other persons in the courtroom. 
!d. at 2336-37, 393 N .E.2d at 906-07. 
' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2334, 393 N.E.2d 904. 
' !d. at 2339, 393 N.E.2d at 2340. The Court held that when security reasons require the 
defendant to be restrained, use of the dock still would be permitted. See text at notes 15-16 
infra. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1699, 408 N.E.2d 834. 
' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2334, 393 N.E.2d at 906. 
• !d. at 2336, 393 N.E.2d at 906. 
7 !d . 
• !d. 
' See id. at 2336-38, 393 N.E.2d at 906-07. Although not explicitly provided for in the 
federal constitution, the presumption of innocence has long been regarded as a basic element 
of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 
453 (1895). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (I 976). 
'
0 !d. at 2338, 393 N.E.2d at 907. For example, in Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 
548, 350 N .E.2d 678, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976), the defendant objected to the use of the 
dock on the ground that it eroded the presumption of innocence, interfered with his ability to 
consult with counsel, and prejudiced the defendant in connection with identifications of him 
by witnesses who viewed him isolated in the dock. !d. at 573, 350 N.E.2d at 695. The Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected these challenges stating that the trial court had not abused its discretion 
by seating the defendant in the prisoner's dock. !d. at 574, 350 N.E.2d at 696. On the iden-
tification issue, the Court noted that use of the dock was not prejudicial where crucial iden-
tification testimony came from accomplices to the crime. !d. In Commonwealth v. MacDonald 
(No.2), 368 Mass. 403, 333 N.E.2d 194 (1975), the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial 
of a motion to seat the defendant at his counsel's table instead of in the prisoner's dock where 
the powerfully built defendant previously had been convicted of first degree murder and where 
the court house security force was under-staffed. !d. at 408-09, 333 N.E.2d at 198. The trial 15
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the use of the dock in light of a decision by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit which questioned the constitutionality of the 
device. In Walker v. Butterworth,t 1 the First Circuit stated, albeit in dic-
tum, that "confinement in the prisoner's dock is unnecessary to accomplish 
any important state interest and may well dilute the presumption of in-
nocence." 12 
After considering the First Circuit's decision in Walker, the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Moore ruled that "[o]rdinarily, a criminal defendant 
should be permitted to sit at counsel table." 13 The Court did not indicate, 
however, that this ruling was required under the federal constitution. 14 
Moreover, the Court stated that under some circumstances the use of the 
prisoner's dock may still play a legitimate role in the conduct of a criminal 
trial. The Court noted that where security reasons require imposing 
restraints in the defendant's movement, the dock can provide the necessary 
court chose to use the dock rather than hand-cuffs.ld. at408, 333 N.E.2d at 198. The Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that the defendant could have requested a cautionary jury instruction. !d. 
at 409, 333 N.E.2d at 198. In Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 362 Mass. 672, 290 N.E.2d 167 
(1972), judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds, 411 U.S. 945 (1973), aff'd on re-
hearing, 365 Mass. 66, 309 N.E.2d 491 (1974), the defendant raised the same objections to the 
use of the dock that were raised in Walker. /d. at 680, 290 N.E.2d at 174. In rejecting these 
challenges, the Court stated that the jury is entitled to know who stands before it. !d. In Com-
monwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 287 N.E.2d 599 (1972), the defendant in a robbery case 
wanted to be seated among the courtroom spectators during the testimony of eye witnesses who 
would be asked to identify the culprit, rather than in the dock or at counsel's table. !d. at 
500-01, 287 N .E.2d at 602. The Court found no error in seating the defendant in the dock dur-
ing this testimony, since there was no showing that the identifying witnesses were unduly im-
pressionable or otherwise unreliable. !d. at 501, 287 N.E.2d at 602. 
'' 599 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1979). 
12 !d. at 1081. Walker involved a petition to the First Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus. !d. 
at 1075. The petitioner was the defendant in the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. 
Walker, discussed in note 10supra. The First Circuit ordered that the writ should issue because 
the trial court had required the defendant, during the proceedings to determine his sanity, to 
exercise his peremptory challenges personally, instead of through his counsel. /d. at 1081-84. 
The petitioner in Walker also claimed that the practice of seating a defendant in the prisoner's 
dock was analogous to making the defendant wear prison garb, a practice that was found un-
constitutional for its dilution of the presumption of innocence in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 
501, 504-05, rehearing denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976). See 599 F.2d at 1080. In its discussion of 
the prisoner's dock, the First Circuit stated that "the Massachusetts prisoner dock must be 
considered, as a general matter, to be an unconstitutional practice'' because of its potential im-
pact on the presumption of innocence. !d. at 1081. All of the First Circuit justices felt that the 
practice raised constitutional issues. See id. at 1081 n. 7. One justice would have found indepen-
dent reversible error in the use of the dock. !d. Another did not join the portion of the court's 
opinion dealing with the dock, however, because it was unnecessary to the disposition of the 
case.ld. 
" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
" See id. at 2339-41, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
16
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protection much less obtrusively than alternative security devices can. ' 5 In 
the future, the Court stated, a trial court should grant a request to seat the 
defendant at counsel's table unless some security measures are necessary.' 6 
If the request is denied, the reasons for the denial should appear in the 
record.'' Where additional security is needed, the Court stated that the 
prisoner's dock should be used only if it is the "least restrictive measure 
available. "' 8 
Despite the Moore Court's creation of a policy to avoid the use of the 
prisoner's dock, it did not find the use of the dock in Moore to be reversible 
error. 19 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the dock had not prejudiced 
the defendant. 20 Although the trial court had not specifically stated the 
reasons for denying the defendant's request, the Supreme Judicial Court 
gleaned from the record that the lower court had been concerned with 
security. 21 Although it was not clear whether the dock was the least restric-
tive security measure available, the Court found no possibility that the 
defendant had been prejudiced because the trial court had "forcefully" in-
structed the jury that no inference of guilt was to be drawn from the use of 
the device. 22 Thus, while the Moore Court established a policy against the 
use of the prisoner's dock, it did not explicitly state that this policy has a 
constitutional dimension. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court's 
failure to find prejudicial error in Moore demonstrated a deference toward 
the trial court's choice of seating arrangements not unlike that present in the 
Court's earlier decisions involving the prisoner's dock. 23 
The issue of the prisoner's dock was again presented to the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the Survey year in Lockley. The defendant in Lockley 
was convicted of robbery. 24 He was required to sit in the prisoner's dock25 
despite his motion that he be allowed to sit at counsel table. 26 The trial court 
1
' /d. at 2339-40, 393 N.E.2d at 908. The Court identified the threat of escape and the need 
to protect others in the courtroom as potential security problems which would permit some sort 
of restraint. /d. at 2339, 393 N .E.2d at 908. 
16 /d. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
17 /d. 
18 See id. The Supreme Judicial Court stated that when additional security measures are 
necessary, they should be imposed in light of the procedural standards set out in the case of 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 305 N.E.2d 830 (1973). See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. The Brown case is discussed at text and notes 40-58 infra. 
19 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2340-41, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
20 !d. 
21 /d. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
" !d. at 2341, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
" See cases cited at note 10 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1699, 408 N.E.2d at 836. 
" /d. at 1707, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
26 /d. 
17
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
130 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.3 
denied the defendant's motion because it felt that the defendant was a 
security threat, 27 as he was then serving a sentence for an unrelated criminal 
offense. 28 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed his conviction and ordered 
a new trial on the unrelated ground that the trial court erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for a polygraph test. 29 Because a new trial was 
necessary, the Court addressed the issue of what seating arrangements were 
to be used at the new trial. 30 After reiterating its holding in Moore, 31 the 
Court stated that trial judges have options in seating criminal defendants in 
addition to placing them in the prisoner's dock or at counsel's table. 32 The 
Court suggested that if some security measures are needed, the intermediate 
step of seating the defendant on a chair or bench at the rear of the enclosure 
in front of the bar may be more appropriate and less restrictive than use of 
the prisoner's dock. 33 The Court believed that such an arran~ement would 
be less likely to dilute the presumption of innocence than using the dock. 34 
As in Moore, the Supreme Judicial Court in Lockley did not indicate that its 
consideration of seating arrangements involved constitutional issues. 35 
The Court did not order any particular seating arrangements to be used at 
the new trial. 36 Instead, it instructed the trial court to determine what 
seating would be proper under the procedures set forth in Moore and in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 37 an earlier decision which analvzed the pro-
cedures imposing security measures to restrain criminal defendants during 
trial. 38 In fact, the Court's decision in Moore itself looked toward the 
Brown opinion as a source of the procedures to be employed in deciding 
what seating arrangements would be proper during trial. 39 
Brown involved a maximum security prisoner convicted of assaulting a 
prison guard. 40 The defendant, who had been involved in two escape at-
tempts, 41 was shackled during trial by means of handcuffing his wrists and 
27 /d. 
28 /d. 
" /d. at 1701-07, 408 N.E.2d at 837-40. The Court held that the trial judge did not give suf-
ficient consideration to the question of whether the defendant, an indigent, should have been 
provided the polygraph examination. See id. at 838-39. For a discussion of the evidentiary 
issues decided by the Court in Lockley, see § 1.2, supra. 
30 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1707, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
31 Id. at 1707-08, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
" /d. at 1708, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
ll /d. 
" See id. 
" See id. 
" !d. at 841. 
" 164 Mass. 471, 305 N.E.2d at 830 (1973). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1708, 408 N.E.2d at 841. 
39 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
40 364 Mass. at 471-72, 305 N.E.2d at 831. 
41 /d. at 474, 305 N.E.2d at 833. 
18
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attaching the handcuffs to a waist belt. 42 The defendant challenged these 
security measures as excessive and claimed they improperly diluted the 
presumption of innocence. 43 The defendant moved for a mistrial on these 
grounds, but the motion was denied by the trial court. 44 In its discussion of 
the defendant's claim, the Brown Court noted that shackling and other such 
security measures are to be avoided whenever possible. 4 s Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Judicial Court recognized a duty on the part of trial judges "to do 
what may be necessary to prevent escape, to minimize danger of harm to 
those attending trial as well as to the general public, and to maintain decent 
order in the courtroom. " 46 The Court stated that a trial judge possesses 
broad discretion in determining what sort of security measures are proper, 
and that a conviction will not be overturned due to allegedly excessive 
measures unless the defendant demonstrates that the trial judge's decision 
was "arbitrary or unreasonable. " 47 Because the facts of the Brown case 
demonstrated the need to take security measures, 48 and because the judge 
had cautioned the jury against bias, 49 the Supreme Judicial Court could not 
find that the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing the hand 
security restraints on the defendant. so 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion in Brown, it also attempted to define the procedure a trial judge should 
use in deciding where to seat a defendant. In Brown, the trial judge had con-
sulted privately with the sheriff concerning the need for restraining the 
defendants 1 but had not made any formal statement for the record of the 
reasons behind his decision to shackle the defendant. s2 The Court stated 
" Id. A codefendant, who was acquitted, id. at 472, 305 N.E.2d at 832, and certain defense 
witnesses, all of whom were inmates in the same prison in which the defendant was confined, 
also were shackled during the trial. ld. at 473-74, 305 N.E.2d at 833. The trial court decided to 
shackle the defendant because of his criminal record and escape attempts, the sheriff's deter-
mination that the defendant was a serious security threat and the sheriff's recommendation 
that the shackles be used. Id. at 474, 305 N.E.2d at 833. The jurors were able to observe these 
restraints on the defendant during his trial. !d. 
" See id. at 472, 305 N.E.2d at 832. 
" Id. 
" ld. at 475, 305 N.E.2d at 833. 
•• ld. at 475, 305 N.E.2d at 834 (footnote omitted) . 
., !d. at 476, 305 N.E.2d at 834 (footnote omitted). 
•• See id. at 473-76, 305 N.E.2d at 833-35. In addition to the defendant's record of convic-
tion and escape attempts, the Court noted that it was proper to "attach significance" to the 
report and recommendation of the official charged with custody of the defendant, here the 
sheriff. ld. at 475, 305 N.E.2d at 834. The Court stated, however, that the trial judge may not 
abdicate his decision-making duty on this matter to that official. !d. 
•• Id. at 477, 305 N.E.2d at 835. 
'" Id. 
" ld. at 474, 305 N.E.2d at 833. 
" See id. at 478-79, 305 N.E.2d at 835-36. 
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that requiring a judge to "give reasons and respond to possible criticisms by 
counsel" would promote better decision-making regarding the restraints on 
criminal defendants. 53 The Court, therefore, sketched a "more circum-
spect" procedure to be followed in future cases. 54 The Court stated that, 
before trial, the judge should inform the defendant and his counsel of the 
reasons for imposing additional security measures. 55 The trial court should 
then hear any objections to the security measures from the defendant. 56 If 
such objections are made, a hearing, which may be informalj should then be 
held to consider them. 57 The Court stated that while ordinarily rules of evi-
dence need not be followed in such a hearing, a record should be 
produced. 5 8 
Both Moore and Lockley pointed to the Brown decision as a procedural 
guide for determining whether the prisoner's dock should be employed in a 
criminal trial. 59 The Moore Court stated that the defendant should be per-
mitted to sit at counsel's table unless procedures of Brown are followed in 
imposing the dock. 60 Because both Moore and Lockley relied on Brown, 
these two cases do not seem to place a heavy burden on a trial judge who 
determines that security reasons justify a refusal to seat a defendant at 
counsel table. The reliance on Brown suggests only that the defendant must 
be afforded the opportunity to present oral objections to the alternative ar-
rangements, 61 and that the trial judge must demonstrate that these objec-
tions received consideration by stating the reasons for his decision on the 
record. 62 Both Moore and Lockley do require that there be security reasons 
for employing an alternative seating arrangement, and it seems implicit in 
" ld. 
" ld. 




" See Commonwealth v. Moore, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908; Com-
monwealth v. Lockley, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1709, 408 N.E.2d at 841. 
60 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. It is unclear whether in either Moore or 
Lockley an informal hearing of the type sketched in Brown was held. The trial court in Moore 
entertained argument from the defendant's counsel concerning the adverse effects of the use of 
the prisoner's dock. See id. at 2336, 393 N.E.2d at 906. The trial judge stated that he would 
consider the defendant's request, but that he would make inquiries of the sheriff" 'because 
the Sheriff has, of course, the responsibility of security.' "Id. It is unclear whether the trial 
judge believed that the decision was to be left to the sheriff. See id. The Brown Court indicated 
that the trial judge may "attach significance" to the security officer's recommendation, but 
must make an independent decision on the matter. See note 48 supra. In Lockley, on the other 
hand, the trial court entertained arguments from the defendant's counsel, and the trial court's 
reasons for denying the defendant's motion apparently appeared in the record, since they were 
reported by the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1707, 408 
N.E.2d at 840. 
61 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. at 478-79, 305 N.E.2d at 835-36. 
6
' See id. at 479, 305 N.E.2d at 836. 
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both opinions that the exigencies of security are the only justifications 
which will permit the use of an alternative. 63 The Brown Court, however, 
stated that the standard of review to be applied to the trial judge's decision 
regarding security restraints is to determine whether that decision was ar-
bitrary or unreasonable. 64 Therefore, the traditional discretion of the trial 
courts in imposing security measures, including restrictive seating ar-
rangements, 65 probably will continue to be respected by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
This notion that the trial courts will retain discretion in selecting seating 
arrangements receives additional support in the Supreme Judicial Court's 
refusal to find error in the use of the prisoner's dock in the Moore case. The 
Court was willing to assume that the trial court had valid security reasons 
for utilizing the dock, and the Court was not concerned about the lack of 
clarity in the record as to whether a less restrictive alternative was 
available. 66 The Court simply stated that "[i]f there was error, we are 
unable to discover any risk of prejudice." 67 
Such deferential treatment of a trial judge's decision on seating ar-
rangements is inappropriate if the presumption against the use of the 
prisoner's dock rests on a constitutional requirement. Although the First 
Circuit decision which prompted the Supreme Judicial Court's reevaluation 
of the use of the prisoner's dock raised constitutional questions about the 
use of the device, 68 neither Moore nor Lockley expressly indicates a con-
stitutional dimension to the preference for seating a defendant at counsel's 
table. 69 Thus, where a trial judge indicates that there is a rational, security-
related reason for employing the prisoner's dock or another seating device, 
it is unlikely that a criminal conviction will be reversed merely on the 
ground that such an alternative was employed. 
Thus, the significance, for the present, of Moore and Lockley is prob-
lematical. The constitutionality of the prisoner's dock is unclear, and it is 
possible that if the Supreme Judicial Court continues to refrain from 
deciding the issue, the First Circuit will strike down the device on constitu-
tional grounds. Both Moore and Lockley stated that in the "ordinary" case 
a criminal defendant should be allowed to sit at the counsel's table. 70 It 
would appear that unless a defendant poses a genuine security problem, a 
" See Commonwealth v. Moore, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339-40, 393 N.E.2d at 908; Com-
monwealth v. Lockley, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1707-08, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
•• See text at note 47 supra. 
•• See cases cited at note 9 supra. 
•• See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2340-41, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
67 /d. at 2340, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
•• See note 12 supra. 
•• See Commonwealth v. Moore, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339-41, 393 N.E.2d at 907-08; 
Commonwealth v. Lockley, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1707-08, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
70 See Commonwealth v. Moore, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339, 393 N.E.2d at 908; Com-
monwealth v. Lockley, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1707-08, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
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trial court would have no discretion on the choice of seating. Even if a 
security threat is presented, Lockley indicates that a seating arrangement 
other than the prisoner's dock should be considered by the trial court as an 
alternative. It is likely, however, that the trial court's initial determination 
whether the defendant poses a security threat will withstand challenges 
based upon the use of an alternative seating device. Therefore, the practi-
tioner who is unable to convince a trial judge that an alternative seating ar-
rangement is unnecessary should not expect to convince appellate courts in 
this commonwealth that use of such an alternative was reversible error. 
§ 4.4. Trial of a Juvenile as an Adult.* Under Massachusetts law, 
juveniles under the age of eighteen generally are not subject to criminal pros-
ecution. 1 Instead, cases involving such juveniles are heard by a juvenile 
court in a non-criminal proceeding. 2 Nevertheless, certain circumstances 
may allow a juvenile court to find that the interests of the child and the 
public are best served if the accused child stands trial, as an adult would, in 
a criminal prosecution. 3 The Massachusetts legislature has stated, however, 
that as far as is practicable, juveniles should be treated "not as criminals, 
but as children in need of aid, encouragement, and guidance."' Conse-
quently, the transfer of a juvenile complaint to a criminal court is warranted 
* By Jonathan M. Albano, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.4. ' G.L. c. 119, §53 provides: 
/d. 
Sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive, shall be liberally construed so that the 
care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate 
as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far 
as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in l).eed of aid, en-
couragement and guidance. Proceedings against children under said sections shall not 
be deemed criminal proceedings. 
2 /d. 
' G.L. c. 119, § 61 provides in part: 
/d. 
If it is alleged in a complaint made under sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive, that 
a child (a) who had previously been committed to the department of youth services as a 
delinquent child has committed an offense against a law of the commonwealth which, if 
he were an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison; or (b) has 
committed an offense involving the infliction or threat of serious bodi\Y harm, and in 
either case if such alleged offense was committed while the child was between his four-
teenth and seventeenth birthdays, and if the court enters a written finding based upon 
clear and convincing evidence that the child presents a significant danger to the public as 
demonstrated by the nature of the offense charged and the child's past record of delin-
quent behavior, if any, and is not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile, the court 
may, after a transfer hearing held in accordance with such rults of court as shall be 
adopted for such purpose, dismiss the complaint .... 
• /d., § 53. See note 1 supra. 
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only in exceptional cases. s In such instances, the juvenile court must first 
determine if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is guilty. 6 If 
probable cause is established, the court must then address the question of 
the transfer itself. 7 
During the Survey year, in A Juvenile v. Common wealth, 8 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered what type of evidence 
justifies the transfer of a juvenile complaint. The petitioner in A Juvenile v. 
Commonwealth, a sixteen year old male, was brought before Boston 
Juvenile Court in May of 1976 on charges of delinquency. 9 The state moved 
to transfer the proceeding to Superior Court. 10 At the inquiry into probable 
cause, testimony was introduced which tended to prove the petitioner raped 
a five-year-old girl at knife-point and left her bleeding in a hallway. 11 
After determining probable cause existed, a hearing was held on the ques-
tion of the transfer itself. 12 The juvenile court considered reports from the 
probation department, the Department of Youth Services (D.Y.S.), the 
court clinic psychiatrist, and the Boston Juvenile Court clinic regarding the 
petitioner's condition. 13 Testimony also was heard from the petitioner's 
mother, two family friends, the court liaison with D.Y.S., and the director 
of a METCO program in which the petitioner was participating concerning 
their evaluation of the juvenile. 14 The judge then entered his findings and 
order, which, under Massachusetts law, must be based on "clear and con-
vincing evidence." 1 s The court found that the petitioner posed a serious 
threat to the public and that he could not be rehabilitated within the juvenile 
justice system. 16 
As a result of the court's findings, the juvenile complaint was dismissed 
and a criminal complaint against the petitioner was issued. 17 In November 
of 1976, the petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment which ensued! 8 
Petitioner argued that the opinion and order of transfer by the juvenile 
court violated the standards established by the Supreme Judicial Court in a 
' A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 281-82, 347 N.E.2d 677, 684 (1976). 
' G.L. c. 119, § 61. 
'Id. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1131,405 N.E.2d 143. 






" G.L. c. 119, § 61; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1132, 405 N.E.2d at 145. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1132-33, 405 N.E.2d at 145. 
" /d. at 1133,405 N.E.2d at 145. 
18 /d. 
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1976 case also entitled A Juvenile v. Commonwealth. 19 After three years of 
procedural delays, the Supreme Judicial Court granted the petitioner's re-
quest to review the Superior Court's refusal to dismiss the ilildictment. 20 
The Court held that, under the guidelines for transfer hearings which it 
had announced in its 1976 decision of A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, the 
juvenile court's findings were too ambiguous to support a transfer order. 21 
According to the Court's prior decision, the crucial question was whether 
the petitioner was amenable to rehabilitation. 22 The juvenile court had 
found that the petitioner had no prior delinquency record, that he was a 
high school student living in a "well intact" family, that the court clinic 
reported there was no need for psychiatric recommendations for the 
juvenile, and that D.Y.S. had no recommendation for him. 23 The Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that such findings suggest a good prognosis for a first 
offender. 24 
The juvenile court's findings, however, also emphasized the seriousness 
of the crime of which the petitioner was charged. 25 In addition, the court 
noted the short time period in which the petitioner could be confined by the 
D.Y.S., as well as the "semi-secure" nature of D.Y.S.'s facilities. 26 Such 
statements suggested to the Supreme Judicial Court that the juvenile court 
was concerned more with protecting the public and with the nature of the 
crime of which the petitioner was accused than with the petitioner's pros-
19 ld. (citing A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 347 N.E.2d 677 (1976)). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1134,405 N.E.2d at 146. On September 8, 1977, a superior court 
judge found the transfer order had inadequate subsidiary findings and remanded the case to 
the Boston Juvenile Court for further findings. In December of 1978, the petitioner renewed 
his motion to dismiss the indictment stating that fourteen months had elapsed with no further 
findings made by the juvenile court. The superior court judge ordered the parties to contact 
the juvenile court justice who had handled the case. On February 14, 1979, that justice issued 
findings and order similar to his original, except for an addendum to the sixth subsidiary find-
ing. When the superior court refused to dismiss the indictment, the petitiober requested the 
Supreme Judicial Court to review the case under its supervisory powers as detailed in G.L. c. 
211, § 3. ld. at 1133-34, 405 N.E.2d at 145-46. 
21 ld. at 1134, 405 N.E.2d at 146. 
" 370 Mass. at 283, 347 N.E.2d at 685. As for other factors the court should consider in its 
decision, the statute provides in part: 
If the court so finds, the court shall then consider, but shall not be limited to, evidence 
of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (b) the child's family, school and social 
history, including his court and juvenile delinquency record, if any; (c) adequate protec-
tion of the public; (d) the nature of any past treatment efforts for the child, and (e) the 
likelihood of rehabilitation of the child. 
G.L. c. 119, § 61. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1139-40, 405 N.E.2d at 149. 
24 ld. at 1140, 405 N.E.2d at 149. 
" ld. at 1139, 405 N.E.2d at 149. 
26 ld. at 1139-40, 405 N.E.2d at 149. 
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pects for rehabilitation. 27 The Supreme Judicial Court had held expressly in 
its 1976 opinion that although the factors of the seriousness of the crime 
and the public's safety are relevant to the transfer decision, they are inade-
quate in themselves to support a transfer order. zs Rather, the Court 
required a finding that the juvenile either could not be rehabilitated within 
the present juvenile system, or that the juvenile posed a serious threat to the 
public in the absence of long-term supervision and security. 29 Subsidiary 
findings were also required to indicate the basis for such a conclusion. 30 In 
the present case, the Court observed that a statement by the juvenile court 
that the D.Y.S. offered no treatment for sexual offenders may have been 
relevant to the issue of rehabilitation. 31 Nevertheless, because such 
statements were not reconciled with the earlier hopeful indications, the 
Court characterized the juvenile court's findings as ambiguous. 32 Such an 
ambigu.ous report by the court failed to constitute sufficient subsidiary find-
ings to support the conclusion that the petitioner was not amenable to 
rehabilitation. 33 The Court therefore found that because of the absence of 
such findings, the transfer order was without justification. 34 
The infirmities in the transfer procedure, however, did not result in 
dismissal of the criminal indictment against the petitioner. Instead, the in-
dictment remained in place provisionally while the juvenile court was re-
quested to clarify its findings in light of the Court's decision. 35 If the revised 
" ld. at 1139, 405 N.E.2d at 149. 
" In A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 282-83,347 N.E.2d 677,685 (1976), the 
Court stated: 
/d. 
However, we do not believe that a decision to transfer is proper when supported by 
findings which deal only with the seriousness of the charge and the inadequacy of ex-
isting juvenile facilities in terms of safeguarding the public. Despite the importance of 
these two factors and the weight that they may have in support of a conclusion that 
there should be a transfer to adult court, there must also be a finding that the juvenile 
cannot be rehabilitated within the present juvenile structure, or that, in the absence of 
long-term supervision and security, he poses a serious threat to the public, with sub-
sidiary findings indicating the basis for this conclusion. It cannot be assumed that the 
nature of the offense demonstrates the need for treatment beyond available juvenile 
facilities, for this assumption would imply that juvenile facilities will be adequate only if 
a child is charged with a minor offense and that, by definition, serious offenders must 
be denied the statutory protections afforded juveniles. Such a conclusion ignores the 
rehabilitative purposes of our statutes relating to delinquent children and, in effect, 
restricts without legislative sanction our juvenile system to the treatment of minor of-
fenders. 
" id. at 282, 347 N.E.2d at 685 . 
•• /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1140, 405 N.E.2d at 149 . 
.. /d. 
" /d. at 1139, 405 N.E.2d at 148-49. 
"ld. 
" /d. at 1141, 405 N.E.2d at 150. 
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findings failed to show adequate cause for transfer, the indictment was to 
be dismissed. 36 If the findings indicated otherwise, the indictment was to 
stand and the petitioner to face trial. 37 The Court concluded that the 
"lesson to be learned" from the decision is that "in the relatively few cases 
in the juvenile courts in which the transfer question arises, the proof should 
be full, and in the still fewer cases where transfer is ordered, the findings 
should express the judge's decision in fair detail and with logical 
cohesion. " 38 
The Court's opinion in A Juvenile v. Commonwealth is responsive to the 
policies formulated by the Massachusetts legislature regarding the juvenile 
justice system. The decision to transfer a juvenile proceeding to criminal 
court affects important statutory rights of the juvenile. If treated as a 
juvenile, the individual would have no criminal record, 39 would not be dis-
qualified from public service, 40 would be eligible for rehabilitation under 
the care and guidance of the Youth Service Board, 41 and would be discharged 
at the age of eighteen unless there is a finding that his discharge would be 
physically dangerous to the public. 42 
The Massachusetts legislature has made it clear that non-criminal treat-
ment of juvenile offenders is the favored approach. 43 Consequently, the 
Court has stated in the past that a transfer should be ordered only when 
warranted by exceptional circumstances. 44 That the juvenile is accused of a 
serious crime and may pose a threat to the public does not, without more, 
constitute such "exceptional circumstances. " 4 ' Rather, an exceptional cir-
cumstance is the juvenile's non-amenability to rehabilitation, as found in an 
explicit, detailed statement by the court. 46 
Unless a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation, a decision to try his 
case in a criminal proceeding contradicts the purpose of the juvenile justice 
system. The underlying concept of "juvenile justice" is that a juvenile 
delinquent is fundamentally different from his adult counterpart. 47 The 
juvenile is viewed as more deserving of help than punishment, primarily 
because his character is seen as more malleable than that of a hardened 




•• ld. at 1142, 405 N.E.2d at 150. 
40 G.L.·c. 119, § 53. 
" Id. § 60. 
" Id. § 58, and c. 120. 
" ld. c. 120, §§ 16, 17. 
" Id. c. 119, §53. See note 1 supra. 
" 370 Mass. at 281-82, 347 N.E.2d at 684. 
" Id. at 282, 347 N.E.2d at 685 . 
., Id. 
•• Institute of Judicial Administration/ American Bar Association, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS at 3 (1977) 
(hereinafter cited as Juvenile Justice Standards Project). 26
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juvenile can be diverted from the punitive criminal justice system into a 
juvenile justice system designed solely to rehabilitate and not to punish. 49 
Under this philosophy, the only proper justification for a transfer to 
criminal court is a finding that neither the juvenile nor society could profit 
from utilizing the juvenile justice system because the child is not amenable 
to rehabilitation. 
The Court's decision that the juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation 
must be supported by subsidiary findings is also consistent with the policies 
of the legislature regarding juvenile justice. Requiring a judge to provide 
subsidiary findings which support the transfer order prevents the order 
from being based upon improper considerations such as the seriousness of 
the crime, protection of the public, or any other subjective criterion which 
may influence a judge. Detailed subsidiary findings will ensure that a con-
clusion of non-amenability to rehabilitation is supported by facts relevant 
only to the issue of rehabilitation. Expert evaluations of the accused's 
background, his emotional and psychological condition, as well as an ex-
amination of the dispositional alternatives available to the court would all 
be relevant to such a decision. In addition, if it is the juvenile facilities 
themselves which make rehabilitation seem unlikely, a transfer order based 
explicitly on those inadequacies may focus attention on the problem and en-
courage reform. so In contrast, findings which refer only to the seriousness 
of the crime and protection of the public, as in A Juvenile v. Com-
monwealth, are inadequate to support a transfer order since they do not 
pertain to the question of rehabilitation. s 1 
In summary, the Court's decision in A Juvenile v. Commonwealth is in 
keeping with the policies of the Massachusetts legislature regarding the 
juvenile justice system. The system was created in order to furnish juveniles 
with an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. That opportunity should not 
be foreclosed unless it appears clear that attempts at rehabilitation would be 
fruitless. 
§ 4.5. The Officer Safety Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule.* 
When making an entry into a dwelling house, police ordinarily must knock, 
identify themselves, and state their purpose. 1 This requirement rests in part 
•• Id. at n.35. See also, J. Gasper and D. Katkin, A Rationale for the Abolition of the 
Juvenile Court's Power to Waive Jurisdiction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 937, 951 (1980). 
•• Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 48, at 6. The Commission noted that 
" ... the criminal justice system is so inhumane, so poorly financed and staffed, and so general-
ly destructive that the juvenile court cannot do worse." I d. 
" Id. at 41. Commenting on the validity of a transfer order supported by a bare finding of 
nonamenability Judge Bazelon noted, "Perhaps it is only by searching for what we need but do 
not have that future improvements in knowledge and resources can be hoped for." Haziel v. 
United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
*By Donald M. Keller, Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 4.5 ' See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970) [hereinafter 
cited as Yale Note]; Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitu-
tional Problem, 44 ~T. JOHN'S L. REV. 626 (1970). 27
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
140 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.5 
on the principle that every individual is entitled to protection from surprise 
invasions of the privacy of his home. 2 An exception to this rule recognized 
in many jurisdictions, however, allows police to omit the announcement of 
their identity and purpose if exposure of their identity would endanger their 
safety. 3 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized this 
exception for the first time in Commonwealth v. Cundriff. 4 
In Cundriff, defendant Jamie Cundriff and three companions entered a 
hairdressing salon armed with guns. s They took money, jewelry and other 
items including a backgammon set. 6 Soon after the robbery, the police ar-
rested the defendant's brother, Cedric Cundriff, and found several objects 
from the robbery in his possession. 7 Two months after the incident, police 
officers went to defendant Jamie Cundriff's home with an arrest warrant. 8 
When they knocked on the door, a woman asked "Who is it?" 9 One officer 
answered "School bus." 10 The woman opened the door and the officers 
rushed into the apartment, arrested Jamie Cundriff and seized a backgam-
mon set. 11 
At trial for the robbery of the hair salon, defendant Jamie Cundriff moved 
to suppress the backgammon set as evidence, arguing that the police officers 
unlawfully entered Cundriff's apartment without first announcing their 
identity and purpose. 12 In ruling on the motion, the trial judge acknowledged 
the general common law rule that officers must knock and announce before 
entering a dwelling. 13 The judge found, however, that because an announce-
ment under these circumstances would have endangered lives, the officers 
were justified in failing to make one. 14 The Supreme Judicial Court granted 
the defendant's request for direct appellate review of the trial court's 
ruling. 15 
The Court examined the trial judge's finding that there had been a strong 
possibility that an announcement by the police would have endangered the 
officers' lives. The Court determined that the finding was supported by the 
' See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 152-53; Oysted v. Shed, l3 Mass. 520, 523 (1816). 
' Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822) (the first American case to recognize an officer safe-
ty exception to the knock-and-announce rule); United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2519, 2529, 415 N.E.2d 172, 178. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2519, 415 N.E.2d 172. 
• Id. at 2520, 415 N.E.2d at 173. 
7 ld. 
' ld. at 2520, 415 N.E.2d at 174. 






" Id. at 2520, 415 N.E.2d at 173. 
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evidence suggesting that the defendant had participated in an armed rob-
bery and by the testimony of the police indicating that they had considered 
the defendant armed and dangerous. 16 Accordingly, the Court recognized 
that under such circumstances an exception to the common law knock-and-
announce rule should allow the police to fail to identify themselves and to 
fail to state their purpose." 
In reaching its decision, the Court initially surveyed the history of the 
common law knock-and-announce rule and observed that three factors 
spurred the development of the rule in England. 18 First, the rule was intend-
ed to limit violence resulting from homeowners attempting to protect their 
property from unannounced intruders. 19 A policeman's knock and an-
nouncement notified homeowners that the person at their door did not in-
tend to commit a crime against their person or property. Second, the rule 
protected the peace, tranquility and privacy of a homeowner. 2° Finally, the 
rule sought to prevent policemen from destroying windows and doors to 
gain entrance to a dwelling21 while executing warrants. The CundriffCourt 
maintained that these justifications for the rule are as legitimate today as 
they were in the past. 22 
The Court then examined an exception to this rule which has developed in 
American law. The Court noted that as early as 1822, American courts had 
recognized that a knock and an announcement are unnecessary if an officer 
has reason to believe that an announcement would present imminent danger 
to human life. 23 In addition, the Court observed that the California 
Supreme Court had applied this exception to situations where an announce-
ment would increase the officer's peril or would frustrate the arrest. 24 
In light of this background, the Court examined the status of the rule and 
this exception in Massachusetts. The Court's analysis revealed that early 
Massachusetts cases had adhered strictly to the common law announcement 
rule. 25 These cases also demonstrated, however, that the Court had never 
" /d. at 2529, 4I5 N.E.2d at 178. 
" Id. 
" Id. at 2522, 415 N.E.2d at 174. 
19 /d. See 2 F. POLLOCH & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 4I (2d ed. 
1899). 
•• I980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2522, 4I5 N.E.2d at 174. 
" /d. at 2522-23, 415 N.E.2d at 175. See Lee v. Gansel, 98 Eng. Rep. 935, 938 (K.B. 1774). 
In Gansel the court stated that failing to protect against breaking doors and windows would 
"leave the family within, naked and exposed to thieves and robbers." /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2528, 415 N.E.2d at 177. 
" /d. at 2528, 415 N.E.2d at 178. See Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2528, 415 N.E.2d at 178. See People v. Maddex, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 
306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2527-28,415 N.E.2d at 177. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 
Mass. 190, 196 (1876); Oysted v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520, 523 (1816). 
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had the chance to accept or reject the officer safety exception to the rule. 
Accordingly, the Court used the opportunity presented by the Cundriff case 
to endorse more completely the common law development of the rule by ap-
plying the exception to the circumstances in the Cundriffcase. Specifically, 
the Court held that whenever police attempt to enter a dwelling house with 
reason to fear for their safety, or for the safety of others, they may utilize 
the exception by failing to identify themselves and their purpose. 26 
Although the Court implied that its decision merely recognizes a widely 
accepted exception to the knock-and-announce rule, the case actually carves 
a broader exception than the widely accepted version. The Court based its 
holding on both the evidence suggesting that the defendant had participated 
in an armed robbery and the police testimony stating that they had con-
sidered the defendant armed and dangerous. 27 Since such police testimony 
should logically follow from any armed robbery, the decision rests primari-
ly on the evidence of the defendant's participation in the armed robbery. 
Thus, in effect, police in Massachusetts no longer need to knock and an-
nounce their purpose when attempting to arrest a suspected armed robber in 
his home. 
The authorities cited by the Court to achieve this result, however, do not 
support such a broad application of the officer safety exception to the 
knock-and-announce rule. For example, in reaching its decision, the Court 
cited Read v. Case, 28 the first case to apply this exception to the knock-and-
announce rule. In Read, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors excused 
a failure to announce after finding that the occupant of the invaded home 
previously had indicated to authorities that he would not give himself up 
and would use his gun to protect himself if an arrest were attempted. 29 The 
Read court explained that the knock-and-announce rule would be distorted 
if the court were to extend the rule's benefits to a defendant who had full 
knowledge of the information he contended should have been com-
municated to him and ''who waited only for a demand, to wreak on his bail 
the most brutal and unhallowed vengeance. " 30 Thus, the Read v. Case ex-
ception to the knock-and-announce rule does not extend to every situation 
in which a man is believed to have participated in an armed robbery. In-
stead, the result in Read turns on the home occupant's knowledge ofthe im-
pending arrest and the police officer's knowledge of likely armed resistance 
to that arrest. 
In the two more recent cases that the Cundriff Court cited to support its 
decision, the circumstances again more clearly suggest danger to the ar-
26 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2529, 415 N.E.2d at 178. 
" Id. 
" 4 Conn. 166 (1822). 
" I d. at 167. 
•• Id. at 170. 
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resting officers from identifying their presence and purpose than do the cir-
cumstances in Commonwealth v. Cundriff. For example, the Court cited 
Gilbert v. United States31 where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
approved an unannounced entry into an apartment thought to contain one 
or two armed suspects. 32 The entry took place within hours of a bank rob-
bery and the shooting death of a policeman. 33 The Gilbert court held that 
failure to announce must be excused "where to require it would create 
palpable peril to the life or limb of the arresting officers. " 34 The Cundriff 
Court also cited United States v. Scott, 3 s where the Ninth Circuit again ex-
cused the failure of the police to announce their purpose, although they did 
knock and announce their identity, when the police were in pursuit of 
suspected armed robbers two hours after the crime. 36 
Both Gilbert and Scott allowed exceptions to the knock-and-announce 
rule in circumstances of fresh pursuit of armed robbers or murderers. While 
the Court in Commonwealth v. Cundriffuses these two cases to support its 
decision, the facts of Cundriff are significantly different from the facts of 
Gilbert and Scott. Unlike the officers in Gilbert and in Scott, the officers in 
Cundriff were not in fresh pursuit. Rather, they approached Cundriff's 
home early in the morning two months after the robbery. It was, therefore, 
much less likely in Cundriff that the officers would confront armed 
criminals ready to respond to an arrest attempt than would the officers in 
Gilbert and Scott. Indeed, in Cundrifj, the officer's response of "school 
bus" 37 to the specific request to identify himself, indicated that the officers 
expected the Cundriff family to be preparing their daughter for school, 
rather than preparing to resist an arrest. 
Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Cundriff has 
recognized for the first time not only an officer safety exception to the 
knock-and-announce rule, but also has endorsed the exception's application 
in more extended circumstances than those generally recognized in other 
jurisdictions. While the lack of an announcement may have avoided a 
danger to the officers in Cundriff, the Court in future cases should ar-
ticulate with greater care the circumstances required to excuse an officer's 
knock and announcement. Unless the decision is clarified and limited, 
Cundriff erodes the knock-and-announce rule and invites repeated unwar-
ranted invasions of a home dweller's privacy. 
" 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968). 
" 366 F .2d at 932. 
" /d. at 929. 
" /d. at 932. 
" 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976), cited in 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 2529, 415 N.E.2d at 178. 
" 520 F.2d at 700-0l. 
" See text and notes at note 10 supra. 
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§ 4.6. The Abolition of the Year-and-a-Day Rule - Ex Post Facto 
Laws.* At common law, an indictment for homicide would not stand if the 
victim had died more than a year and a day after the alleged wrongdoing. • 
This "year-and-a-day" rule developed during a period in which it was dif-
ficult to establish a line of causation between a criminal act and a death 
which occurred more than a year and a day after the criminal act. 2 In this 
respect, one commentator suggested in 1909 that the rule "was a wise 
precaution in view of the defectiveness of medical science in medieval 
days. " 3 While many jurisdictions still support this rule, 4 a significant 
number of jurisdictions recognize that the rule has been rendered 
anachronistic by advances in medical sciences that allow a victim's life to be 
sustained for relatively long periods of time. s To reflect modern medical ex-
periences, the legislature in at least one jurisdiction has extended the 
allowable time period between the alleged act and the victim's death. 6 
Following similar logic, courts in other jurisdictions have repealed the rule 
completely. 7 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Com-
monwealth v. Lewis, 8 placed Massachusetts with the growing group of 
jurisdictions that have abolished the rule. 
In Lewis, the Court reviewed the homicide indictments pending against 
defendant Lewis and three co-defendants. 9 The Court also considered a 
murder charge against defendant Phillips in a consolidated case, Common-
wealth v. Phillips. 10 Defendant Lewis and his three companions allegedly 
assaulted their victim on April 19, 1976;•• the victim died on May 30, 
1978. 12 Phillips was indicted for murder after an assault on October 22, 
*By Donald M. Keller, Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.6 ' See generally Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230,232 (1894); Note, 
The Year and a Day Rule: Has Its Time Run Out?, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 683, 683-84 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as The Year and a Day Rule]. 
' See State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 94-95, 318 A.2d 257, 259-60 (1974). 
' KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1909), cited in State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 
91, 95, 318 A.2d 257, 260 (1974). 
• The Year and a Day Rule, supra note 1, at 685. This note, published in 1978, lists twenty-
five jurisdictions that still support the rule. See Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. 
1959). 
'See, e.g., State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405,412-14,372 A.2d 117, 1121 (1977); Com-
monwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 173-74, 166 A.2d 501, 506-07 (1960). 
• The California legislature extended the rule to three years and a day. Cal. Penal Code § 
194 (West 1970). The Washington legislature also extended the rule to three years and a day, 
Wash. Rev. Code§ 9.48.010 (1972 Supp.) (repealed 1975), but later deleted the length require-
ment from its statutory definition of homicide. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.32.010 (1977). 
' State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. at 412-14, 372 A.2d at 1121; Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 
Pa. at 173-74, 166 A.2d at 506-07. 
' Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1973, 1980-81, 409 N.E.2d 771, 775-76. 
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1977, which resulted in the victim's death on April27, 1979. 13 During each 
trial, the respective defendants moved to dismiss the indictments because 
the victims had died more than a year and a day after the attacks. 14 Upon 
hearing these motions, the trial court in Lewis and in Phillips reported ques-
tions of law to the Appeals Court as to whether the indictments could be 
maintained lawfully. 1s Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court, upon its 
own initiative, granted a request for direct review of the question in 
Phillips, and ordered direct review of the motion in Lewis. 16 
In its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court first noted that it previously 
had expressed severe doubts about the modern day utility of the year and a 
day rule in Commonwealth v. Golston. 11 The Lewis Court then reiterated its 
concern that the rule fails to reflect present day medical ability to prolong 
and sustain life after severe trauma. 18 Thus, the Court found the rule to be 
"senselessly indulgent toward homicidal malefactors." 19 Before abolishing 
the rule, however, the Court considered whether it could do so without 
violating the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 20 
In considering the ex post facto law issue, the Court first surveyed other 
jurisdictions for their reactions to the year-and-a-day rule. The survey in-
dicated that the year-and-a-day rule still exists in many jurisdictions. 21 In 
explaining why many jurisdictions retain the rule, the Court noted that 




' Id. at 1973, 409 N.E.2d at 771. 
16 Id. 
17 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977). In Golston, the Court stated that "[w]e take this 
occasion to announce that if the point [the year and a day rule] comes before us we shall feel 
free to reexamine the justification for the rule." Id. at 255, 366 N.E.2d at 749. The Court 
avoided deciding whether the rule should be abolished by deciding that the victim's brain 
death, which occurred within days of Golston's assault, constituted the victim's death for the 
purposes of the homicide indictment. Id. at 253-55, 366 N.E.2d at 748-49. The defendant had 
argued that under the "heart death" standard the victim might have survived beyond a year 
and a day. /d. 
18 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1976-77, 409 N.E.2d at 773. 
19 ld. 
" Id. at 1978-80,409 N.E.2d at 774-75. Although the Court did not specify the source of the 
ex post facto law problems, ex post facto laws are prohibited by both the United States Con-
stitution and the Massachusetts Constitution. The United States Constitution declares that 
"No state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law .... U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Massa-
chusetts Constitution provides that: 
Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws and which have 
not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent 
with the fundamental principles of a free government. 
Mass. Const. part I, art. 24. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1977, 409 N.E.2d at 773. See note 4 supra. 
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to their legislatures to alter this longstanding common law rule. 22 Neverthe-
less, the Court noted that courts in a number of jurisdictions recently have 
abolished or altered the rule. 23 
The Court then examined the decisions from other jurisdictions that have 
abolished the year-and-a-day rule. 24 In many of these cases, courts deter-
mined whether the rule could be replaced retroactively to the case they were 
considering or whether retroactive abolition would violate prohibitions 
against ex post facto laws. 25 A few courts abolished the rule retroactively 
after characterizing the year-and-a-day rule as a rule of evidence rather than 
of substance. 26 Changes in rules of evidence, one court maintained, do not 
invoke the rule against ex post facto laws. 27 The Court in Lewis, however, 
considered this distinction artificial and, therefore, refused to allow this 
distinction to determine the outcome of the case. 28 The Court also rejected a 
requirement of justified reliance on the rule by the defendant - a require-
ment the defendants in these cases clearly could not meet. 29 Instead, the 
Court focused on the policy behind the ex post facto law prohibition, which 
· is to discourage badly motivated or erratic action by a lawmaker. 30 Thus, 
the Court concluded that the year-and-a-day rule should continue only to 
the point where the Court declared the rule vulnerable. 31 As a result, acts 
committed prior to the Court's statements in Commonwealth v. Golston 
concerning the rule's vulnerability continue to receive the protection of the 
rule, but acts committed after Golston are no longer guarded by this time 
limitation. 32 Consequently, because the Court had decided Commonwealth 
v. Golston on August 26, 1977,33 and the assault in Lewis was committed on 
April19, 1976/4 the Court dismissed the murder charges against Lewis and 
his co-defendants. 35 Phillips, however, attacked his victim on October 22, 
1977.36 Hence, the Court allowed the homicide indictment against him to 
stand. 37 
22 /d. 
" /d. at 1977-79, 409 N.E.2d at 773-74. See text and notes at notes 5-7 supra. 
24 /d. 
" /d. at 1978, 409 N.E.2d at 774. 
26 People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 746-48, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9-10 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 169-73, 166 A.2d 501, 505-07 (1960). 
" People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 746-48, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1980, 409 N.E.2d at 775. 
" /d . 
•• /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 1981, 409 N.E.2d at 776. 
" 373 Mass. at 249, 366 N.E.2d at 744. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1974, 409 N.E.2d at 772. 
" /d. at 1981, 409 N.E.2d at 776. 
" /d. at 1974, 409 N.E.2d at 772. 
" /d. at 1981, 409 N.E.2d at 776. 
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Although the Court in Lewis abolished the year-and-a-day rule, the Court 
did not foreclose the possibility of a similar rule with a longer time limita-
tion. The Court acknowledged that there are competing interests in 
homicide cases where the victim has died an appreciable time after the 
wrongdoing. First, there is the commonwealth's interest in punishing those 
who commit homicide. 38 Opposing this interest is the accused's right to be 
protected from stale claims of homicide. 39 In reaching its decision, the 
Court noted that the striking of a balance between these interests, by setting 
a time limit between the wrongful act and the victim's death, is characteris-
tically within the province of the legislature. 40 The Court also mentioned, 
however, that if the legislature is inactive, the time limit could be set by the 
Courts. 41 In the Lewis case, the Court did not set a time limit. Rather, it 
allowed homicide defendants, including defendant Phillips, only the right 
to challenge causation. 42 
While the result in Lewis may appear inequitable because it treats defend-
ant Phillips different from the defendants in the Lewis case, the decision is, 
nevertheless, consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing the ex post facto law doctrine. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that "if a judicial construction of a criminal statute is 
unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed 
prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect. " 43 In a 
more recent decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the maxim that, for a 
retroactive change in the law to be upheld, the change must be expected. 
The Court again noted that the ex post facto law prohibition is based on 
"the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which 
will give rise to criminal penalties. " 44 Consistent with these principles, the 
Lewis Court abolished the year-and-a-day rule only against defendant 
Phillips, who clearly could have foreseen this change in the law. Even 
though the defendants in the Lewis case did not rely on the year-and-a-day 
rule, they were not given fair warning concerning the abolition of the rule. 
Hence, abolishing the rule in their case would have violated constitutional 
requirements involving ex post facto laws. 
" /d. at 1980-81, 409 N.E.2d at 775. 




" Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). In Bouie, the Court reversed the South 
Carolina State Supreme Court's retroactive application of its new judicial construction of a 
statute which rendered the petitioner's act in Bouie criminal. /d. at 349-51. The Court stated 
that retroactive application of the new interpretation of the statute would violate the peti-
tioner's right to fair warning. /d. at 363. 
" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977). In Marks, the Supreme Court determined 
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment precludes retroactive application of obscen-
35
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Once the Court in Lewis satisfied the ex post facto law considerations, the 
Court did not show a reluctance to abolish the year-and-a-day rule judicial-
ly. In a similar fashion, the Court in recent years has removed the distinc-
tion between an invitee and a licensee in determining the duty of a land-
owner in a negligence action45 and has abrogated the doctrine of municipal 
and governmental immunity against recovery for personal injuries and con-
sequential damages. 46 In Lewis, the Court again has evidenced both its will-
ingness to change outdated, longstanding common law rules, and its wish to 
avoid undesirable results while awaiting legislative action. 
§ 4. 7. Mental Abnormality Precluding Capacity to Premeditate.* Mas-
sachusetts long has permitted evidence of a defendant's abnormal mental 
condition to be introduced at trial to show the defendant's legal insanity at 
the time the charged act was committed. 1 An appropriate showing of legal 
insanity operates as a complete defense to the crime charged. 2 Prior to the 
Survey year, however, Massachusetts courts had held consistently that 
evidence of an abnormal mental condition not rising to the level of legal in-
sanity could not be considered by the trier of fact for any purpose. 3 Thus, 
mental incapacity was viewed as an aU-or-nothing defense. 4 If a defendant's 
mental condition was sufficiently severe, then he would be acquitted by 
reason of insanity. s If a defendant's mental abnormality did not rise to this 
level, however, he would be held fully responsible for the crime charged. 6 
The law afforded no lenience to the mentally impaired defendant who could 
not establish his legal insanity. 
ity standards which were announced after the petitioner's violation of those standards. /d. at 
189-97. 
" Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 706-09, 297 N.E.2d 43, 50-52 (1973). 
•• Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 210, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 212 (1977). In addition, the 
Court has held that a mother can recover for witnessing the wrongful death of her child. 
Dziokonski v. Babinean, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 N.E.2d 1297. The Court has also held 
that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Mone v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 355, 331 N.E.2d 916, 917 (1975). 
*By Frederick F. Eisenbiegler, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.7 ' See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844). 
' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattson, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 818, 825, 387 N.E.2d 546, 550; 
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-48, 226 N.E.2d 556, 557-58 (1967). 
' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 547, 350 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177, 185, 274 N.E.2d 802, 807-08 (1971); Commonwealth v. 
Cooper, 219 Mass. I, 4-6, 106 N.E. 545, 547 (1914). 
• See Diminished Capacity, -Recent Decisions and an Analytic Approach, 30 VAND. L. 
REv., 213, 214-15, 222-24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Diminished Capacity]; W. LAFAVE, 
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 327 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LaFave]. 
' See Diminished Capacity, supra note 4, at 214-15, 222-24; LaFave, supra note 4, at 327 . 
• !d. 
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The rule that a sane defendant's mental abnormality may not be con-
sidered by the trier of fact in assessing criminal liability had withstood a 
series of challenges during the past decade. On several occasions, defend-
ants had sought to introduce evidence of mental abnormality short of legal 
insanity in order to show that they had been incapable of the mental state of 
deliberate premeditation required for first degree murder. These defendants 
had argued that, because they had lacked the capacity to premeditate 
deliberately, verdicts of only second degree murder or manslaughter could 
be returned. In response to each of these arguments, the Supreme Judicial 
Court had maintained its position that a defendant's mental condition 
could be considered only in the context of an insanity defense. 7 The rule 
that evidence of an abnormal mental condition not amounting to legal in-
sanity was inadmissible for any purpose was not easily reconcilable with 
prior decisions of the Court concerning the effect of voluntary intoxication 
in first degree murder cases. Those decisions established that if a defendant 
was incapable of deliberate premeditation due to his voluntary use of 
alcohol or drugs, then he could not be found guilty of murder in the first 
degree, but he could be found guilty of murder in the second degree. 8 The 
rationale for these cases was apparently the same as that which underlies the 
insanity defense: a defendant may not be found guilty of a crime unless his 
act is accompanied by the mental state which is an element of that crime. 9 
During the Survey year, the Court once again had. occasion to decide 
whether the mental condition of a defendant charged with first degree 
murder should be admissible to show that the defendant did not have suffi-
cient mental capacity to deliberate and premeditate. In Commonwealth v. 
Gould, 10 the Court held that juries may consider mental impairment in 
' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. at 547, 350 N.E.2d at 465 (Court rejected 
defendant's argument that evidence of his mental disease should be admissible in order to 
prove that he was incapable of deliberate premeditation); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 
at 185, 274 N.E.2d at 807-08 (Court rejected the contention of a defendant charged with 
murder that a verdict of no greater than manslaughter was warranted if the jury found that 
diminished mental capacity not amounting to legal insanity rendered defendant incapable of 
harboring malice aforethought). 
• Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177, 186, 274 N.E.2d 802, 808 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 617-18, 84 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (1949); Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 263 Mass. 356, 361-63, 161 N.E. 245, 247-48 (1928). 
' Compare Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844) (describing the act 
of an insane person "as not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body 
without the concurrence of a mind directing it.") with Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 
30, 34, 313 N.E.2d 875, 878 (1974) (stating that the rule that voluntary intoxication may render 
defendant incapable of deliberate premeditation and thus not guilty of murder in the first 
degree "is merely an application of the ordinary rules of law pertaining to the requisite mental 
state for conviction of a particular crime charged.'') 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253, 405 N.E.2d 927 (1980). 
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determining whether the defendant entertained the specific intent required 
for murder in the first degree. 11 In so holding, the Court departed from the 
prior Massachusetts rule which had permitted evidence of a defendant's ab-
normal mental condition to be considered by the jury only for the purpose 
of establishing the defendant's legal sanity. After Gould, if a defendant can 
show that his impaired mental condition precluded him from deliberating 
and premeditating the acts charged, he can thereby avoid a conviction for 
first degree murder. The Gould opinion leaves open, however, the question 
of whether evidence of mental impairment may be introduced to negate the 
element of specific intent in crimes other than first degree murder. 
The facts of Gould presented the issue of whether a defendant could be 
held incapable at deliberating and premeditating a killing due to his mental 
impairment, despite evidence that he planned the murder and intended to 
kill the victim. The defendant in Gould fatally stabbed his former girlfriend 
outside a nursing home where she had worked. 12 Witnesses had observed 
Gould keeping the nursing home under surveillance from a covert position 
one and a half hours before the stabbing. 13 Another witness named 
McPherson saw the defendant attack the victim and shouted at Gould to 
stop. 14 Upon hearing McPherson, Gould dropped the knife and allowed 
McPherson to seat him some distance from the victim. 15 McPherson then 
left the defendant to get help for the victim. 16 When he returned, the defend-
ant again was stabbing the victim. 17 McPherson again told the defendant to 
sit down away from the victim. 11 The defendant did so and remained there 
until the police came. 1' 
At trial on a charge of first degree murder, uncontradicted evidence 
established that the defendant had had a long-standing and constant delu-
sional belief system. 20 Both the commonwealth and the defense produced 
expert testimony which was addressed solely to the issue of the defendant's 
" Id. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
12 /d. at 1253, 1254-55, 405 N.E.2d at 927, 928. 
" /d., 405 N.E.2d at 928. 
14 /d. 





•• Id. at 1256, 405 N.E.2d at 929. Expert testimony in the record defined a delusional belief 
system as a false set of beliefs which distort reality and which cannot be reasoned away. Id. at 
1256 n.5, 405 N.E.2d at 929 n.5. 
The defendant believed he was the Messiah and the savior of the Jewish people. He also 
believed he was required by God to kill the victim as part of his divine mission and because she 
was "impure." Id. at 1256, 405 N.E.2d at 929. Between 1973 and 1978, the defendant had been 
admitted to various institutions for the mentally ill.Id. at 1257 & n.6, 405 N.E.2d at 929 & n.6. 
As a result of treatment with drugs and psychotherapy, Gould was better able to think and to 
perceive reality, but he never abandoned his delusional beliefs./d. at 1257,405 N.E.2d at 929. 
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criminal responsibility. 21 The commonwealth's expert diagnosed the defend-
ant's mental illness as paranoid psychosis. 22 Despite the defendant's state-
ment in interviews with the expert that, as to the killing, he could not "say 
whether it was wrong or it was right," but could "only sanctify it," the ex-
pert concluded that the defendant was legally sane and criminally responsi-
ble. 23 The defense produced as experts two psychiatrists, both of whom 
stated that the defendant was suffering from a severe and long-standing 
mental illness, which they termed paranoid schizophrenia. 24 Both experts 
opined that this was a "clear-cut" and "straightforward" case of lack of 
criminal responsibility. 25 After hearing the evidence and expert testimony, 
the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree. 26 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued that as a 
result of his mental abnormality he could not form the specific intent re-
quired for murder in the first degree. 27 The Court framed the issue before it 
as whether a jury may properly consider a defendant's long-standing mental 
illness in determining whether the defendant was capable of deliberating 
and premeditating the acts charged. 28 The Court began its discussion by 
noting that under its previous decisions, 29 if a defendant was found to be 
" /d. at 1258, 405 N.E.2d at 930-31. 
" /d. at 1257, 405 N.E.2d at 930. Every other doctor who examined the defendant both 
before and after the crime diagnosed his illness as paranoid schizophrenia. /d. at 1257 n.8, 405 
N.E.2d at 930 n.8. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth's expert admitted that the 
defendant's mental illness "may even be schizophrenia," but maintained that he would need 
further evidence before he would change his diagnosis. /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1257,405 N.E.2d at 930. The Commonwealth's expert concluded 
that the defendant appreciated at the moment of the homicide that his act was "immoral, 
wrong and a criminal and illegal thing to do," and that "he was capable of controlling his 
behavior to such an extent that he could have stopped himself from doing it." /d. at 1258, 405 
N.E.2d at 930. 
,. /d. at 1258, 405 N.E.2d at 930. 
" /d. 
26 Id. at 1253, 405 N.E.2d at 927. 
" /d. at 1259, 405 N.E.2d at 931. The defendant urged the Court to exercise its supervisory 
power under G.L. c. 273, § 33E to either grant him a new trial or reduce his conviction to 
murder in the second degree. /d. at 1253-54, 1260, 405 N.E.2d at 928, 931. 
Although it found no error at trial, the Court, pursuant to its power under section 33E, 
determined that the defendant was entitled to a new trial at which he could produce expert 
testimony on the issue of whether the impairment of his mental processes precluded him from 
being able to deliberate and premeditate. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1253-54, 1261,405 N.E.2d at 
928, 932. 
" /d. at 1261, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177, 186, 274 N.E.2d 802, 808 (1971) (rule 
that if the jury found the defendant "so affected by his voluntary use of harmful drugs and 
narcotics as to be incapable of deliberate premeditation, then the jury would be warranted in 
returning verdicts no greater than guilty of murder in the second degree."); Commonwealth v. 
Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 617-18, 84 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (1949) (capacity for deliberate premedi-
tation precluded because of voluntary intoxication). 
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incapable of deliberately premeditating the acts charged due to his volun-
tary use of alcohol or drugs, then he could not be convicted of first degree 
murder. 30 Under the same line of cases, however, the Court noted that such 
defendants could be found guilty of second degree murder. 31 Some previous 
cases had intimated that reducing the verdict from first degree murder to 
some lesser offense when the defendant was incapable of premeditation was 
based on the law's "kindness" to him in that situation. 32 According to the 
Court in Gould, however, the rule of its prior decisions had been based on 
an application of the ordinary rules of law pertaining to the requisite mental 
state for conviction of the particular crime charged, 33 and had not been 
based on "kindness." 
Having made clear the logical foundation for its rule in cases involving 
the voluntary use of liquor and drugs, the Court proceeded to bring 
evidence of a defendant's abnormal mental condition within the ambit of 
that logic. The Court stated that it could find "no justifiable reason to treat 
the effect of the defendant's involuntary mental illness on his capacity for 
deliberate premeditation in a manner different from the effect of the volun-
tary use of liquor or drugs. " 34 The commonwealth had argued, in reliance 
on the Court's prior rulings, that evidence of a defendant's mental illness 
was admissible only on the issue of criminal responsibility, and not on the 
issue of specific intent or the degree of murder. 3S The Court rejected this 
contention, and stated that to the extent its prior cases were inconsistent 
with Gould, it would no longer follow those cases. 36 The Court emphasized 
the logical incongruity of holding that while the crime of murder in the first 
degree can be committed only after deliberate thought or premeditated 
malice, the crime might nevertheless be committed by one lacking the 
capacity to think deliberately or rationally. 37 
The Court also was satisfied that psychiatric testimony would be compe-
tent to determine whether the defendant was capable of forming the specific 
intent required for the commission of the crime, at least in cases of first 
degree murder. 38 Such testimony could be offered properly, the Court con-
cluded, ''to distinguish between 'intent' in the sense of a conscious desire, 
'planning' in the sense of considering the mechanical feasibility of effec-
tuating that desire, and 'premeditation' in the sense of critically evaluating 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" ld. 
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. at 617-18, 84 N.E.2d at 8-9; Com-
monwealth v. Taylor, 263 Mass. 356, 363, 161 N.E. 245, 248 (1928). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262-63, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" /d. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" ld. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933 . 
•• /d. 
" ld. 
" /d. at 1263-64, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
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the pros and cons of proceeding to effectuate the desire. " 39 It was entirely 
logical, the Court maintained, that a person could entertain an intent, plan 
the effectuation of that intent, but not deliberately premeditate the objec-
tive of that intent. 40 
In ruling that a jury may consider the effect of a defendant's mental ill-
ness on his capacity to premeditate deliberately, the Court stressed that it 
was not thereby "adopting a doctrine of diminished responsibility. " 41 
Disclaiming reliance on this doctrine, the Court attempted to distinguish the 
principle on which its decision was based from the theory of diminished 
responsibility. 42 Thus, in one passage of its opinion, the Court noted that its 
decision was limited in scope to permitting "jury consideration of mental 
impairment as well as voluntary intoxication on the issue of deliberate 
premeditation. " 43 In another passage of its opinion, the Court disclaimed 
reliance on the doctrine of diminished responsibility by emphasizing that its 
rule "contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for the crime ac-
tually committed. " 44 Because conviction for murder in the first degree re-
quires proof of deliberate premeditation, the Court reasoned that if the 
defendant's mental condition rendered him incapable of forming that 
specific intent, then he could not be convicted of the crime. •s Thus, the 
Court found logic, and not kindness, to be at the root of its decision. 
The Court's insistence that it was not "adopting a doctrine of diminished 
responsibility" 46 seems to stem from the Court's failure to understand fully 
the theory of the doctrine. That theory, simply stated, is that if because of 
mental disease or defect a defendant cannot form the specific intent which is 
an essential element of a crime, then he may not be convicted of that 
crime. 47 The defendant unable to form this specific intent, however, may be 
convicted of a lower grade of the offense which does not require that par-
ticular mental state. 48 Thus, the theory is logical, rather than ameliorative. 49 
" /d. (quoting G. Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liabili-
ty: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 313, 325 (1971)). 
40 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
41 /d. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. See text and notes at notes 47-49 infra, for a discussion of 
the doctrine of diminished responsibility. 
" The Court had rejected the doctrine of diminished responsibility on several prior occa-
sions. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1268, 405 N.E.2d at 932 (Quirico, J ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 546-47, 350 N.E.2d 460, 
465 (1976) . 
., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932 . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
•• Id. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" T. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other Than the Defense 
of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1051, 1054 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lewin] . 
•• /d. 
•• See Lewin, supra note 47. 'lt 1056-57, 1063. 
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It contemplates full responsibility, but only for the crime actually commit-
ted. ' 0 This formulation of the doctrine of diminished responsibility is entire-
ly consistent with the rationale of the Gould opinion. 
The Court's reasoning was basically that if the crime of first degree 
murder can "only be committed after deliberate thought and premeditated 
malice,'' then defendants ''without the mental capacity to think deliberately 
or determine rationally" cannot be convicted of this crime.,. This reasoning 
is also logical, rather than ameliorative. Thus, the rationale of Gould seems 
identical to that which underlines the doctrine of diminished responsibility. 
This conclusion is supported by the authority which the Gould Court cited. 
For example, in maintaining that its ruling was not "tantamount to adopt-
ing the doctrine of diminished responsibility, '''2 the Court quoted from the 
case of State v. Padilla. 33 In that case, however, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court adopted the theory of diminished responsibility. 54 The relevant pas-
sage of that opinion reveals, perhaps, that the Court's discomfort with sub-
scribing to the doctrine of "diminished responsibility" was attributable to 
the label given the theory rather than to the theory itself: 
The doctrine contended for by the defendant is sometimes referred 
to as that of "diminished" or "partial" responsibility. This is actually 
a misnomer, and the theory may not be given an exact name. 
However, it means the allowing of proof of mental derangement short 
of insanity as evidence of lack of deliberate or premeditated design. In 
other words, it contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only 
for the crime actually committed." 
Thus, although the Court disclaimed reliance on the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility, the theory underlying its decision was in fact indistinguish-
able from the theory underlying that doctrine. 
There is much to commend about both the Court's ruling and the doc-
trinal basis upon which it rests. The doctrine which has been called various-
ly partial responsibility, diminished responsibility, and diminished capacity, 
is logically unassailable. Admitting evidence of a defendant's abnormal 
mental condition, totally apart from the defense of insanity, appears to be 
appropriate whenever that evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the 
defendant entertained the specific intent required for conviction of the 
•• State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314 (1959). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
" Id. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959). 
•• /d. at 292-96, 317 P.2d at 314-17. 
" Id. at 292, 317 P.2d at 314. 
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crime charged. ' 6 If the rule were otherwise, then major crimes specifically 
requiring a certain evil state of mind would be in effect strict liability of-
fenses as applied to mentally impaired defendants." 
Critics of the doctrine ·of diminished responsibility acknowledge the 
logical soundness of the doctrine, but point to perceived difficulties in its 
administration. Thus, it is argued that juries are ill-equipped to understand 
psychiatric testimony which makes subtle distinctions such as that a defend-
ant's mental impairment prevented him from premeditating and 
deliberating but not from having an intent to kill." The legislature, 
however, has drawn the line between first and second degree murder on the 
basis of the defendant's state of mind. Accordingly, juries must determine 
the defendant's specific intent before returning a verdict of murder in the 
first degree. Evidence that a mental disorder precluded the defendant from 
premeditating or deliberating the killing is undeniably material on the issue 
of specific intent. Mere difficulty in distinguishing one mental state from 
another is a dubious ground for denying an otherwise allowable defense. ' 9 
Moreover, "precluding the consideration of mental deficiency only makes 
the jury's decision on deliberation and premeditation less intelligent and 
trustworthy. " 60 
Another objection to the doctrine is that it may result in compromise ver-
dicts in cases where the jury is uncertain of the defendant's sanity, or where 
they cannot agree on a verdict of guilt or innocence. 61 Juries, however, 
already have wide powers to convict in a lower degree or for a lesser offense 
than that charged. 62 The danger of compromise verdicts is already so great 
that opening an additional door will make little difference. 63 Moreover, the 
possibility that juries may sometimes misuse the rule is no grounds for 
refusing to apply a doctrine which is legally and logically proper. 64 
A final objection is that the rule would logically extend to all crimes re-
quiring a specific criminal intent. 6 ' Applying the doctrine of partial respon-
" The Model Penal Code,§ 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1%2) permits the admission of 
such evidence. The Code provides that "[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental 
disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not 
have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." /d. 
" See LaFave, supra note 4, at 331. 
" See LaFave, supra note 4, at 331; H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, 
at 176-79 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Weihofen). 
" See Weihofen, supra note 58, at 186. 
•• Fischer v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
61 Weihofen, supra note 58, at 186. 
62 /d. at 186-87 . 
., /d. at 187 . 
•• /d . 
., /d. at 187-88; see LaFave, supra note 4, at 331. 
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sibility to all such crimes, it is argued, would result in inadequate protection 
for the public. 66 It is feared that defendants who formerly would have either 
been convicted for the crime charged and sentenced to a long prison term or 
death, or found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed indefinitely, 
will now serve shorter sentences for lesser offenses or else will be acquitted 
completely at trial. 67 The specific holding of Gould will not create this kind 
of problem, because it will result only in reducing a conviction of first degree 
murder to a conviction of second degree murder. 68 Extending the principle 
underlying Gould to other crimes requiring proof of a specific intent, 
however, could present a real danger if the result was a complete acquittal, 
or conviction of a relatively minor offense. A possible remedy. for this prob-
lem is to empower the judge to order the defendant confined as punishment 
for the offense for which he has been found guilty, and retained for medical 
care until safe to be at large. 69 
In addition to being logically sound, the doctrine of diminished respon-
sibility as adopted by the Court in the context of first degree murder cases is 
in harmony with a dominant theme of Anglo-American criminal justice. 
For over 200 years that system has drawn fine distinctions in grading the 
severity of crimes in order to punish the criminal not only for his actions but 
also for the state of mind with which he committed those acts deemed 
criminal. 70 Accordingly, a premeditated murder is sanctioned more severely 
than an intentional but unplanned killing. Refusing to allow the jury to con-
sider the effect of a mental impairment on the defendant's capacity to 
premeditate violates this tradition. 
At the time of committing the alleged homicide, a defendant charged with 
first degree murder may have been suffering from an abnormal mental con-
dition which was not of the kind or character to afford him a successful in-
sanity defense. 71 Although this defendant would be ineligible for a finding 
of not guilty by reason of insanity, evidence concerning his mental condi-
tion would be admissible, under the holding of Gould, to determine whether 
" LaFave, supra note 4, at 331; see Weihofen, supra note 58, at 188. 
" See LaFave, supra note 4, at 331. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261-62, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" See Weihofen, supra note 58, at 188-89. See also United States v. Brauner, 471 F.2d 969, 
1001.{)2 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
70 See Lewin, supra note 47, at 1089. 
" In Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 548, 555, 226 N.E.2d 556, 558-59, 563 
(1967), the Court adopted the test for criminal responsibility as set out in E4.01 of the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft) (1962). Section 401(1) 
reads as follows: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he-Jacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law." 
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he had the specific intent required for first degree murder. 72 Therefore, the 
Gould case will afford mentally impaired defendants charged with first 
degree murder a separate, limited defense, in addition to the defense of 
criminal irresponsibility. Practitioners should take note of the different 
consequences of the two defenses. If a successful insanity defense is inter-
posed, the result must be a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Usually, this finding will result in commitment of the defendant. 73 In con-
trast, a successful showing that the defendant did not premeditate the acts 
charged will result in a finding of not guilty of first degree murder. 74 Con-
viction of second degree murder or manslaughter, however, will be likely 
under most circumstances. 7 s The probable consequence of a successful 
defense of diminished capacity, therefore, will not be commitment, but a 
sentence of imprisonment following conviction of a lesser offense than 
originally charged. Thus, defense counsel may make a tactical decision to 
defend on the grounds of diminished capacity rather than on the grounds of 
insanity, thereby avoiding the risk of indeterminate commitmenV 6 As to 
the specific intent crime of second degree murder, the Gould opinion sug-
gests that this crime already may be within the ambit of the rule of dimin-
ished capacity. If this were true defendants could avoid a conviction for sec-
ond degree murder by maintaining that their mental condition rendered 
them incapable of harboring malice aforethought. This interpretation of the 
opinion is suggested by the Court's statement, "[t]o the extent that cases 
such as Commonwealth v. Sires and Commonwealth v. Costa are inconsis-
tent with this [ruling], we no longer follow them. " 77 In Costa, 78 the Court 
had held that in a trial for first degree murder, a finding of manslaughter 
would not be permissible even if the defendant's diminished mental capacity 
rendered him incapable of harboring malice aforethought. 79 By declaring 
that it will no longer follow Costa, the Court appears to have indicated that 
charges of second degree murder will fall under the rule of Gould. The most 
important issue left undecided by Gould is whether the Court will extend the 
principle of diminished capacity to other crimes requiring proof of specific 
intent. 
The Gould opinion also suggests that the Court may be receptive to extend-
ing the rule of diminished capacity to non-homicide crimes of specific in-
tent. Evidence that the Court may extend the rule of Gould in future cases 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262-63, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" See Lafave, supra note 4, at 326 & n.2. 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261-63, 405 N.E.2d at 932-33. 
" See LaFave, supra note 4, at 326; See also, Lewin, supra note 47, at 1055, 1061. 
" See LaFave, supra note 4, at 326. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
" 360 Mass. 177, 274 N.E.2d 802 (1971). 
" /d. at 184-86, 274 N.E.2d at 807-09. 
45
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
158 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 4.8 
can be found in the authority cited by the Court in two passages of its opin-
ion. 80 In the first passage, the Court buttressed its conclusion that there was 
"no justifiable reason" for not admitting evidence of a defendant's mental 
abnormality on the issue of premeditation•• with a rather lengthy quotation 
from United States v. Brauner. 12 In Brauner, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia had ruled that in a prosecution for any crime requiring 
proof of a specific intent, the defendant may introduce psychiatric evidence 
to show that he did not have the specific mental condition that is an element 
of the crime. 13 In another passage of its opinion, the Gould Court cited sec-
tion 4.02 of the Model Penal Code as support for its statement that convict-
ing a defendant of first degree murder when he was unable either to pre-
meditate or to deliberate would be a "legal as well as a logical 
incongruity."14 Section 4.02 states that "[e]vidence that the defendant suf-
fered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to 
prove that defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element 
of the offense."" Both the Model Penal Code and Brauner have taken the 
position that the doctrine of diminished responsibility should apply to any 
crime of specific intent. The Court's reliance on these authorities indicates 
that it may extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the context of first 
degree murder in future cases. 
§ 4.8. Sadomasochism: Assault and Battery or Protected Sexual Con-
duct?* In Massachusetts, the offense of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon is punishable either by imprisonment for not more than 
ten years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars under General 
Laws chapter 264, section 15A (hereinafter section 15A).• The statute does 
not, however, identify the elements of this crime2 and, therefore, leaves the 
courts free to develop their own definition. Until this Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court had not artiCulated specifically the elements of the 
crime of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Although the 
Court had not defined this crime previously, it had defined other similar 
crimes. For example, the Court has defined assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon 3 as an attempt to commit a battery or as an unlawful act placing 
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery by 
•• See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262, 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 932, 933. 
" /d. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932. 
" 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
" /d. at 1002. 
14 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. 
" Model Penal Code, § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
*By Peter E. Gelhaar, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETISLAW. 
§ 4.8 I G.L. c. 265, § 15A (1970). 
2 ld. 
' /d. § 15B. 
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means of a dangerous weapon. 4 The Court also has defined assault and 
battery as "the intentional and unjustified use of force upon the person 
of another, or the intentional doing a wanton or grossly negligent act 
causing personal injury to another."6 During the Survey year, in Com-
monwealth v. Appleby, 6 the Court took the opportunity to define the crime 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon under section 15A 
as an assault and an intentional, unjustified touching, however slight, by 
means of a dangerous weapon.' 
The Appleby case involved two men, Kenneth Appleby (Appleby) and 
Steven Cromer (Cromer), who engaged in a homosexual, sadomasochistic 
relationship for over two years. 8 While living with defendant Appleby, 
Cromer performed household services and other duties for Appleby. 9 Dur-
ing the course of their master-servant relationship, Appleby frequently 
would beat Cromer with objects such as a baseball bat, a bullwhip, and a 
leather riding crop.'° Cromer alleged that these beatings were administered 
when Appleby was dissatisfied with Cromer's performance as a servant." 
Cromer also maintained that Appleby enjoyed inflicting such violence and 
that these acts appeared to be sexually motivated.' 2 There was conflicting 
evidence as to whether Cromer ever protested Appleby's sadistic conduct.' 3 
On August 31, 1976, Cromer served Appleby some melted ice cream. 14 
This enraged Appleby to such an extent that he beat Cromer with a leather 
riding crop, landing several severe blows.ll Cromer fled from the 
premises. ' 6 Thereafter, Cromer presumably pressed criminal charges 
against Appleby." Appleby was charged with three counts of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and tried in superior court before 
a jury. 18 The jury convicted Appleby on one of the three counts of assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon. 19 
• Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686, 692, 259 N.E.2d 769, 773-74 (1970). 
' Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 203, 178 N.E. 633, 634 (1931). 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 867, 402 N.E.2d 1051 (1980). 
' !d. at 877, 402 N.E.2d at 1058. 
• /d. at 867, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
' /d. at 868, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
10 /d. at 868, 402 N.E.2d at 1054. 
" /d. at 868, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
" Id. at 870, 402 N.E.2d at 1054. 
"Id. 
14 Id. at 869, 402 N.E.2d at 1054. 
" !d. 
" /d. 
" /d. It is not clear from the case whether Cromer actually pressed charges against Appleby 
or whether charges were brought by a relative on Cromer's behalf. /d. 
" /d. at 867 & n.1, 402 N.E.2d at 1053 & n.l. The three indictments stemmed from three dif-
ferent beatings on different occasions involving a baseball bat, a bullwhip, and a leather riding 
crop. /d. 
" /d. at 867, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
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Appleby appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court, 20 alleging error 
in the trial court judge's denial of a directed verdict and in tlle judge's in-
structions to the jury on the issues of consent and intent. 21 On appeal, the 
Court identified three questions central to the assignment of error: (1) 
whether the riding crop was a "dangerous weapon" under section 15A, (2) 
what criminal intent is required by section 15A to sustain a conviction, and 
(3) whether Appleby's defense of consent on Cromer's part was legally suf-
ficient to prevent conviction. 22 
The Court first addressed the issue of whether a riding crop is a 
"dangerous weapon" under section 15A. The Court observed that 
dangerous weapons usually fall into two categories: those weapons which 
are dangerous per se and those which are dangerous as used. H A dangerous 
weapon per se is an instrument designed and constructed to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. 24 In contrast, a weapon that is dangerous as used is 
an instrument which is not designed or constructed for the purpose of pro-
ducing serious bodily injury but is capable of being used in a manner which 
may cause great harm or death. 2S The Court noted that the riding crop ob-
viously was not designed to inflict serious bodily harm on persons and thus 
was not dangerous per se. 26 The Court then examined the characteristics of 
the riding crop to determine whether a riding crop could be considered 
dangerous as used. 27 The riding crop in this case was approximately eight-
een inches long and one inch in diameter at its thickest point. 28 The Court 
likened the riding crop to a short whip and concluded that such a riding 
crop is capable of being used in a manner which could inflict serious bodily 
harm. 29 The Court held, therefore, that as a matter of law, a riding crop can 
be a dangerous weapon as used. 30 Nevertheless, the Court maintained that 
whether a weapon which is not dangerous per se was employed as a 
dangerous weapon is a question of fact to be decided by objective stand-
ards. 31 Accordingly, in order to convict Appleby under section 15A, the 
jury must find that the crop in this case was in fact dangerous as used. 32 
20 /d. G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G set out the appeal procedure to the Supreme Judicial Court in 
criminal cases involving felonies. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 867, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
" /d. at 873-74, 402 N.E.2d at 1056. 
" Id. 
,. /d. 
" Id. at 874, 402 N.E.2d at 1057. 
26 /d. at 874, 402 N.E.2d at 1056. 




" Id. at 876, 402 N.E.2d at 1058 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411, 416, 
326 N.E.2d 710, 714 (1975)). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 875, 402 N.E.2d at 1057. 
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Thus, the victim's subjective apprehension of danger cannot determine the 
characteristics of the weapon as dangerous as used. 33 The Court held, 
however, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the 
riding crop was a dangerous weapon as used by Appleby. 34 
The Court relied on evidence offered by Cromer at trial that Appleby was 
in a fit of rage when he repeatedly beat Cromer with the crop. 3 ' Appleby 
contended that the blows were not severe but only caused redness. 36 In 
response to this claim, the Court emphasized that any touching with a 
potentially dangerous weapon is sufficient for purposes of section 15A and 
the law need not wait until serious bodily harm in fact does occur by means 
of the instrument before labeling the instrument as dangerous. 37 
Having addressed the meaning of section 15A's dangerous weapon re-
quirement, the Court turned its attention to ascertaining the criminal intent 
necessary to satisfy the statute. It noted that in Massachusetts, assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon is a "general intent" crime. 38 According-
ly, section 15A only requires a general intent to do the act which causes in-
jury and does not require a specific intent to injure. 39 In this case, Appleby 
admitted that he beat Cromer almost daily. 40 Nevertheless, Appleby main-
tained that his sole intent was to provide Cromer with sexual gratification. 41 
Because he intended to benefit Cromer in this way, Appleby argued, he did 
not possess the requisite criminal intent to be convicted under section 15A. 42 
The Court rejected this claim, noting first that section 15A's general intent 
requirement is satisfied by proof of intent to commit the lesser included 
crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. 43 To satisfy the intent require-
ment for the lesser crime of assault with a dangerous weapon, the actor need 
"/d. at 876,402 N.E.2d at 1058 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411,416, 
326 N.E.2d 710, 714 (1975)). 
" !d. at 877, 402 N.E.2d at 1058. 
" !d. at 869, 402 N.E.2d at 1054. 
" !d. at 872, 402 N.E.2d at 1056. 
" !d. at 877-78, 402 N.E.2d at 1058. 
" /d. at 878, 402 N.E.2d at 1058. A crime can be defined either by requiring an intent to 
engage in specific conduct or an intent to produce a specified result. An example of the former 
is the common law crime of forcible rape which requires that the rapist intend only to engage in 
sexual intercourse. Such a crime is referred to as a "general intent" crime. It is called a 
"general intent" crime in order to distinguish it from the "specific intent" which a crime "may 
specifically, by its definition, require, over and above any required intention to engage in the 
forbidden conduct. ... " W. LaFave and A. Scott, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW§ 28, at 196 
(1972). An example of a specific intent crime is burglary which requires the specific intent to 
commit a felony by breaking and entering. /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 878, 402 N.E.2d at 1059. 
•• /d. at 871, 402 N.E.2d at 1055. 
" /d. at 868, 402 N.E.2d at 1053. 
" /d. at 883, 402 N.E.2d at 1061. 
" !d. at 878, 402 N.E.2d at 1059. 
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only intend to threaten to use an instrumentality in a dangerous fashion. 44 
Thus, although the crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon 
requires that the threat be consummated by the application of any force 
upon the victim by means of the instrument, the intent requirement can be 
satisfied by a showing of intent to threaten rather than an intent to consum-
mate the threat. 45 The intent to commit the battery is then inferred from the 
intent to commit the lesser crime of assault by means of a deadly weapon. 46 
Regardless of whether the intent requirement is fulfilled by proof of in-
tent to assault or intent to batter, the actor must intend to use the instru-
ment in a dangerous or a potentially dangerous fashion. 47 The Court stated 
that even if Appleby subjectively intended to use the riding crop for his own 
or Cromer's sexual gratification, he still could have possessed the requisite 
intent to use the riding crop in a dangerous fashion. 48 Thus, a jury properly 
could find that Appleby intentionally placed Cromer in fear and struck him 
with the riding crop in a dangerous manner. 49 Accordingly, the Court 
upheld the jury's finding that Appleby possessed the intent to threaten to 
use the riding crop in a dangerous manner and the intent requirement of sec-
tion 15A was therefore satisfied. 50 The battery element of the offense was 
completed when the threatened force was actually applied to Cromer. 
After finding that Appleby used a dangerous weapon with the requisite 
intent for purposes of section 15A, the Court considered Appleby's third 
defense, Cromer's consent. Throughout the proceedings, Appleby main-
tained that Cromer requested to be beaten51 and thereby consented to the 
beatings for Cromer's own sexual gratification. 52 The Court considered two 
interpretations of this evidence which might sustain Appleby's defense: (1) 
that Cromer had consented to his overall relationship with Appleby or (2) 
that based on Cromer's past behavior, Appleby subjectively believed that 
Cromer would consent to this particular beating. 53 
With regard to Cromer's general consent to the relationship, the Court 
considered whether a state, through the use of assault and battery statutes, 
can regulate violent behavior occurring in private consensual sexual rela-
tionships. 54 The Court noted that in the 1974 case of Commonwealth v. 
" /d. at 878-79, 402 N.E.2d at 10S9. 
•• /d. at 879, 402 N.E.2d at 10S9. 
•• Commonwealth v. Randall, 70 Mass. 36, 38-39 (18SS). 
47 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 879, 402 N.E.2d at 10S9. 
•• Id. at 882, 402 N.E.2d at 1061. 
•• /d. at 882-83, 402 N.E.2d at 1061. 
,. /d. 
" /d. at 871, 402 N.E.2d at lOSS. 
" Id. at 868, 402 N.E.2d at lOS3. 
" Id. at 879-80, 402 N.E.2d at 10S9-60. 
•• Id. at 880, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
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Balthazar, ss a statutory prohibition on "unnatural and lascivious" actsH 
was found inapplicable to private, consensual conduct between adults. 57 
Although not defined in chapter 272, section 35, "unnatural and lascivious 
acts" has been interpreted as the irregular indulgence in sexual behavior, il-
licit sexual relations, and infamous conduct which is lustful, obscene, and in 
deviation of accepted customs and manners. ss In effect, the Balthazar 
Court recognized consent as a complete defense to that crime. Nevertheless, 
the Court in Appleby refused to extend this defense to crimes commited 
under section 15A. The Court found that the underlying public policy of 
section 15A prohibits an individual from consenting to become a victim of 
an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. 59 The Court maintained 
that any right to sexual privacy is outweighed in a constitutional balancing 
scheme by a state's interest in preventing violence upon its citizens. 60 To 
support this conclusion, the Court cited the New York case of New York v. 
Onojre61 which held that because certain sexual conduct is potentially harm-
ful, the right to sexual privacy is not absolute and a state may restrict such 
harmful conduct. 62 
The Court employed a similar analysis in determining that Cromer's con-
sent to the specific act of being beaten could not serve as a viable defense. 
Once again, the Court held that a state may protect its citizens against 
physical harm even if the violence is related to consensual sexual activity. 63 
Thus, a victim's consent is, as a matter of law, both ineffective and im-
material as a defense to prosecution under section 15A. 64 Cromer's alleged 
consent, therefore, could not absolve Appleby if Appleby had otherwise 
satisfied the requisite intent and instrumentality elements of section 15A. 
The Court therefore affirmed Appleby's conviction. 65 
As demonstrated in the Appleby decision, the defense of consent to illegal 
sexual conduct has been a problematic area of criminal law. This problem is 
well illustrated by the crime of rape. By definition, consent by a youth can 
never be an effective defense to the crime of statutory rape. 66 The accepted 
rationale for criminalizing intercourse with a minor is that minors must be 
protected from their own poor judgment and failure to realize the harm-
" 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974). 
" G.L. c. 272, § 35 (1970). 
" 366 Mass. at 302, 318 N.E.2d at 481 (1974). 
" Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 439, 442, 120 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1954). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
•• /d. at 880-81, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
61 72 App. Div.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980). 
62 /d. at 271, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
•• Id. at 881-82, 402 N.E.2d at 1060-61. 
., /d. at 883, 402 N.E.2d at 1061. 
66 W. LaFave and A. Scott, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 57, at 408 (1972). 
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fulness of the conduct. 67 A similar policy has been advanced as a justifica-
tion for disallowing the defense of consent to violent sexual acts between 
adults in cases like Appleby. For example, the California appellate case of 
People v. Samue/s68 involved two males who engaged in sadomasochistic 
conduct during the production of a movie. One male was charged with ag-
gravated assault. 69 The defendant argued that a victim's consent constitutes 
an absolute defense to the charge. 70 The California Court of Appeals, 
however, rejected the defense citing the generally held proposition that con-
sent is not a defense to assault or battery." The court stated that the 
California statute obviously was designed to prohibit individuals from 
severely or mortally injuring others. 72 This may be construed as 
acknowledging that an individual's right to sexual privacy is subordinate to 
the state's interest in peaceful behavior. 
In Appleby, the Court applied a similar rationale when it stated that the 
commonwealth can protect its citizens from injury sustained through 
violent sexual activity by vitiating a victim's consent to such conduct. 73 In 
the earlier case of Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 14 however, the Court held 
that consent is a defense to the crime of committing "unnatural and 
lascivious" sexual acts between adults within the meaning of chapter 272, 
section 35. 75 The Balthazar Court based its decision in part on the constitu-
tional right to privacy which frees the individual from unwarranted govern-
mental regulation of certain sex-related activities. 76 The Balthazar Court 
held that because of both the constitutional right to privacy and the liberali-
zation of community values on the subject of permissible sexual conduct, 
chapter 272, section 35, could not apply to private, consensual conduct. 77 
Thus, in view of the Balthazar decision, the Appleby Court essentially was 
required to distinguish "unnatural and lascivious" sexual acts from those 
same acts accompanied by violence in order to find that the state's interest 
in preventing violent sexual conduct superseded the individual's right to 
privacy. 
In so doing, the Supreme Judicial Court in Appleby reaffirmed its posi-
tion in Balthazar, finding that the right to privacy requires that consent 
operates as a defense to nonviolent lascivious conduct. 78 It refused, 
61 ld. 
" 250 Cal. App.2d 501, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1024 (1968). 
" ld. at 503, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 441. 
" ld. at 513, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 447. 
71 ld. 
" ld. at 514, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 447. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
" 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974). 
" ld. at 302, 318 N.E.2d at 481. 
" ld. at 301, 318 N.E.2d at 480. 
" ld. at 302, 318 N.E.2d at 481. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 880, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
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however, to extend the consent defense to acts that are coupled with 
violence. The Appleby court distinguished the purpose of section 15A from 
that of chapter 272, section 35, noting that the former is not designed to 
regulate sexual conduct while the latter is. 79 Moreover, the Court stressed 
that Appleby was not tried for the sexual act of sadomasochism but for the 
crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. 80 Thus, the Appleby 
Court addressed only the question whether a state can regulate violent con-
duct and did not consider a state's ability to regulate deviant sexual 
behavior. 
By considering only the violent aspects of the conduct at issue, the Court 
was able to find support for its decision in the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade. 81 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held 
that a right to privacy exists but that this right is not absolute. 82 Rather, at 
some point, the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of the in-
dividual predominates and thereby limits the individual's ability to assert 
his privacy right. 83 Accordingly, the Appleby Court concluded that a state 
may prevent violence even though such violence is clothed in the cloak of 
privacy in sexual relations. 84 
Just as the Court attempted to distinguish Appleby's violent behavior 
from his deviant sexual behavior, the Court also sought to separate the in-
tent to commit assault and battery with a dangerous weapon from the intent 
to perform acts of sexual gratification. Throughout the trial and the subse-
quent appeal, Appleby admitted that he beat Cromer but contended that 
Cromer initiated the sadomasochistic activities. ss Thus, Appleby claimed 
that he intended the beatings for Cromer's sexual gratification and his own 
sexual gratification which he received through Cromer's enjoyment of the 
beatings. 86 The Court rejected this claim reasoning that, regardless of Ap-
pleby's sexual intentions, a jury could find that he possessed the requisite 
intent to use the riding crop in a dangerous manner. 87 Thus, in evaluating 
Appleby's conduct, the Court attempted to reduce to mere unpermitted 
contact the complicated mixture of sex and violence which characterizes 
sadomasochism. Viewed in this way, there can be no dispute that Appleby 
intended to touch Cromer in a threatening manner and, having done so, 
violated section 15A. 
79 /d. at 881, 402 N.E.2d at 1060 . 
•• /d. 
II 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
" /d. at 155. 
83 /d. 
14 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 880-81, 402 N.E.2d at 1060. 
" /d. at 87{, 402 N.E.2d at 1055. 
" /d. at 872-73, 402 N.E.2d at 1056. 
" /d. at 882, 402 N.E.2d at 1061. 
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The distinction between the sexual and violent aspects of sadomasochism, 
however, may be somewhat artificial. During the trial, a behavioral expert 
offered testimony which tended to show that the beatings were inseparable 
from the sexual aspects of the men's relationship. 88 Indeed, the sexual grati-
fication derives from the harm or the threat of imposing harm. Although 
the Court did not refer to this testimony in its analysis of the case, it did 
seem to offer a reason for separating the sexual intent from the criminal in-
tent of the case. At one point the Court observed that the law need not wait 
until an instrument actually causes harm before declaring it a dangerous 
weapon. 89 This statement was made during the Court's analysis of whether 
a riding crop is a dangerous weapon, but also holds true for the issue of in-
tent. Although Appleby intended the beatings for his own and Cromer's 
sexual gratification, it is foreseeable that such lustful behavior can cause 
serious bodily injury. 90 Perhaps the Court preferred not to wait until serious 
injury occurred as a result of a sadomasochistic relationship. In essence, the 
perpetrator of these beatings may not use his right to sexual privacy to 
shield him from prosecution should injury occur solely because the violence 
relates to sexual conduct. Consequently, in order to prevent severe injury 
precipitating from sexual conduct, the Court will look at violent sexual con-
duct as violent conduct regardless of its content and punish that conduct ac-
cordingly. 
Thus, Commonwealth v. Appleby presented the Supreme Judicial Court 
with the difficult task of applying a statute prohibiting assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon to a situation where the violence was in-
tertwined witha protected right to sexual privacy. In order to advance the 
state's interest in deterring and punishing violence while respecting the in-
dividual's right to privacy, the Court attempted to separate the sexual 
aspect from the violence aspect of the case. Although this distinction may 
be somewhat illusory, the Court was forced to do so because of Appleby's 
right to sexual privacy. The Court correctly noted that the right to privacy 
was not absolute and that a state may protect its citizens from harm. Thus, 
regardless of the sexual conduct, consent was held not to be a valid defense 
to an action arising under section 15A. 
§ 4.9. Administrative Search Warrants.* During the Survey year, in 
Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court had its first op-
portunity to apply the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
" Id. at 873, 402 N.E.2d at 1056. 
" ld. at 877, 402 N.E.2d at 1058. 
•• Indeed, on one other occasion after Cromer was beaten with a baseball bat, he sustained a 
fractured kneecap. As a result, Cromer was forced to undergo surgery./d. at 868, 420 N.E.2d 
at 1054. 
*By Kevin M. Carome, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSBTIS LAW. 
§ 4.9 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1009, 404 N.E.2d 1204. 
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States which defined the permissible limits of an administrative search. 2 The 
Court applied these decisions in Accaputo to invalidate an administrative 
search warrant which failed to define narrowly the scope of the authorized 
search. 3 The Court also held that facial inadequacies of a search warrant 
may be cured by incorporation of information from an extrinsic document 
only when the document is attached to the warrant and when the warrant 
contains "suitable words of reference which incorporate" the extrinsic 
document. 4 The incorporation holding of the Accaputo decision should ex-
tend beyond the narrow sphere of administrative searches and apply to any 
attempt to incorporate an extrinsic document into a search warrant. This 
section will examine both holdings of the Accaputo decision. 
The defendant in Accaputo was indicted for various narcotics violations 
following a search of his pharmacy. s The search was conducted by police 
officers pursuant to an administrative search warrant. 6 The warrant was 
issued under the commonwealth's Controlled Substances Act, 7 which sets 
forth procedures regarding the inspection of "controlled premises," a 
category including pharmacies dispensing prescription drugs. 8 The warrant 
' An administrative search (alternatively called an administrative inspection) refers to a 
search conducted by a regulatory agency pursuant to its organic statute in order to determine 
whether the subject of the search is in compliance with or in violation of the relevant statutory 
guidelines or prohibitions. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525-28, 531-34 
(1967). The Supreme Court decisions which the Accaputo Court applied have dealt with the 
permissibility of warrantless searches, the standard for probable cause when an administrative 
warrant is sought, and the scope of the search permitted by such a warrant. In Camara, the 
Court held that a homeowner could refuse to admit a municipal housing inspector who lacked 
a warrant to inspect the premises. ld. at 534. The Court determined that such a warrantless 
search would be unreasonable and in contravention of the fourth amendment. I d. In the com-
panion case of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that the warrant re-
quirement also applied to administrative inspections of commercial premises. ld. at 543. The 
Camara decision also determined that the standard of probable cause governing the issuance of 
administrative search warrants is less stringent than that which must be demonstrated to search 
for evidence in a criminal investigation. 387 U.S. at 538. Probable cause exists for the issuance 
of an administrative search warrant if • 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an area inspection are satisfied" with respect to a particular establishment or 
premises. Id. The Court also held that because there was a lesser standard of probable cause 
for an administrative warrant, the scope of an administrative warrant must be drawn more nar-
rowly than the scope of a criminal investigation. Id. at 537. A decade after Camara, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that case's validity, holding in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, that the portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act permitting warrantless 
searches was unconstitutional. ld. at 325. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016-17, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. 
• ld. at 1019, 404 N.E.2d at 1211. 
' Id. at 1009-1010, 404 N.E.2d at 1206. 
• Id. 
' G.L. c. 94C. 
• G.L. c. 94C, § 30(a) includes in the definition of "controlled premises": "any place or 
area ... in which persons registered under the provisions of this chapter or required thereunder 
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did not contain a statement delineating the purposes of the inspection, 9 
describe the items to be seized, nor even mention the power to seize any con-
traband. 10 Neither the application for the warrant nor the supporting af-
fidavit for the warrant were attached to the warrant. 11 
The Court began its analysis by examining the fourth amendment stand-
ards which control the issuance and execution of administrative search war-
rants.12 It noted that generally a warrant must be obtained in order to con-
duct an administrative search, even where "controlled premises" are in-
volved.13 The Court recognized that certain "pervasively regulated busi-
nesses" may be subject to warrantless inspections despite the general war-
rant requirement, 14 and that the defendant arguably was involved in a busi-
ness which came under that exception.•' Nevertheless, the Court concluded 
that the search of the defendant's pharmacy could not be justified under the 
"pervasively regulated business" exception. 16 The Court reasoned that that 
exception was not relevant where the statute authorizing the search pro-
hibited warrantless inspections. 17 
to keep records are permitted to hold, manufacture, compound, process, distribute, deliver, or 
administer any controlled substance or in which such persons make or maintain records pur-
suant thereto." /d. § 30(b) states that probable cause: exists upon a showing of a reasonable 
and valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this chapter ... under a general plan 
sufficient to justify administrative inspection of an area . . . in the circumstances specified in 
the application or such moment. /d. Section 30(c) requires that the warrant identify "the area, 
premises, buildings or conveyances to be inspected, the purpose of the inspection, and, if ap-
propriate, the type of property to be seized, if any." /d. Section 30(c) also states: Such warrant 
shall: ... (2) command the person to whom it is directed to inspect the area ... identified for 
the purpose specified . . . (3) describe the items or types of property to be inspected or seized, 
if any. /d. (emphasis supplied). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. 
10 /d. at 1016-17, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. The warrant was no more specific in these respects 
beyond permitting an inspection "[p]ursuant to said SECTION 30 of CHAPTER 94C," dur-
ing normal business hours. /d. at 1017 n.10, 404 N.E.2d at 1210 n.10. 
" Id. at 1019, 404 N.E.2d at 1211. 
" /d. at 1010-16, 404 N.E.2d at 1206-09. 
" Id. at 1010-11, 404 N.E.2d at 1206-07. 
" The Supreme Judicial Court cited United States v. Biswell, 406 U,S. 311 (1972) (the 
firearms industry), and Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (the li-
quor industry). See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011-12,404 N.E.2d at 1207. The basis for such an 
exception is that the history of extensive regulation of these industries together with the public 
interests involved outweigh the considerations which normally make a warrant necessary, thus 
making warrantless inspections reasonable under the fourth amendment. See Biswell, 406 U.S. 
at 315-16. 
" 1980 Mass, Adv. Sh. at 1012, 404 N.E.2d at 1207. 
16 /d. 
" /d. The exact relation of the fourth amendment to the inpsection procedures established 
legislatively in the Controlled Substances Act is not entirely clear. The Court cited United 
States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1972) aff'd 480 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 
1973). See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1012, 404 N.E.2d at 1207. Montrom, which involved the 
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The Accaputo Court recognized that the standard for probable cause re-
quired to obtain an administrative search warrant is "less stringent" than 
the probable cause necessary for granting a warrant in a criminal investiga-
tion.18 The Court also noted that "[i]nexorably linked" to this lower 
threshold for probable cause is the requirement that a search under an ad-
ministrative warrant be limited in scopeY The Court found that the pro-
cedures contained in the Controlled Substances Act closely resemble and 
adequately apply the federal constitutional standards for defining probable 
cause and limiting the scope of an administrative search of controlled 
premises. 20 The Court concluded, therefore, that an inspection exceeding 
the limits of the statute violates both the Act and the fourth amendment re-
quirements which the Act reflects. 21 
The Court stated that the Act and the fourth amendment require that a 
warrant used in an administrative search must define the bounds of the 
search with adequate specificity. 22 The Court recognized two policies 
behind this requirement: to ensure that the owner of the premises be ap-
prised of the reasons and lawful limits of the search 23 and to circumscribe 
the discretion of the executing officers. 24 Since the warrant in Accaputo did 
not adequately define or limit the scope of the inspection it purported to 
authorize, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the warrant could not sup-
port the seizure of the evidence taken from the defendant's pharmacy. 2S 
pharmaceutical industry, indicated that although Congress constitutionally could have 
eliminated the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of such industries, express 
statutory language permitting warrantless inspections is required. 345 F. Supp. at 1340 n.l. 
Montrom is probably an accurate statement of the law. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 
311, 317 (1972); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1969). Never-
theless, it is arguable whether legislative approval of warrantless inspections alone, without a 
determination that the statute regulates a "pervasively regulated business" would be sufficient 
to overcome objections on fourth amendment grounds. See text and note at note 14 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013, 404 N.E.2d at 1208. The Supreme Judicial Court adopted 
the "reasonable legislative or administrative standards" test of Camara. See note 2 supra. 
" /d. at 1014, 404 N.E.2d at 1208. 
20 /d. at 1014-15, 404 N.E.2d at 1208-09. The statute is discussed at note 8 supra. 
" /d. at 1015-16, 404 N.E.2d at 1209. 
22 /d. at 1016, 404 N.E.2d at 1209. 
23 /d. 
" /d. at 1017-18, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. 
" /d. at 1018-20,404 N.E.2d at 1210-11. The defendant's challenge was limited to a claim 
that the warrant was insufficient to support any seizures. /d. at 1017, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. He 
did not claim that the warrant was insufficient to support the inspection. /d. & n.11. This may 
have been a serious tactical error on the part of defendant's counsel. Because the inspection 
was not challenged per se, the Court could not find that the officers were wrongfully on the 
premises. /d. Hence, the Court was able to rule that those items which would have been lawful-
ly seized under the plain view doctrine could be lawfully admitted against the defendant. /d. at 
1020-24, 404 N.E.2d at 1211-14. The Court also ruled that certain inculpatory statements made 
by the defendant in response to qu<'stioning regarding certain of the items which were seized 
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The Accaputo decision accurately applies the relevant requirements of the 
fourth amendment. In so doing, Accaputo supersedes prior Massachusetts 
case law which permitted warrantless administrative searches under 
statutory provisions which did not contain a warrant requirement. 26 In 
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 27 the Supreme Judicial Court stated, albeit in dic-
tum, that a statute permitting entries by fire department inspectors28 sanc-
tioned warrantless searches for fire code violations. 29 That statute remains 
substantially unchanged, but its validity is clearly open to constitutional 
challenge in light of Accaputo and the recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. Such statutes and local ordinances have been rendered con-
stitutionally suspect unless the ''pervasively regulated business'' exception 30 
applies. Thus, although the Accaputo Court recognized that the standards 
for obtaining an administrative warrant are not difficult to satisfy, 31 the 
practitioner may assume confidently that, in the ordinary case, an ad-
ministrative search conducted without a warrant is invalid and that evidence 
obtained thereby is suppressible. 
The more practical question t"or the attorney is what t"orm the lower 
threshold for probable cause will take. The standard applied in Accaputo, 
'' 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area 
inspection,' " 32 is not self-defining. Since Massachusetts law on this subject 
is yet to be developed, federal case law reviewing administrative searches 
may serve as a guide in predicting what will be required in Massachusetts for 
both establishing probable cause and limiting the permissible scope of ad-
ministrative searches. 
Under federal law it is clear that the warrant application need not 
demonstrate probable cause to believe that a violation of the relevant 
could be admitted against the defendant in response to questioning regarding certain of the 
items which were seized could be admitted against the defendant despite the fact that Miranda 
warnings had not been given. Id. at 1025, 404 N.E.2d at 1214-15. The Court held that the 
defendant, who "was questioned at his pharmacy amidst employees and occasional 
customers," had not been subjected to " 'custodial interrogation' " and hence his Miranda 
rights had not yet attached./d. at 1025, 404 N.E.2d at 1214. Both the plain view issue and the 
Miranda issue are beyond the scope of this section. 
" Commonwealth v. Dixon, 352 Mass. 420, 423, 225 N.E.2d 919, 921; Commonwealth v. 
Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 442-43, 222 N.E.2d 681, 685-86 (1966), vacated and remanded, 388 
U.S. 464 (1967). This change in the law was recognized by the Massachusetts Appeals Courtin 
Boston v. Ditson, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 327-28, 348 N.E.2d 116, 118-19 (1976), appeal 
dismissed 429 U.S. 1057 (1977). 
" 352 Mass. 420, 225 N.E.2d 919 (1966). 
" G.L. c. 148, § 4. 
" 352 Mass. at 423, 225 N.E.2d at 921. 
•• See text and note at note 14 supra. 
" See text at note 18 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013, 404 N.E.2d at 1208 (quoting Camara v. United States, 387 
U.S. at 538). 
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statute exists. 33 The Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 34 stated 
that the premises may be selected for an inspection on the basis of a 
"general administrative plan" for enforcing the relevant statute derived 
from "neutral sources. " 35 This neutral criteria test was examined in United 
States v. Greenberg, 36 a Pennsylvania district court decision which reviewed 
an administrative search warrant granted under a federal narcotics statute 
containing substantially the same procedures as the Massachusetts Con-
trolled Substances Act. 37 The district court found that criteria such as a 
substantial passage of time since the last inspection or an absence of 
previous inspections of the premises could establish probable cause for such 
a search. 38 Cases involving searches conducted under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act also shed light on the neutral criteria test. In Stod-
dard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 39 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that an administrative search plan based on general 
safety data for an entire industry, rather than on specific data about the 
safety record of the company to be inspected, would establish probable 
cause for a search of that individual company's plants. 40 
These federal cases demonstrate that probable cause for making routine 
inspections under the relevant statute ordinarily will exist if established ad-
ministrative criteria which can be considered "neutral" call for an inspec-
tion. The requisite neutrality may exist due to the presence of a factor as 
basic as the mere passage of time. Thus, if a pharmacy had never been in-
spected, or if a suitable period of time defined by administrative rules had 
passed since the last inspection, probable cause for an administrative search 
might exist based on these factors alone. 
As the Accaputo Court recognized, because the threshold for probable 
cause is lower in the area of administrative searches, the scope of such 
searches is, at least in theory, to be defined narrowly. 41 Federal cases, 
however, demonstrate that the permissible scope of administrative searches 
can be expanded by the relevant statutes. These cases have permitted 
theoretically limited searches to become quite extensive where the relevant 
statutory provisions are broadly written. In Burkart Randall v. Marshall, 42 
" Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
34 436 u.s. 307 (1978). 
" /d. at 321. 
36 334 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
" 21 u.s.c. § 880(d) (1976). 
" 334 F. Supp. at 367; see also United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1976). 
" 627 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1980). 
•• /d. at 988-89; see also Marshall v. Chromalloy American Corp., 589 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 
(7th Cir. 1979). 
41 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1014, 404 N.E.2d at 1208 . 
., 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that in light of the broad purposes of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, a warrant granted pursuant to an 
employee complaint need not be confined to the subject matter ofthat com-
plaint. 43 Thus, a warrant which permitted a search beyond the subject mat-
ter of the complaint was not invalid. 44 Similarly, in Chroma/loy American 
Corp. v. Marsha/1, 45 that same court stated that the scope of an ad-
ministrative search warrant "must be as broad as the subject matter 
regulated by the statute and restricted only by the limitations imposed by 
the legislature and the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment."46 
Therefore, it is probable that a broadly drawn statute will support an ex-
tensive administrative search, and a search which remains within the 
statutorily defined limits will not run afoul of the fourth amendment. Thus, 
although the Accaputo Court stated that the scope of an administrative 
search is to be narrow, 47 the practitioner should recognize that the scope of 
such a search may be quite expansive if the statute providing for the inspec-
tion is subject to a broad interpretation. A broad search conducted pur-
suant to such a statute will not be invalid provided the warrant is drawn to 
conform with the statutory limits. 48 In Accaputo the warrant failed to con-
form with these statutory limits because it did not adequately limit the scope 
of the search it purported to authorize. 49 If the scope had been described 
with sufficient specificity, there would have been no sustainable challenge 
to the validity of the search of the defendant's pharmacy. 
In Accaputo, the commonwealth attempted to cure this defect in the war-
rant by incorporating into it the application made to obtain it. 50 The 
Supreme Judicial Court took the opportunity to discuss when extrinsic 
documents may be incorporated into a defective warrant to cure its defects. 
The Court held that an extrinsic document may not be incorporated if it was 
not physically attached, and if the warrant did not use "suitable words of 
reference which incorporate" the extrinsic document. 51 The Court made no 
" I d. at 1326-27. 
44 /d. 
" 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1979). 
" /d. at 1343. On the other hand, if the scope of the warrant exceeds what is permitted by 
the statute, that portion of the search which exceeds the statutory limit will be declared invalid. 
In In reEstablishment Inspection Portex, Inc., 595 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1979), the court held that a 
warrant could not authorize the seizure of an item, where the item did not fall within the in-
spection provisions of the statute. /d. at 85-86. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1014, 404 N.E.2d at 1208. 
" See id. at 1015-16, 404 N.E.2d at 1209. This requirement serves the two policies of notify-
ing the subject of the search's limits and the executing officer of the bounds of his authority. 
/d. at 1016, 404 N.E.2d at 1209-10. See text at notes 23-24 supra. 
" /d. at 1016-17, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. 
" /d. at 1018, 404 N.E.2d at 1210. 
" /d. at 1019, 404 N.E.2d at 1211. 
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attempt to limit this holding to administrative warrants. Moreover, since 
most of the authorities cited by the Court in support of this holding involved 
criminal investigations, 52 the Court's holding on the incorporation issue 
presumably would apply to warrants used in criminal investigations. In its 
incorporation ruling, the Court again stressed the two policies of requiring 
specificity in order to limit the discretion of the executing officers and to in-
form the "person subject to the search and seizure what the officers are en-
titled to take. " 53 This policy, especially the latter element, applies equally in 
criminal investigation. Although the United States Supreme Court has 
never faced this question, the Accaputo test was adopted by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Roche. 54 
The court of appeals stated that it was a matter of "settled law" that the 
document to be incorporated be physically attached and referred to by the 
warrant.ss 
In its discussion of the extrinsic document issue, the Accaputo Court 
stated that the power to seize, which did not appear in the Accaputo war-
rant, could never be incorporated from an extrinsic document. 56 In so do-
ing, the Court distinguished previous Massachusetts cases in which extrinsic 
documents had been incorporated in order to cure defective warrants. 57 
Two of the cases cited by the Court involved the incorporation of 
documents which were not physically attached to the warrant. In Com-
monwealth v. Vitello, ss and in Commonwealth v. Todisco, 59 incorporation 
" The Supreme Judicial Court stated that "substantial authority" supported these re-
quirements. /d. The following cases, cited by the Accaputo Court, accurately support the 
Court's holding: In re Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 4 (1979); United States v. Klein, 
565 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (test met); United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975) (test met); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.7 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (test met) rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Moore, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (test met). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1019,404 N.E.2d at 1211. 
,. United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980). 
" /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1018, 404 N.E.2d at 1211. The Court stated that "[a]n extrinsic 
document simply cannot authorize a power not contained in the warrant itself." /d. Despite 
the inherent logic of the proposition, the Court cited no authority for it. Apparently, no court 
has ever been confronted with this narrow issue. Nevertheless, it would seem that the policy to 
reveal the limits of the search to the subject logically supports such a proposition. See 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016, 1019,404 N.E.2d at 1209, 1211. 
" See id. at 1018, 404 N.E.2d at 1210-11 (discussing Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 
224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975); Commonwealth v. Todisco, 363 Mass. 445, 294 N.E.2d 860 
(1973); Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 241 N.E.2d 848 (1968)). 
" 367 Mass. 224, 271-74, 327 N.E.2d 819, 846-47 (1975). 
" 363 Mass. 445,448-49, 294 N.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1973). In Todisco, the application was at-
tached to the warrant, but it was insufficient to cure the defect. The affidavit, which was not 
attached, was allowed to be incorporated to supply the cure. See id. 
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was allowed despite this fact, apparently because the searches in those cases 
were conducted by officers who had filed the extrinsic documents and were, 
therefore, presumed to have known the warrants' restrictions. 60 While such 
an exception to the Accaputo rule might satisfy the policy of circumscribing 
the discretion of the executing officer, 61 it does not meet the related aim of 
ensuring that the limits of the search are made known to the subject. 62 
Obviously, a strict application of the Accaputo rule would have required 
a different result in both Vitello and Todisco. In Vitello, the termination 
date of a warrant authorizing a wiretap was inadvertently omitted. 63 The 
Accaputo Court distinguished Vitello on the ground that the inadvertent 
omission from a wiretap order did not prejudice the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. 64 This is a sensible distinction; since the warrant will not be 
presented to the subject of a wiretap order, the policy of informing him of 
the scope of the search - here the scope of the wiretap order - does not 
apply. As long as the executing officer knows and follows the limits of the 
order, this exception to the Accaputo rule is appropriate. Todisco, however, 
involved the physical search of the defendant's apartment. 65 Here again, 
there is a basis for distinguishing the decision from Accaputo on the ground 
that the defendant in Todisco was not present at the time of the search. 66 
Thus, he would not have benefited from a warrant which accurately defined 
its limits. Such an exception is less justified than in the wiretap setting, 
where the subject of the search will never be presented with the warrant 
prior to the search and seizure. A warrant for a physical search of private 
quarters ordinarily should be drawn with the expectation that it will be 
presented to the subject at the time of the search in order to satisfy the 
policy to reveal the limits of the search to the subject. Under the narrowest 
reading of Accaputo, when the subject is present at the time of the search, a 
warrant to which a necessary extrinsic document is not attached may not be 
cured by the incorporation of the extrinsic document, unless the Accaputo 
test is met. It remains for future cases to resolve whether Accaputo will have 
broader applications. There is, however, no reason to limit the incorpora-
tion of that case to administrative searches. 
In an extensively regulated society, administrative inspections are an im-
portant element in enforcing legislatively determined policy decisions. Ac-
caputo presents the Supreme Judicial Court's initial application of the past 
6° Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. at 272, 327 N.E.2d at 846-47; Commonwealth v. 
Todisco, 363 Mass. at 449, 294 N.E.2d at 864. 
" Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 323; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
532 (1%7); 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1017-18, 1019, 404 N.E.2d at 1210, 12U. 
62 Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 323; United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 
(2d Cir. 1970); 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016, 1019, 404 N.E.2d at 1209, 1211. 
63 367 Mass. at 272, 327 N.E.2d at 847. 
64 See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1010, 404 N.E.2d at 1211 n.16. 
6
' 363 Mass. at 447, 294 N.E.2d at 862. 
66 Id. 
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decade's fourth amendment developments in this area. The decision ac-
curately reflects the current state of the law relating to probable cause for is-
suing an administrative search warrant and to the scope of searches permit-
ted by such devices. It also sets forth stringent requirements regarding the 
incorporation of extrinsic documents to cure a defective warrant. It is 
unclear how broad an application that requirement will receive, but it 
should extend beyond the narrow sphere of administrative searches to cover 
searches conducted in criminal investigations. 
§· 4.10. Right to a Speedy Trial.* The ~ixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides a criminal defendant in federal court the right 
to a speedy trial. 1 This amendment applies to criminal defendants in state 
courts through the fourteenth amendment. 2 In addition, article XI of the 
Massachusetts Bill of Rights guarantees a criminal defendant's right to a 
speedy trial. 3 Nevertheless, neither the federal nor state Constitutions define 
"speedy trial." During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was 
provided with two opportunities, in Commonwealth v. Look4 and in Com-
monwealth v. Rodriguez,s to determine whether a defendant's right to a 
speedy trial has been violated. In doing so, the Court applied a four factor 
test first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. 
Wingo 6 to ascertain whether a trial is "speedy. " 7 
In Commonwealth v. Look, the defendant was arrested on January 28, 
1974, for the murder of his wife and was indicted on May 29, 1974, for sec-
ond degree murder. 8 On March 17, 1975, a superior court judge granted the 
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress statements made by the defendant 
during interrogation on the night of the murder. 9 In response, on March 26, 
1975, the commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme 
Judicial Court seeking a reversal of the order to suppress. 10 The application 
for appeal was dismissed on November 22, 1975.ll The commonwealth did 
*By Peter E. Gelhaar, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW. 
§ 4.10 ' "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial .... " U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
' See Kopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1976). 
' Mass. Const. Part I, Article XI: "Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a cer-
tain remedy, by having recourse to the laws ... He ought to obtain right and justice freely ... 
promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws." 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 537, 402 N.E.2d 470 (1980). 
' 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. 1223, 405 N.E.2d 124 (1980). 
6 407 u.s. 514 (1972). 
' Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1230, 402 N.E.2d at 128; Com-
monwealth v. Look, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 540, 402 N.E.2d at 475. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 537-39, 402 N.E.2d at 473-74. 
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nothing further on the case for almost two years until November 2, 1977. 12 
On that date, it moved to vacate the dismissal of the appeal. 13 The Court 
denied this motion twenty days later. 14 On March 27, 1978, the com-
monwealth requested a trial assignment in superior court. 1 s Nine days later, 
Look moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 16 Thus, Look first asserted 
his right to a speedy trial more than four years after his indictment. He was 
not incarcerated, however, during this period. 17 The superior court judge 
denied the motion and the trial commenced on October 19, 1978. 18 A jury 
convicted Look of second degree murder. 19 He appealed the conviction to 
the Supreme Judicial Court claiming, inter alia, that his right to a speedy 
trial had been violated. 20 The Court examined four factors which must be 
considered to decide whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been 
violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay by the pro-
secution, (3) whether and when defendant asserted his right, and (4) 
whether any prejudice to the defendant resulted from the delay. 21 
With regard to the first factor, the length of delay, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a period of four years and five months between indictment 
and trial is sufficient to require further inquiry into a defendant's claim of a 
violation. 22 The Court cited delays in other cases which, by comparison, 
suggested that the delay in this case warranted further scrutiny. 23 The Court 
stated that, unless the commonwealth could explain why the delay was so 
long, this factor supported a finding for the defendant. 24 
Accordingly, the Court next examined the second factor in its test, the 
reasons for the prosecutor's delay. Because the commonwealth offered no 
explanation, the Court attributed the delay to negligence on the part of the 









19 Id. at 537, 402 N.E.2d at 473. 
20 ld. 
" Id. at 540, 402 N.E.2d at 475. 
22 Id. at 541, 402 N.E.2d at 475. 
" ld. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977) (fifty-
five month delay); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 169, 326 N.E.2d 320 (1975) (fourteen 
month delay); Commonwealth v. Horne, 326 Mass. 738, 291 N.E.2d 629 (1973) (forty-eight 
month delay). 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 541, 402 N.E.2d at 475. 
" ld. at 542, 402 N.E.2d at 476. 
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tentional delay designed to frustrate the defendant's case and negligent 
delay, it nevertheless found that the needless delay also would strongly sup-
port the defendant's claim of a violation of his right to a speedy trial. 26 
Despite the Court's finding that the first two factors favored the defend-
ant, it attributed primary importance to the third factor of the test, Look's 
failure to assert his right to a speedy trial at some earlier stage of the pro-
ceedings. 27 The Court held that it is the defendant's responsibility to assert 
his right in a timely manner. 28 The Court characterized Look's failure to act 
as "a gamble" that the commonwealth would not prosecute or that the 
commonwealth would "forg[et] about him." 29 Moreover, because Look's 
first motion to suppress was granted on March 17, 197 5, and affirmed on 
November 22, 1975, Look had almost two years to move to dismiss for lack 
of a speedy trial. 30 Thus, the Court concluded that this third factor did not 
bolster defendant's case since the right to a speedy trial cannot be kept in 
reserve in case one's belief that prosecution will not occur proves to beer-
roneous.31 
In addressing the fourth factor of the prejudice to the defendant's case 
caused by the delay, the Court heard three claims by Look. Look asserted 
that the delay resulted in, first, the unavailability of one defense witness, sec-
ond, the failure of memory of all witnesses, and third, Look's anxiety dur-
ing the four years before trial. 32 He claimed that each of these three events 
prejudiced his case. The Court noted that the speedy trial right is designed 
to afford a defendant the opportunity to present witnesses on his behalf. 33 
The -Court acknowledged that the testimony of Look's presently 
unavailable witness would have been relevant at trial. 34 Nevertheless, the 
Court found that, at trial, Look produced other witnesses who offered 
substantially the same testimony as the missing witness would have offered 
if present. 3S Because Look did not adequately demonstrate that the 
unavailable witness would have offered anything that had not been provid-
ed by testifying witnesses, the Court concluded that he was not prejudiced 
by the absence of the witness. 36 Furthermore, an examination of the trial 
26 /d. 
" Id. at 543, 402 N.E.2d at 476-77. 
" /d. at 543, 402 N.E.2d at 476. 
29 /d. at 543, 402 N.E.2d at 476-77. 
30 Id. at 543, 402 N.E.2d at 477. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
" Id. at 544, 402 N.E.2d at 477. 
34 /d. at 544-45, 402 N.E.2d at 477. The witness would have testified as to the tranquility of 
the marital relationship. /d. 
" /d. at 545, 402 N.E.2d at 478. 
36 /d. 
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transcript did not convince the Court that the witnesses who did testify 
demonstrated a significant failure of memory as a result of the delay. 37 
Finally, the Court dismissed Look's third claim of prejudice concerning his 
anxiety. 38 The Court emphasized that Look was not incarcerated pending 
trial and had failed to demonstrate his alleged anxiety sooner during the 
four year waiting period. 39 In sum, Look's failure to assert his speedy trial 
right and his failure to demonstrate that the delay prejudiced his case under-
cut his claim that his right to a speedy trial was denied. 40 Thus, the fact that 
the delay was quite long and unexplained was not sufficient to dismiss the 
charges against Look without a showing of timely assertion of the right and 
of prejudice caused by the delay. 41 
Just three months after the Look decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that a sixteen-month delay between indictment and trial was suffi-
cient to constitute a denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial. In Com-
monwealth v. Rodriguez, 42 the defendant, Ronaldo Rodriguez, was arrested 
on February 28, 1978, while possessing a sawed-off shotgun. 43 He was taken 
into custody and indicted on May 1, 1978, for unlawfully carrying a 
dangerous weapon on his person. 44 On June 7, 1978, a superior court judge 
allowed several motions by the defendant and granted him leave to file 
several more. 45 On June 7, 1978, the case was continued to June 12 and later 
continued for four more days. 46 Nevertheless, on the scheduled trial date of 
· June 12, the defendant moved for a speedy trial. 47 Thus, unlike the defend-
ant in Look, Rodriguez first asserted his right to a speedy trial just forty-
three days after indictment. 
On the trial date of June 16, 1978, the prosecution sought to amend the 
indictment to the more serious charge of unlawful possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun as opposed to the earlier indictment of the unlawful. carrying on 
one's person of a dangerous weapon. 48 The prosecution's motion, however, 
" ld. 
" ld. at 546, 402 N.E.2d at 478 . 
.. ld . 
•• ld . 
.. ld. 
42 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1223, 405 N.E.2d at 124. 
u ld. at 1223-24, 405 N.E.2d at 125. 
•• ld. at 1224, 405 N.E.2d at 125 . 
•• ld . 
•• ld . 
., ld. 
•• ld. The crime of carrying a dangerous firearm under chapter 269, section lO(a) is 
punishable by imprisonment of not less than two and one-half years in a state prison, while the 
crime of possession of a sawed-off shotgun under chapter 269, section lO(c) is punishable by 
life imprisonment. 
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was denied. 49 The prosecutor then made an endorsement of nolle prosequi50 
on the indictment of carrying a dangerous weapon. 51 The prosecution 
believed that the facts considered by the grand jury, which had returned an 
indictment for the unlawful carrying of a firearm, warranted further con-
sideration regarding a possible indictment of the more serious crime of 
possession. 52 In response to the prosecution's endorsement of nolle prose-
qui, the grand jury indicted Rodriguez on September 7, 1978, charging him 
with unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun. 53 At this time, the defend-
ant was serving a prison sentence in a New York jail on other charges. 54 The 
defendant filed a motion for speedy trial on the new indictment on April17, 
1979." Four months later, on August 14, 1979, the defendant moved to dis-
miss the charges against him for the denial of his right to a speedy trial. 56 In 
support of this motion to dismiss, defendant filed two affidavits with the 
superior court on September 11, 1979. 57 The commonwealth filed no oppos-
ing affidavits. 51 As a result, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted 
after a hearing held on September 11." 
The superior court judge found that the delay from the time of the initial 
indictment on May 1, 1978, to the hearing date of September 11, 1979, was 
caused by the mistake in the first indictment and the commonwealth's 
subsequent failure to correct the grand jury's mistake until June 16, 1978. 60 
In addition, the judge found that the prosecution's endorsement of nolle 
prosequi and its petition for the second indictment were intended to circum-
vent the superior court's denial of the motion to amend the first 
indictment. 61 As a result of the delay, the imprisoned defendant was ineligi-
ble for both parole and other prison activities at the New York state prison 
and was thereby prejudiced. 62 The judge found that the defendant also had 
been prejudiced by the lapsing of the memories of many of defendant's 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1224, 405 N.E.2d at 125. 
50 An endorsement of nolle prosequi is defmed as "[a] formal entry of record by the pros-
ecuting attorney by which he declares unwillingness to prosecute a case or his intention not to 
prosecute the case further." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 853 (3d ed. 1969). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1224, 405 N.E.2d at 125. 
"/d. 
" /d . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 1224-25 n.3, 405 N.E.2d at 125 n.3. 
" /d. at 1226, 405 N.E.2d at 126. 
"/d. 
" /d. at 1226, 405 N.E.2d at 127. 
" /d. at 1226, 405 N.E.2d at 126. 
•• /d. at 1226-27, 405 N.E.2d at 126 . 
.. /d. 
62 /d. at 1227, 405 N.E.2d at 127. 
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witnesses. 63 Finally, the superior court judge rejected the prosecutor's ex-
planation of the delay - their inability to find the defendant between Oc-
tober 1978 and April 1979. 64 The judge found that the commonwealth 
should have surmised that the defendant was in the custody of the New 
York State authorities when those authorities arrested Rodriguez at the 
nolle prosequi hearing on June 16, 1978. 65 
The commonwealth subsequently appealed the superior court judge's 
findings to the Supreme Judicial Court. 66 The Court reiterated the four fac-
tors employed in Look to determine whether the defendant's right to a 
speedy trial was violated. 67 With regard to the first factor, the length of 
delay, the Court held that, for the purposes of this case, the delay would be 
measured from the date of Rodriguez's arrest on February 28, 1978, to the 
date of dismissal of September 11, 1979. 68 The Court thus considered the 
two indictments as one prosecution which constituted the delay. 69 The delay 
of eighteen months, as the Court observed, was not great in comparison to 
much longer delays tolerated by the Court in earlier decisions. 7° Conse-
quently, it found that the delay in this case did not in itself constitute a vio-
lation of the speedy trial right.'' Whether Rodriguez could succeed in estab-
lishing a violation of this right would, therefore, depend on the other three 
factors. 
The next factor considered by the Court was the prosecution's reason for 
delay. The Court compared the conduct of the prosecutor in this case with 
the conduct of the prosecutor in the 1967 case of Commonwealth v. 
Thomas. 72 In Thomas, the prosecution's request for a thirty-day contin-
uance was denied by a district court judge. 73 In response to the denial, the 
prosecution refused to prosecute and filed a nolle prosequi. 74 The com-
monwealth then presented the case to a grand jury which returned an indict-
ment for the crime of breaking and entering. 75 The case then was assigned to 
the superior court. 76 Thus, by filing the nolle prosequi and obtaining 




•• /d. at 1223, 405 N.E.2d at 125. 
" !d. at 1232, 405 N.E.2d at 128. See text and note at note 21 supra. 
" /d. at 1231, 405 N.E.2d at 129 . 
.. /d. 
" /d. at 1231-32, 405 N.E.2d at 129. See note 20 supra. 
" /d. at 1231, 405 N.E.2d at 129. 
" 353 Mass. 429, 233 N.E.2d 25 (1967). 
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the district court judge's refusal to grant the continuance. On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Thomas chided the prosecution for its attempt to 
skirt the district court and held that the delay caused by such an attempt was 
a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. 77 Accordingly, the case 
was dismissed. 78 As in Thomas, the Rodriguez Court concluded that the 
prosecutor's conduct supported a finding of a violation of the defendant's 
right to a speedy trial. 79 
Having analyzed the first two factors with differing results, the Court 
then examined whether the defendant had asserted his speedy trial right in a 
timely fashion. After reviewing the trial judge's findings, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant seasonably and persistently asserted this right 
throughout the case. 80 The Court held that the defendant's efforts to assert 
this right in the face of the prosecution's delay strongly militated in favor of 
finding that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. 8 ' 
Finally, the Court addressed the fourth factor, whether the delay in any 
way prejudiced the defendant. It first examined the trial judge's finding that 
the passage of time probably had impaired the memories of defendant's 
witnesses. 82 The Court found the trial judge's finding to be unjustified and 
contradictory to many past decisions of the Court including the Look 
case. 83 Nevertheless, the Court approved the trial judge's findings that the 
defendant had been prejudiced by the delay since the pending trial in-
terfered with his parole eligibility and his opportunity to participate in pro-
grams at his place of detention in New York. 84 The Court found that this 
prejudice was further substantiated by two of defendant's affidavits. 85 
Because the prosecution offered no opposing affidavits, the trial judge was 
justified in relying solely on defendant's affidavits in making his findings. 86 
Thus, although the length of the delay was in no way remarkable, the Court 
found a violation of the defendant's speedy trial right based on the pros-
ecutor's reason for the delay, the defendant's timely assertion of his right, 
and the prejudice he sustained from the delay. 87 
In both Look and Rodriguez, the Supreme Judicial Court employed the 
four-factor test to determine whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial 
" /d. at 432, 233 N.E.2d at 27. 
" Id. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1232, 405 N.E.2d at 129 . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 1233, 405 N.E.2d at 130. 
" /d. at 1229, 405 N.E.2d at 128. 
" /d. 
•• /d. at 1233-34, 405 N.E.2d at 130. 
" /d . 
.. /d. 
" /d. at 1234, 405 N .E.2d at 130-31. 
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had been violated. This test was first articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo. 11 In Barker, however, that Court first 
rejected other approaches before adapting this particular test. One sug-
gested approach was the so-called "demand-waiver doctrine. " 89 This rule 
provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his speedy trial right 
for any period prior to which he has not demanded a speedy trial. 90 Unless 
the defendant actively asserts his right to a speedy trial, his right to a speedy 
trial will not be considered. 91 Thus, in order for the defendant to perfect his 
claim, he might be compelled to make a demand before trial and an addi-
tional motion for dismissal at trial. 92 The Supreme Court rejected this ap-
proach characterizing the demand-waiver rule as inconsistent with the 
Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights. 93 The Court 
held that there is a strong presumption against the waiver by silence of fun-
damental rights. 94 The Court also perceived this rule as placing the defend-
ant's counsel in an awkward position. Unless counsel demands a trial early 
and often in the proceedings, he may frustrate his client's right. 95 Converse-
ly, if counsel tolerates some delay for whatever reason, including to prepare 
his own case better, he runs the risk of waiting too long and losing his 
client's righU6 Furthermore, since under the demand-waiver rule no time 
runs until the demand is made, the government will have a reasonable time 
after the demand has been made in which to prepare its case. 97 The result is 
that the defendant may have to wait an unreasonable length of time before 
his trial commences. 98 
Although the Barker Court rejected the demand-waiver rule, it maintained 
that a defendant has some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim. 99 
Moreover, the Court stated that the assertion or failure to assert this right is 
one factor for determining whether the right has been violated. 100 In adopt-
ing its four-factor test, the Court found this particular criterion not to be 
determinative but, rather, closely related to the other factors of the test. 101 
II 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
" Id. at 523-24. 
90 /d. 
91 /d. 
" Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1602 (1965). 
" 407 U.S. at 525 . 
.. /d. 
" Id. at 527 . 
.. /d. 
" Id. at 527-28. 
"Id. at 528. 
"Id. at 529. 
100 Id. at 528. 
101 /d. at 531-32. 
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The Court continued to state, however, that the defendant's assertion of his 
speedy trial right would be entitled to strong weight in determining whether 
there was a deprivation of that right. 102 
Although citing the Barker test as its basis for the resolution of both 
Look103 and Rodriguez, 104 the Supreme Judicial Court has relied, sub silen-
tio, upon the demand-waiver rule instead. In both Look and Rodriguez, 
strong, if not controlling weight was given to whether the defendants had 
asserted their right to a speedy trial in a timely manner. For example, the 
Court in Look described the defendant's failure to assert his right as "a 
gamble" that the prosecution would be discontinued. 105 While it is true that 
Look made no attempt to invoke this right for over four years, there is 
nothing in the record to warrant the Court's speculation that Look took a 
"gamble." Similarly, the Rodriguez Court attributed great significance to 
the defendant's seasonable and persistent assertion of his speedy trial right, 
citing Barker for the importance of the defendant's timely assertion of his 
rights. 106 In effect, the Court disregarded the factor of the length of the 
delay in both cases. In its place, the Court effectively fashioned a new fac-
tor: the reason for defendant's failure to assert his rights earlier. Consider-
ing the inordinate delay in Look, it seems incongruous to place greater em-
phasis on the defendant's failure to assert his rights than on the prosecu-
tion's negligent failure to prosecute for over four years. 
The Court also has misapplied the four-factor approach in Look by wed-
ding the factors of the timely assertion of the speedy trial right and the prej-
udice to the defendant caused by the delay. The fourth factor, the prej-
udice to the defendant caused by the delay, was comprised of several 
elements including the anxiety and concern to the defendant during the 
delay. 107 The Look Court stated that the defendant's failure to assert his 
speedy trial right at an earlier time precluded any claim that the delay had 
caused him undue anxiety. 108 In this respect, the Court also noted that Look 
was not incarcerated while awaiting trial. 109 In effect, the Court made the 
factor of anxiety, and the prejudice caused by such anxiety, dependent upon 
a defendant's timely assertion of his speedy trial right. The Court found it 
difficult to conceive that Look had experienced any anxiety given that he 
102 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 537, 402 N.E.2d at 470. 
103 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1230, 405 N.E.2d at 128. 
104 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 543, 402 N.E.2d at 476-77. 
10 ' Another possible explanation for Look's failure to assert his rights is that he was 
represented by incompetent counsel. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972). 
106 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1233, 405 N.E.2d at 130. 
107 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532. 
101 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 546, 402 N.E.2d at 478. 
109 /d. 
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did not assert his right for four years and that he was not incarcerated. 110 In 
Barker, however, the Supreme Court noted that even if an accused is not in-
carcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty 
and is still living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. 111 
Indeed, in speedy trial cases, a measurement of anxiety is an extremely ques-
tionable undertaking at best. 112 It is probably better left as a question of fact 
for the trial court. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Barker 
envisioned a test comprised of "related factors [which] must be considered 
together with such other circumstances as may be relevant."" 3 The Court 
did not state, however, that any one factor should be dependent on any 
other. In contrast, the Look Court precluded a finding of substantial and 
prejudicial anxiety because the defendant failed to make a timely assertion 
of his speedy trial right. It therefore made one factor dependent upon 
another and misapplied the test. 114 
Despite its skewed use of the four-factor test, the Court indicated in Look 
that the speedy trial right may be enforced in subsequent cases through the 
new Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure." 5 Specifically, Rule 36, 
entitled "Case Management," provides standards for a speedy trial in-
cluding time limits between indictment and trial." 6 If a defendant is not 
brought to trial within these time limits, he is entitled, upon motion, to a 
dismissal of the charges. 117 Rule 36, however, also provides certain excep-
tions to the general time limits. For example, delays resulting from other 
proceedings concerning the defendant, such as hearings on pretrial motions 
or interlocutory appeals, are excluded in computing the time within which 
the trial must commence. 118 Further, a delay resulting from a continuance 
granted by a court is excluded from the calculation of the required time 
period provided the judge sets forth his reasons for the continuance." 9 
"' Id. 
111 407 U.S. at 533. 
"' Note, Right to a Speedy Trial, 86 HARV. L. REV. 164, 170 (1972). 
"' 407 U.S. at 533. 
1 1 
• This is not to suggest that the weight to be placed on the anxiety factor may not be reduced 
by the length of time a defendant waits to assert his right. A court must balance, however, the 
weight to be given each factor as opposed to making one factor dependent upon another. 
1
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 541 n.2, 402 N.E.2d at 476 n.2. See MASs. R. CRIM. P. 36. See 
also, Mills, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MASs. LAW§ 14.6, at 297. 
"' From July 1, 1979 to July 1, 1980, a defendant must be tried within twenty-four months 
after the defendant's return day - the day on which a defendant is ordered by summons to 
first appear or does first appear to answer the charges. From July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981, the 
defendant must be tried within eighteen months after the return day. Finally, after July 1, 
1981, a defendant must be tried within one year after the return day. Mass. R. Crim. P. Rule 
36(b)(l). 
"' /d. at (b)(1)(D). 
"' Id. at (b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v). 
1
" /d. at (b )(2)(F). 
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In addition to providing for specific time periods for bringing a defend-
ant to trial, the Rules specify other special circumstances which warrant 
dismissal. A defendant may be entitled to a dismissal of the charges if the 
prosecutor's conduct is unreasonably lacking in diligence or has caused prej-
udice to the defendant. 120 This provision is particularly relevant to the Look 
decision. In Look, the defendant had to establish that the prosecution had 
no reasonable explanation for the delay. 121 The Court noted that this 
burden was onerous since a defendant is not privy to the administrative 
decisions of the district attorney's office. 122 Nevertheless, the Court quite 
properly stated that the new Rules mitigate this burden to some degree by 
shifting it to the commonwealth if a defendant has not been brought to trial 
within certain time periods. 123 Thus, a delay as existed in Look should 
become quite uncommon for two reasons. First, the prosecution is 
obligated to try a defendant within a certain time period and, second, a 
defendant may move for dismissal due to prejudicial delay even before this 
time period expires. 
A final special provision of the new Rules which bears directly on 
Rodriguez is a provision which concerns persons detained outside the com-
monwealth. Under this provision, the commonwealth must not delay in 
notifying a defendant who is detained outside the commonwealth of charges 
against him and must promptly seek to obtain his presence for trial. 124 
Should the prosecution fail to do so, the charges against the defendant must 
be dismissed. 125 In Rodriguez, the prosecution failed to notify the defendant 
incarcerated in a New York State prison of the charges against him for 
seven months. 126 Under the new Rule, Rodriguez would have been able to 
argue that this delay was unreasonable and, therefore, greatly increase the 
chance that his charges be dismissed. 
In conclusion, although the Supreme Judicial Court was compelled to 
employ the four-factor test articulated in Barker, the Court nevertheless has 
misapplied the test. The Court has placed so much weight on the factor of a 
defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right that the Court's test ap-
proaches the demand-waiver rule. Despite the Court's questionable inter-
pretation of the Barker test, the new Rules of Criminal Procedure may pro-
vide additional protection to a defendant's right to a speedy trial. In accord-
ance with the new Rules, the prosecution generally will be obligated to try a 
criminal defendant within twelve months. The adoption of these Rules may 
obviate "speedy trials" of four years. 
120 !d. at (c). 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 541, 402 N.E.2d at 476. 
122 !d. at 541 n.2, 402 N.E.2d at 476 n.2. 
"' !d. 
12
' MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(d)(3). 
'" !d. 
126 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1227,405 N.E.2d at 127. 
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§ 4.11. Double Jeopardy - Two-Tier Court System.* Under the 
reorganized court system in effect in Massachusetts since January 1, 1979, a 
criminal defendant who is brought to trial in a district court1 may elect to 
have either a jury trial or a bench trial. 2 If a defendant elects a jury trial and 
is convicted, he may appeal directly to the appeals court. 3 If a defendant 
elects a bench trial, however, his only recourse from a conviction is a trial de 
novo, 4 again at the district court level.' During the Survey year, in Lydon v. 
Commonwealth, 6 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the two-tier trial de 
novo system against a challenge brought under the fifth amendment.' 
Specifically, the challenge asserted that when a defendant has been con-
victed on insufficient evidence at a bench trial, reprosecuting him in a trial 
de novo would violate his right to be protected from double jeopardy. • 
The defendants in Lydon v. Commonwealth were brought to trial for 
possession of burglarious instruments9 in the Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston. 10 Under the Massachusetts court system, the defendants had the 
* By Marco Adelfio, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 4.11. ' The district courts, and the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, have original 
jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior courts, over violations of local ordinances, "all mis-
demeanors, except libels, all felonies punishable by imprisonment in the state prisons for not 
more than five years," and several listed felonies punishable by imprisonment for more than 
five years. G.L. c. 218, § 26. 
2 G.L. c. 218, § 26A. 
' G.L. c. 218, § 27A(g). 
• G.L. c. 218, § 26A. The statute reads as follows: 
/d. 
Trial of criminal offenses in the Boston municipal court department and in the divi-
sions of the district court department shall be by a jury of six, unless the defendant files 
a written waiver and consent to be tried by the court without a jury, subject to his right 
of appeal therefrom for trial by a jury of six pursuant to section twenty-seven A. Such 
waiver shall not be received unless the defendant is represented by counsel or has filed a 
written waiver of counsel. Such trials by jury in the first instance shall be in those jury 
sessions designated by said section twenty-seven A for the hearing of such appeals. All 
provisions of law and rules of court relative to the hearing and trial of such appeals shall 
apply also to jury trials in the first instance. 
' G.L. c. 218, § 27A. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1915, 409 N.E.2d 745. 
' Id. at 1918-19, 409 N.E.2d at 748. 
• /d. In two companion opinions decided the same day, Gibson v. Commonwealth, 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1933, 409N.E.2d 741, and A Juvenilev. Commonwealth, 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1939, 409 N.E.2d 755, the Court upheld the two-tier system that was in effect before January 
1, 1979. The distinguishing feature of the old system was that a defendant could not elect a jury 
trial in the first instance. Instead, a defendant was tried originally in a ben9h trial from which 
the only recourse was a new trial. G.L. c. 278, § 18, as amended through Acts of 1974, c. 167. 
Since these two opinions incorporated much of the Lydon opinion in reaching the same result, 
they will not be discussed separately in this chapter. 
• Lydon v. Commonwealth, Reservation and Report of Questions Arising in the Plaintiff's 
Petition for Relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, at 1. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1916,409 N.E.2d at 746-47. The two-tier system applies equally to 
the Boston Municipal Court and the District Courts of Massachusetts. G.L. c. 218, § 26A. 74
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right to a jury trial, but they elected instead to proceed to a bench trial. 11 
The defendants were convicted at their bench trial, and subsequently they 
petitioned for a trial de novo by jury . 12 Before the second trial commenced, 
however, the defendants filed a motion with the jury trial judge to have the 
charges against them dismissed. 13 The defendants asserted that the prosecu-
tion's evidence at the bench trial had been insufficient to warrant their con-
victions.14 They argued that to require them to submit to a new trial would 
violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, because the 
evidence at the first trial had been insufficient to support convictions. 15 The 
defendants' motion was denied by the trial judge, and the defendants im-
mediately petitioned the single justice session of the Supreme Judicial Court 
for relief under that Court's superintendence power. 16 The single justice 
stayed the second trial and, solely "for the purpose of reporting clearly 
framed questions to the full bench [of the Supreme Judicial Court]," 17 ac-
cepted the defendants' contention that the evidence presented at the bench 
trial did not warrant the convictions. 18 
On the basis of this assumption, the single justice reported two questions 
for consideration by the full bench. 19 First, the Court was presented with 
the question whether, when the evidence at the bench trial is insufficient to 
warrant convictions, the defendants would be placed in double jeopardy by 
requiring that they submit to a new trial. 20 The second question was 
whether, assuming the defendants would be placed in double jeopardy, the 
trial court judge may pass on the sufficiency of the evidence that was 
presented at the first trial. 21 The Court answered the first inquiry in the 
negative22 and held, therefore, that the judge at the second trial would never 
have occasion to adjudicate the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the 
first trial. 23 
The first question decided by the full bench of the Supreme Judicial 
Court was ''whether a defendant would be denied his right not to be placed 
in double jeopardy if he were required to go through a jury trial when the 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 1916, 409 N.E.2d at 747. 
" /d. 
" /d. The defendants also had asserted this at the conclusion of the bench trial. /d. 
" See text and notes at notes 33-36 infra. 
" Id. The superintendence power of the Supreme Judicial Court, conferred by G.L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is the power to correct and to prevent errors and abuses in the courts of inferior jurisdic-
tion by issuing any necessary writs, processes, and directives. 
" /d. at 1918 n.6, 409 N.E.2d at 748 n.6. 
" !d. at 1916, 409 N.E.2d at 747 . 
.. /d. 
20 /d. at 1916-17 n.3, 409 N.E.2d at 747 n.3. 
21 /d. 
22 !d. at 1926, 409 N.E.2d at 752. 
2l /d. 75
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
188 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 4.11 
evidence at the bench trial was inadequate to support his conviction. " 24 On 
this issue, the defendants relied primarily on Burks v. United States, 2s a 
United States Supreme Court decision that substantially broadened the 
availability of a fifth amendment double jeopardy claim to a criminal 
defendant. Prior to Burks, when a defendant successfully had appealed a 
conviction to a reviewing court, the double jeopardy clause did not limit the 
state's ability to reprosecute. 26 Burks narrowed this rule to provide that 
reprosecution was not permissible in cases where the appellate reversal was 
grounded on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 27 
The Burks Court thus distinguished between an appellate reversal because 
of trial error and a reversal because of insufficient evidence. 28 The Court 
stated that reprosecution after an appellate reversal because of trial error 
was permissible, since the reversal "implies nothing with respect to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. " 29 In contrast, when a conviction is reversed 
for lack of sufficient evidence, the prosecution has been given one fair 
chance to offer whatever proof it could assemble and has failed, as a matter 
of law, to prove the defendant's guilt. 30 The Court found no valid distinc-
tion, for fifth amendment purposes, between an appellate determination 
that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict the 
" /d. at 1916-17, 409 N.E.2d at 747. The claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict 
the defendants was accepted by the single justice as a premise on which to hypothesize this 
question. /d. at 1918 n.6, 409 N.E.2d at 748 n.6. 
" 437 U.S. 1 (1978). On the day it was decided, the Burks decision was held applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978). 
" See, e.g., Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960) (The Court stated: "[i]t is elemen-
tary in our law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense when his prior conviction 
for that same offense has been set aside by his appeal.'' /d. at 425 (citing United States v. Ball, 
163 U.S. 662,672 (1896)).) Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (The Court remanded to 
the district court, holding that a new trial was justified "even where the evidence might be 
deemed palpably insufficient, particularly since petitioners have asked in the alternative for a 
new trial as well as for acquittal." /d. at 328). 
The Burks Court examined prior decisions on whether a case that is reversed on appeal may 
be remanded for a new trial. The Court concluded that the cases were fraught with ambiguities, 
but that "at least one principal emerged: A defendant who requests a new trial as one avenue 
of relief may be required to stand trial again, even where his conviction was reversed due to a 
failure of proof at the first trial." 437 U.S. at 10. 
" 437 U.S. at 18. The petitioner in Burks was tried on bank robbery charges in a United 
States District Court, and was convicted despite his assertion of insanity. /d. at 2-3 .. Burks suc-
cessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the prosecution had failed to pre-
sent sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of insanity. Id. at 3. The case reached the Supreme 
Court on Burks' assertion that the Appeals Court's remand for a possible reprosecution placed 
him in double jeopardy. /d. at 5. The Supreme Court agreed that a new trial would violate the 
fifth amendment, and hence directed a judgment of acquittal. /d. at 18. 
" Id. at 15-16. 
'' /d. at 15. 
" /d. at 16. 
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defendant and a jury acquittal in the first instance. 31 Since reprosecution 
would be impermissible in the latter situation, the Burks Court held that 
reprosecution also must be barred in the former. 32 
The defendants in Lydon argued that the principles underlying Burks ap-
plied equally to their own situation. 33 The rule in Burks, they argued, 
should bar their retrial. 34 They asserted that the prosecutor should not be 
provided a second opportunity to prove the defendants guilty after his in-
itial failure during a full and fair first trial. 35 This rule should apply, they 
asserted, regardless of whether there has been an appellate decision on the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented at the bench trial. 36 The Supreme 
Judicial Court, however, interpreted Burks more restrictively and ultimate-
ly distinguished it from the situation in Lydon. 37 According to the Lydon 
Court, the Supreme Court's holding in Burks was limited to situations 
where a " 'reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient.' " 38 
The Lydon Court held that, absent such an appellate decision, the double 
jeopardy clause is not implicated. 39 Because there was no provision in the 
Massachusetts system for an appellate court to determine the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented at the bench trial, the Lydon Court found that the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the double jeopardy clause did not bar a 
trial de novo. 40 
In addition to finding Burks inapplicable, the Lydon Court ultimately 
decided that the two-tier system was "not an act of governmental oppres-
sion of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to 
protect. " 41 First, the defendants' assertion that the commonwealth had no 
legitimate state interest in reprosecuting them was rejected because, the 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
" Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 12. 
" Id. at 14-15. 
" /d. at 9-10. 
" /d. at 13-15. The Appellants cited Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), a pre-
Burks challenge to the Massachusetts two-tier system, in support of their contention that: "the 
answer to the question of how double jeopardy applies to a de novo defendant is found by 
analyzing how double jeopardy applies to a defendant who successfully challenges his convic-
tion in an appellate court." /d. at 631-32. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1919-20, 409 N.E.2d at 748-49. 
" /d. at 1919-20,409 N.E.2d at 749 (quoting Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)) (emphasis 
added by the Supreme Judicial Court). 
" /d. at 1919-20, 409 N.E.2d at 749. 
•• /d. at 1919, 409 N.E.2d at 748-49. The Court also found that, since the double jeopardy 
clause was not violated by a second trial unless a defendant could obtain appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial, the double jeopardy protection did not give a 
defendant the right to such appellate review. /d. at 1920, 409 N.E.2d at 749. 
'' /d. at 1925, 409 N.E.2d at 751 (citation omitted). 
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Court found, the commonwealth was not seeking to reprosecute. 42 Rather, 
the commonwealth merely provided defendants with an option: allow the 
convictions to stand or submit to a trial de novo. 43 Second, the Court 
stressed that under the existing system, the defendants had elected volun-
tarily to proceed to the bench trial from which their only recourse would be 
a trial de novo. 44 Had they not done so, "no question of double jeopardy 
would have arisen. " 45 The notion of waiver of the constitutional protection 
was, therefore, a factor in the Court's decision. Finally, the Court found 
that a criminal defendant actually may benefit from the two-tier system by 
virtue of having "two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure an ac-
quittal. " 46 
Having upheld the two-tier system, the Lydon Court then examined the 
second question reported to it by the single justice. The second question 
was, assuming the existence of a valid double jeopardy claim, whether "a 
jury-trial judge could or should reconsider the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence which a bench-trial judge had decided adversely to a defend-
ant. " 47 The defendants had contended that, because a second trial is pro-
hibited if the initial conviction is based on insufficient evidence, a decision 
must be made on the sufficiency of the evidence before the defendants could 
be subject to a second trial. 48 They argued that in order to decide whether 
the defendants' double jeopardy assertion was valid, the de novo court 
would be required to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the 
first trial. Such a review was required, the defendants argued, even though 
there was no statutory authority for a de novo court to review evidence 
presented at a bench trial. 49 Although the Court accepted the contention 
that the trial de novo judge was required to consider the assertion of a viola-
tion of the double jeopardy clause, it found that the judge would have to re-
ject such an assertion. so This finding was an obvious result, given the 
Court's decision that there is no valid double jeopardy claim in the absence 
" Id. at 1921, 409 N.E.2d at 749. 
" Id. at 1921, 409 N.E.2d at 749-50. 
" /d. at 1923, 409 N.E.2d.at 750-51. In Gibson v. Commonwealth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1933, 409 N.E.2d 741, and in A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1939, 409 
N.E.2d 755, the companion cases to Lydon, the Court upheld the two-tier system in effect in 
Massachusetts before January 1, 1979. Under the old system, a defendant hau no choice but to 
submit to a bench trial from which his only recourse was a trial de novo. G.L. c. 278, § 18, as 
amended through Acts of 1974, c. 167. See note 7 supra. The Court's decisions in these two 
cases indicate that the lack of voluntariness does not warrant a holding different from that in 
Lydon. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1923, 409 N.E.2d at 751. 
•• /d. at 1924, 409 N.E.2d at 751 (citation omitted). Some ancillary benefits of a prior bench 
trial include: "a means of discovery and recordation of the prosecution's testimony [, and] ... 
a less expensive and less time consuming process." Id . 
., Id. at 1917, 409 N.E.2d at 747. 
•• Brief for Defendants-Appellants, at 18-22. 
•• Id. at 19. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1926, 409 N.E.2d_ at 752. 78
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of an appellate reversal. Because such an assertion would be rejected, 
moreover, the trial de novo judge would never reach the issue of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. 5 1 
Justice Liacos, in a separate opinion joined by Justice Abrams, concurred 
in the majority's finding that the de novo court was the proper forum for 
the defendants to raise their double jeopardy claim 52 but dissented on the 
issue of the validity of such a claim. 53 Justice Liacos contended that the 
absence of an appellate decision on the sufficiency of the evidence was ir-
relevant and that a retrial of defendants convicted on insufficient evidence 
would violate the fifth amendment proscriptions. 54 He concluded that the 
majority's interpretation of Burks "fixed upon a formal nicety wholly 
unrelated to the purposes of the double jeopardy clause." 55 Rather than 
reading Burks to require an appellate reversal as a condition precedent to a 
valid double jeopardy claim, Justice Liacos interpreted it as requiring only a 
failure of proof at the first trial. 56 This conclusion resulted from Burks' 
focus on the "nature of the error committed at the first trial, not on acquit-
tal or conviction." 57 In the case at bar, Justice Liacos concluded that the 
defendants' retrial would be barred by the siagle justice's assumption that 
the evidence at the bench trial was insufficient to support their conviction. 58 
The separate opinion also rejected the majority's reliance on the defend-
ants' election as a form of waiver. 59 Justice Liacos contended that a waiver 
is only valid if the defendant knows that the effect of his decision is to waive 
constitutional rights. 60 He found no evidence that the defendants knew they 
were giving up their constitutional right not to be reprosecuted after a con-
viction based on insufficient evidence. 61 The defendants indisputably would 
have retained such a right had they elected a jury trial in the first instance. 62 
Because there was no evidence that the Lydon defendants had decided on a 
bench trial with such knowledge, 63 and because there was no assurance that 
future defendants would make such a decision with such knowledge, 64 
Justice Liacos refused to find a waiver. 65 
" Id. 
" /d. at 1931, 409 N.E.2d at 754. 
" Id. at 1927, 409 N.E.2d at 752. 






" Id. at 1929-30, 409 N.E.2d at 754. 
60 Id. at 1930, 409 N.E.2d at 754. 
61 /d. 
62 Had the defendants elected a jury trial in the first instance, they would have retained the 
right to have an appellate court decide the sufficiency with the evidence, and, by exercising 
such right, they could have avoided reprosecution. 
6
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The Lydon Court's attempt to distinguish Burks on the basis of the lack 
of an appellate review finds no support in the principles underlying Burks. 
The risks that justify extending the double jeopardy protection to cover 
situations involving a failure of proof do not differ depending upon 
whether there has been an appellate reversal. The Burks Court recognized 
that a retrial after· a conviction based on inadequate proof raises double 
jeopardy implications as severe as those raised by a retrial after an 
acquittal. 66 Although Burks did involve an appellate determination that 
evidence was insufficient, its holding was not expressly limited to such situa-
tions. Nor is such a limitation justified, since, regardless of whether there 
has been an appellate determination, a second trial will provide the prosecu-
tion with a second opportunity to obtain a valid conviction after having 
failed in its first attempt. This is precisely the evil against which the double 
jeopardy clause is directed. 67 Moreover, a failure of proof in a first trial car-
ries with it a very definite implication of innocence. 68 
In Lydon, defendants convicted on evidence that was conceded to have 
been insufficient were seeking the acquittal that, by law, should have re-
sulted from the first trial. At the same time, they were seeking to avoid giv-
ing the prosecutor the opportunity to supply additional evidence. By deny-
ing them that right, the Court rejected the principles underlying Burks in 
favor of an arbitrary precondition designed to keep the court system intact. 
The United States Supreme Court, however, already had denied the validity 
of the precondition that a defendant must obtain an appellate reversal in 
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 69 a pre-Burks challenge to the Massachusetts-de 
novo system. In that case, the Court stated: "A defendant who elects to be 
tried de novo in Massachusetts is in no different position than is a convicted 
defendant who successfully appeals on the basis of a trial record and gains a 
reversal of his conviction and a remand of his case for a new trial.'''0 In-
deed, Justice Liacos recognized the arbitrariness of the precondition 
adopted by the majority and instead focused on the nature of the error at 
the trial court. His interpretation of Burks elevates the substantive policies 
•• 437 U.S. at 10-11. 
" The United States Supreme Court has described the evil against which the double jeopar-
dy clause is directed as follows: 
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy rests on the belief that the State 
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and in-
security, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he.may be found 
guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
" See text and note at note 29 supra . 
.. 427 u.s. 618 (1976). 
'
0 ld. at 631-32. 
80
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/7
§ 4.12 CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 193 
of the fifth amendment above the specific procedural differences between 
Burks and Lydon. Since there is no valid reason for the fifth amendment 
protection not to attach until after an appellate reversal, Justice Liacos' in-
terpretation is more consistent with the constitutional proscription. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court acted in Lydon to uphold the 
current Massachusetts two-tier court system against a double jeopardy 
challenge. The Burks Court's expansion of the availability of a double 
jeopardy claim to a defendant convicted on insufficient evidence was 
deemed not to have implicitly invalidated the two-tier system. The Lydon 
Court imposed a precondition on the attachment of the substantive protec-
tions of Burks: an appellate judge must have decided that the evidence 
presented at the first trial was insufficient. Since the Massachusetts court 
system does not provide a defendant convicted at a bench trial with the op-
portunity to seek such an appellate determination, the constitutionality of 
its trial de novo system was upheld. This result does not accord with the 
principles set forth in Burks, and creates a situation where the availability of 
the constitutional protection is dependent on the will of the legislature. The 
risks that the double jeopardy clause was designed to avert are no less 
substantial in the situation of the two-tier court system than in the situation 
considered in Burks, and there is thus no valid justification for the divergent 
result. 
§ 4.12. The Fifth Amendment Requirement of Testimonial Communi-
cation.* The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does 
not protect an accused from being compelled to engage in any activity that 
would produce self-incriminating evidence.' Rather, the fifth amendment 
protects an accused only from being compelled to make incriminating 
testimonial communications. 2 During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. 
Hughes, 3 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court delineated the scope of 
activities that are sufficiently testimonial to evoke the protections of the 
fifth amendment. The Hughes Court held that an accused could not be 
compelled to produce the revolver allegedly used in an assault. By produc-
ing the gun, the accused would admit possession of the gun. This admission 
is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 4 In reaching this 
result, the Court relied on principles set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Fisher v. United States. 5 
*By Marco Adelfio, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 4.12 ' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 
245, 252-53 (1910); 8 1. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2263 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
2 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2263 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1161, 404 N.E.2d 1239. 
' Id. at 1173, 404 N.E.2d at 1246. 
, 425 u.s. 391 (1976). 
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In Fisher, two taxpayers who were under criminal investigation obtained 
work papers prepared by their accountants and transferred them to their at-
torneys. 6 The attorneys challenged summonses served on them to produce 
the papers, relying on their clients' privilege against self-incrimination. 7 The 
Court agreed that the clients' privilege was the relevant issue, 8 but on the 
facts of the case, the Court held that the production of the papers could be 
compelled. 9 
In deciding whether the summonses violated the fifth amendment, the 
Fisher Court focused exclusively on the communicative aspects of the act of 
producing the documents. 10 The Court stated that "[t]he act of producing 
evidence in response to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its 
own .... " 11 Thus, the Court recognized that all acts of production have a 
communicative character. The act of producing the papers in Fisher was 
found to be tantamount to an admission by the defendants that the papers 
had existed and that the defendants had possessed and controlled them. 12 
Once the Court discerned the substance of the implicit communications, it 
analyzed these communications to determine whether they were sufficiently 
"testimonial" to be protected by the fifth amendment. 13 
The Fisher Court focused on the factual issues involved in the case in 
deciding whether the implicit communications were testimonial. The Court 
found that the existence and location of the work papers were not "in 
issue" 14 but were a "foregone conclusion." 15 Moreover, attesting to the 
papers' existence and location was deemed to provide little or no additional 
evidence for the prosecution. 16 Consequently, the Fisher Court held that the 
implicit communications were not testimonial and, hence, not privileged. 17 
• ld. at 394. 
' ld. at 395. 
• ld. at 404-05. 
• ld. at 410-12. 
•• ld. at 410. The contents of the papers did not come within the ambit of the fifth amend-
ment because the privilege extends only to protect against one's own compelled testimony and 
the accountant's workpapers "were not prepared by the taxpayer and they contain no 
testimonial declarations by him." Id. at 409. 
" ld. at 410. 
12 ld. 
" ld. at 408. The Court commented: "It is clear that the Fifth Amendment does not in-
dependently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but 
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communciation that is in-
criminating." ld. (emphasis original). 
•• ld. at 412. 
" ld. at 411. 
16 ld. 
" Id. The Fisher Court analogized the case before it with a hypothetical case of an accused 
who is compelled to submit a handwriting examplar, thereby implying only that he has the 
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Thus, the Fisher Court establisherd the principle that the fifth amendment 
privilege does not protect an accused from being compelled to make an im-
plicit communication that is tantamount to a foregone conclusion, because 
the communication is not testimonial. 
The Supreme Judicial Court applied the Fisher principle in Com-
monwealth v. Hughes, 18 a criminal case in which the defendant was charged 
with assault with a deadly weapon, specifically, a revolver. 19 Prior to 
Hughes' indictment, the police had searched his car pursuant to a lawful 
warrant, but they were unable to find the pistol. 20 Six months after the in-
dictment was entered, the commonwealth filed a "Motion to Order Defend-
ant to Produce Weapon," describing with particularity a gun that was 
registered in the accused's name which was of the same caliber as the gun 
allegedly used in the shooting incident. 21 The motion was granted after a 
hearing, but Hughes failed to comply with the subsequent court order. 22 
Hughes was adjudged in contempt and sentenced to incarceration by the 
superior court, but his sentence was stayed pending direct appellate review 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. 23 
The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of contempt, 24 basing 
its decision on its interpretation of the "converse inference from Fisher," 25 
namely that "assertions implied from the production of things (whether or 
not documents) are within the Fifth Amendment ... when they are non-
trivial and incriminating. " 26 To justify drawing this inference, the Court 
cited several cases where communications implied by the act of production 
were deemed privileged. 27 The Hughes Court applied this principle to the 
facts and concluded that the act of producing the revolver would have suffi-
cient incriminating and communicative implications to warrant the defend-
ability to write and that the examplar is his. /d. Since these facts generally would not be subject 
to dispute, the defendant's fifth amendment privilege would not be violated because "nothing 
he has said or done is deemed to be sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege." /d. 
See note 45 infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1161, 404 N.E.2d 1239. 
19 /d. at 1161, 404 N.E.2d at 1240. 
" Id. at 1162, 404 N.E.2d at 1240. 
21 /d. 
" Id. at 1162-63, 404 N.E.2d at 1240-41. 
" /d. at 1163, 404 N.E.2d at 1241. 
,. /d. at 1173, 404 N.E.2d at 1246. 
" /d. at 1168, 404 N.E.2d at 1243. 
" /d. 
21 /d. at 1168-69, 404 N.E.2d at 1243-44. The Court cited: United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 
890, 893 (8th Cir. 1977) (production of patient records by doctor would implicitly authenticate 
them); United States v. Campos-Serrano, 430 F.2d 173, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1970) (production of 
forged alien registration card by defendant would be tantamount to a waiver of his fifth 
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ant's invoking of the fifth amendment. 28 In reaching this result, the Court 
reasoned that the act of producing the revolver was equivalent to making an 
implicit statement about the existence, location, control, and authenticity of 
the gun. 29 The futility of the search warrant demonstrated to the Court that 
the commonwealth did not know the whereabouts of the revolver. 30 Because 
of the commonwealth's lack of solid information, the Court determined 
that the implicit assertions of possession and control would not "amount to 
a 'foregone conclusion' conveying merely trivial new knowledge." 3 ' 
Rather, the implicit admissions would add significantly to the prosecution's 
case, 32 thus satisfying the nontrivial element of the test. The Court also 
found that the implicit communications would be incriminating. 33 Thus, the 
Court concluded that Hughes could not be compelled to produce the 
revolver. 34 
The prosecutor in Hughes argued by analogy to Fisher that, since it could 
prove the defendant's possession of the gun "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
by independently obtained evidence, 35 the "production of the weapon 
would add nothing to what is already known" and hence should not be 
privileged. 36 In emphatically rejecting the prosecutor's argument, 37 the 
Supreme Judicial Court seemed to adopt the position that the degree to 
amendment privilege because "the only effective evidence defendant could produce in rebuttal 
would be for him to testify." /d. [this case preceded Fisher)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum, 466 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's production of financial 
records would implicitly assert existence and possession); In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp. 37, 39 
(S.D. Fla. 1977) (defendant's production of incriminating tape recordings would implicitly 
authenticate them); State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1979) (production of 
allegedly obscene films by defendants would implicitly assert their control over, possession of, 
and responsibility for the films); State v. Dennis, 16 Wash. App. 417, 423-24, 558 P.2d 297, 
301 (1976) (production of cocaine implicitly acknowledged guilty knowledge of possession). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169-71, 1173, 404 N.E.2d at 124445, 1246. 
29 /d. at 1169-70, 404 N.E.2d at 1244. 
" /d. at 1170,404 N.E.2d at 1244. The Court commented that "the Commonwealth is seek-
ing to be relieved of its ignorance or uncertainty by trying to get itself informed of knowledge 
the defendant possesses." /d. (citation omitted). 
31 /d. 
" /d. at 1170-71, 404 N.E.2d at 124445. 
" /d. at 1171, 404 N.E.2d at 1245. In deciding that the production of the pistol would in-
criminate the defendant independently, the Court reiterated the generally recognized proposi-
tion that "the constitutional privilege 'does not merely encompass evidence which may lead to 
a criminal conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence that could lead to prosecution .... ' " /d. (citation omitted). 
" !d. at 1171, 1173, 404 N.E.2d at 1245, 1246. 
" Brief for the Commonwealth, Appellee at 8-9. 
" /d. at 9. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1171-72, 404 N.E.2d at 1245. 
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which the implicit communications would enhance "other persuasive 
evidence obtained without the defendant's help" 38 was irrelevant to the 
disposition of the case. 39 The opinion is inconsistent, however, because the 
Court ultimately did dispose of the case by evaluating the degree to which 
the implicit communications would enhance the prosecutor's independently 
obtained evidenced. The prosecutor's lack of solid evidence of the weapon's 
whereabouts was conclusive. 40 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Hughes renders the scope of the 
fifth amendment privilege uncertain. Although the ambiguities in Fisher 
and its progeny have contributed to the uncertainty, the Hughes opinion 
further confounds the issues because it inconsistently discusses the manner 
in which significance is to be determined and because it shifts its focus from 
"testimonial" to "nontrivial." As a result, the role of incriminating evi-
dence independently obtained by the prosecutor remains unresolved. 
Furthermore, the concept of "nontriviality" intimates that the scope of the 
privilege is a question of degree, yet the Court offers no justification for this 
approach and provides no guidelines or characteristics that would enhance 
the predictive value of its analysis. 
In Fisher, the United States Supreme Court based its holding that the act 
of producing the work papers was not testimonial on three findings. The 
Fisher Court found that the substance of the implicit communications was 
not in issue, 41 that it was a foregone conclusion, 42 and that it added "little 
or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information .... " 43 
Although some courts that have interpreted Fisher, including the Hughes 
Court, have treated this third element as justification for examining the pro-
secutor's independently obtained evidence, 44 the Fisher Court itself did not 
examine such evidence. The statement in Fisher, therefore, appears to mean 
nothing more than the recognition that the government would gain no 
benefit from the implicit communications, since the existence and location 
of the work papers had not been disputable issues in the case. 4 s Although 
" /d. at 1171, 404 N.E.2d at 1245. 
39 /d. 
40 See text and notes at notes 30-32 supra. 
" 425 U.S. at 412. 
" /d. at 411. 
43 /d. 
•• See, e.g., In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 466 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); and State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349, 352 
(Minn. 1979). 
•• Further supporting this interpretation of Fisher is the Court's statement that the papers 
were "the kind usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client." 
425 U.S. at 411. Thus, the Court implied that the existence of the privilege depends on whether 
the implicit communications relate to matters that would be undisputed, rather than whether 
85
Adelfio et al.: Chapter 4: Criminal Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
198 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.12 
Fisher has been interpreted to have created a standard based solely on the 
existence of a disputable issue, 46 it also has been interpreted to have adopted 
a test based on the extent of incriminating evidence independently obtained 
by the prosecutor. 47 Under the former interpretation, a determination by 
the Hughes Court that the defendant's possession of the gun was at issue 
would have been dispositive. Because the defendant had purchased the gun 
more than two years before the crime, his possession of the weapon could 
be an issue. If the possession was an issue, the implicit admission of posses-
sion would be testimonial and, hence, within the fifth amendment protec-
tion. Instead, the opinion leaves open the possibility that an absence of the 
prosecutor's need for the implicit communication should result in a finding 
that the privilege is unavailable despite the Court's vigorous rejection of the 
prosecutor's similar argument. In fact, the Hughes opinion seems to require 
an analysis of the prosecutor's evidence to evaluate his need for the implicit 
communication, in order to decide whether the substance of the implicit 
communication amounts to a foregone conclusion. The Fisher Court did 
not intend this result, 48 yet the Hughes Court appears to have left open the 
possibility of such an analysis. 
the prosecutor has independent proof of the facts. 
The Supreme Court also analogized the production of the accountant's work papers with the 
production of a handwriting examplar by a defendant. 
When an accused is required to submit a handwriting examplar he admits his ability 
to write and impliedly asserts that the exemplar is his writing. But in common ex-
perience, the first would be a near truism and the latter self-evident . ... [H]is Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not violated because nothing he has said or done is deemed to 
be sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege. . . . The existence and posses-
sion or control of the subpoenaed documents being no more in issue here than in the 
above cases, the summons is equally enforceable. 
/d. at 411-12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See note 17 supra. 
•• The Court of Appeals of Washington, in State v. Dennis, 16 Wash. App. 417, 423-24, 558 
P.2d 297, 301 (1976), cited in Hughes at 1980 Mass. Adv. ~h. at 1168, 404 N.E.2d at 1244, 
adopted this interpretation of Fisher. The court emphasized the existence of a contestible issue 
about guilty knowledge of possession of cocaine. !d. By' being compelled to produce the co-
caine, rather than awaiting the inevitable execution of a search warrant, the defendant had "all 
but negated any possible defense of unwitting or unknowing possession." /d. at 424, 558 P .2d 
at 301. Although the court also discussed the defendant's having provided an "additional in-
gredient" to the prosecutor's case, id., the court did not address the prosecutor's lack of infor-
mation on the matter. Hence, the court's finding was predicated primarily on its finding that 
guilty knowledge was, or could be, placed in issue. 
47 Indeed, Justice Brennan, concurring in Fisher, apparently interpreted the majority as 
deciding testimoniality on the basis of the extent to which the prosecutor has independent 
proof. He stated the reason for his hesitancy to endorse the majority opinion: "I know of no 
Fifth Amendment principle which makes the testimonial nature of evidence, and, therefore, 
one's protection against incriminating himself, turn on the strength of the Government's case 
against him." 425 U.S. at 429. See also note 44 supra. 
•• See text and notes at notes 41-45 supra. 
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Moreover, the Hughes Court's emphasis on significance rather than 
testimoniality renders ambiguous the standard to be applied. The concept 
of significance intimates that the scope of the privilege is a question of 
degree. This represents a departure from the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court in Fisher where the principle was established that any matter 
that is not a foregone conclusion is testimonial and thus privileged. The ex-
act nature of the departure taken by the Hughes Court, however, is unclear. 
The Hughes Court, by adopting an analysis based on the significance of the 
implicit communications, may have been attempting to take into considera-
tion the relative values of the evidence that would be obtained by the im-
plicit communications and the evidence that would be lost by failure to 
comply with the order to produce. The Court's failure to explain its use of 
the term "nontrivial," however, renders the opinion ambiguous and its ap-
plication unpredictable. 
The Hughes Court's failure to clarify the role of independently obtained 
evidence and its focus on the "significance" of the implicit communication 
places the practitioner in an uncertain position. A prosecutor, in order to 
obtain a valid order to produce, first must discern the possible com-
municative implications of complying with the order, such as admitting 
possession, existence, control, or authenticity. The prosecutor then must 
prove that these matters are a foregone conclusion conveying merely trivial 
new knowledge. Triviality is apparently dependent on the conclusiveness of 
the prosecutor's independently obtained evidence, but probably also could 
be satisfied by a showing that the matter is not a disputable issue. A prose-
cutor, of course, also should assert that the matter is not incriminating, but 
such an argument must focus on the implicit communications themselves 
and not the evidence that is the object of the subpoena. A defendant's at-
torney, conversely, must prove that the implicit communications are not 
conclusively established and that they are significant, in addition to proving 
that the defendant would be incriminated thereby. 
In summary, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized in Hughes that the 
act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena may be tantamount to 
an implicit assertion regarding the existence, location, authenticity, and 
control of the subpoenaed evidence. Where the implicit assertions relate to a 
matter that is not a foregone conclusion, where they add significantly to the 
prosecutor's case, and where they are incriminating, compulsory process 
issued against a criminal defendant is unenforceable because it would 
violate the fifth amendment. The test adopted in Hughes, however, is am-
biguous. The manner in which a court will decide whether a matter is a 
foregone conclusion and whether a matter is significant remains uncertain. 
Although a shift in focus toward a determination of whether the asserted 
facts are or could be placed in issue, accompanied by an abandonment of 
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the concept of significance, would not change the result in Hughes, the ad-
vantages to the parties in terms of certainty and clarity would be substan-
tial. 
§ 4.13. Indirect Interrogations and the Scope of Miranda.* In two 
cases decided during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court examined 
the restrictions on the custodial interrogation of suspects by police. The 
foundation of these restrictions lies in the United States Supreme Court 
decisions of Miranda v. Arizona1 and Michigan v. Mosley.~ In Miranda v. 
Arizona, 3 the Supreme Court held that certain procedural safeguards must 
be employed by law enforcement officers during a custodial interrogation 
of a suspect. 4 Before questioning begins, the suspect must be informed that 
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either re-
tained or appointed.$ Should the accused indicate that he wishes to consult 
with an attorney before speaking, the interrogation must cease immedi-
ately.6 In Michigan v. Mosley,' however, the Court stated that Miranda did 
not create a permanent proscription of any further questioning once the 
suspect has invoked his right to remain silent. 8 Rather, the Court noted that 
the admissibility of statements obtained after the suspect has decided to re-
main silent depends on whether his " 'right to cut off questioning' was 
'scrupulously honored.' " 9 
During the Survey year, in Commonealth v. Brant10 and Commonwealth 
v. Gallant, 11 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered whether 
the constitutional rights of two suspects were adequately protected by law 
enforcement officials conducting a custodial interrogation. In both cases, 
the Court ruled that the immediate resumption of an interrogation - under 
any form - after a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, violates 
the accused's Miranda rights. 12 
*By Jonathan M. Albano, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETfS LAW. 
§ 4.13 I 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 423 u.s. % (1975). 
' 384 u.s. 436. 
• /d. at 444-45. 
'/d. 
6 /d. 
7 423 u.s. 96. 
' /d. at 102·03. 
• Id. at 104 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1473, 406 N.E.2d 1021. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2031, 410 N.E.2d 704. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480-82, 406 N.E.2d at 1026-27; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2034,410 
N.E.2d at 706-07. 
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The defendant in Brant was arrested, along with a man named Kampen, 
by Brevard County Police in Titusville, Florida, on February 4, 1978.' 3 On 
February 13, 1978, while the two suspects awaited arraignment on certain 
Florida charges, Assistant District Attorney Tiernan of Norfolk County, 
Massachusetts contacted Deputy Sheriff Hudepohl of Florida. 14 Tiernan re-
quested the Deputy Sheriff to interview the suspects regarding an armed 
robbery of a grocery store in Norwood, Massachusetts.'' Hudepohl conse-
quently interrogated Kampen about the Norwood incident. ' 6 Kampen 
knowingly and willingly waived both his right to remain silent and his right 
to the presence of an attorney during questioning.'' He then gave Hudepohl 
an inculpatory statement regarding the Norwood robbery .U 
Upon learning of the incriminating statement Kampen had made, Assist-
ant District Attorney Tiernan, accompanied by two Massachusetts police 
officers, traveled to Florida to interrogate Brant.' 9 Before questioning 
began, Sheriff Hudepohl asked Brant if he was willing to proceed without 
an attorney being present to represent him. 20 Brant replied that he was not, 
and refused to answer any further questions in the absence of his counsel. 21 
At this point, one of the Massachusetts authorities informed Brant that 
Kampen already had made a statement to the police. 22 Brant immediately 
asked to speak with Kampen privately, and was granted his request. 23 Four-
teen minutes later, Brant declared that he had changed his mind and wished 
to make a statement regarding the Norwood robbery. 24 The statement Brant 
made was a virtual confession to the Massachusetts charges. 25 Both Kampen 
and Brant then agreed to return to Massachusetts to face the armed robbery 
charges. 26 
At trial, Brant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term 
of eighteen to thirty years in prison. 27 Brant appealed from the conviction, 
claiming as error the denial of his motion to suppress the inculpatory state-
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1474, 406 N.E.2d at 1023. 
•• Id. at 1475, 406 N.E.2d at 1023. 
" ld. 
16 Id., 406 N.E.2d at 1023-24. 
" Id. at 1476, 406 N.E.2d at 1024. 
" Id. at 1475, 406 N.E.2d at 1024. 
" Id. at 1476, 406 N.E.2d at 1024. 
20 Id. at 1476-77, 406 N.E.2d at 1024. 
" Id. at 1477, 406 N.E.2d at 1024. 
"Id. 
"Id. 
24 Id., 406 N.E.2d at 1024-25. 
" Id. at 1478, 406 N.E.2d at 1025. 
"Id. 
" Id. at 1473, 406 N.E.2d at 1022-23. 
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ment he had made in Florida. 28 The Appeals Court affirmed the 
conviction. 29 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convic-
tion. 30 The Court held that by informing Brant of Kampen's incriminating 
statement, the Massachusetts official had interrogated Brant. 31 Further-
more, because the interrogation was resumed immediately after Brant had 
invoked his right to remain silent, the Court found that the suspect's consti-
tutional rights had been violated. 32 
In finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officials following 
Brant's assertion of his right to remain silent constituted an interrogation, 
the Court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision of Rhode Island v. 
Innis. 33 In Innis, the Supreme Court held that the term 4.nterrogation" 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to "any words or actions on 
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect. " 34 Noting that, in ruling on the de-
fendant's request to suppress his confession, the motion judge had found 
that the officials informed Brant of Kampen's statement in order to elicit an 
incriminating response from him, the Court ruled the practice was one 
which the officials should have known was reasonably likely to have that ef-
fect. 3 ' The Court concluded that this type of "compelling influence" wield-
ed by the authorities constituted an interrogation in violation of the defend-
ant's right to remain silent. 36 
The Court next considered the prosecution's contention that although a 
second interrogation may have taken place, it nevertheless yielded admissi-
ble evidence. 37 The commonwealth relied on the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Michigan v. Mosley, 38 where evidence obtained in an in-
terrogation which followed the accused's invocation of his right to remain 
silent was held to be admissible against the defendant. 39 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the Mosley case from Brant on 
several grounds. The Court observed that when the defendant in Mosley 
asserted his Miranda rights, the police immediately ceased the interroga-
tion. 40 Questioning was resumed only after the passage of a "significant 
" Id. at 1473-74, 406 N.E.2d at 1023. 
" Id. at 1473-74, 406 N.E.2d at 1023. 
•• Id. at 1484, 406 N.E.2d at 1028. 
" Id. at 1480, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
" /d. at 1481-82, 406 N.E.2d at 1027. 
" 446 u.s. 291 (1980). 
•• Id. at 301. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480, 406 N.E.2d at 1026 . 
.. /d. 
" /d. 
" 423 u.s. 96 (1975). 
" Id. at 107; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1481, 406 N.E.2d at 1027. 
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period of time. " 41 In addition, the Court noted, the subsequent interroga-
tion was accompanied by a fresh set of Miranda warnings, and restricted to 
a crime which was not the subject of the earlier interrogation. 42 In Brant, 
however, the interrogation did not cease when the defendant asserted his 
rights. 43 Quite to the contrary, the statements made by the authorities were 
intended to overcome the defendant's resistance to interrogation. 44 The 
respite of fourteen minutes, allowing Brant to confer with Kampen, also 
was designed to elicit an incriminating response. 45 Thus, a suspect who 
asserted his right to have an attorney present during his interrogation in-
stead was "subtly turned" towards making an inculpatory statement.'6 
Such conduct on the part of the authorities, the Court held, violated the ac-
cused's undisputed right to remain silent, and therefore the inculpatory 
statement was excluded from evidence. 47 
In Commonwealth v. Gallant, 48 the Court was faced with a similar ques-
tion of whether a suspect's right to terminate questioning was scrupulously 
honored. 49 The defendant in Gallant was arrested in connection with in-
cidents related to the robbery of a variety store in Amesbury. so After the 
Amesbury police informed Gallant of his Miranda rights, he replied that he 
did not wish to make a statement. 51 Approximately one minute after the 
defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the chief of police handed him 
a statement made by Gallant's brother which implicated both Gallant and 
his brother in the variety store crimes. 52 After advising the defendant of his 
rights once again, the chief asked Gallant if his brother's statement was 
true. 53 Gallant replied that it was, and made an oral statement of his version 
of what happened. 54 
" /d. In Mosley, more than two hours elapsed before the interrogation was resumed. 423 
U.S. at 4 . 
., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1481, 406 N.E.2d at 1027. 
" /d . 
•• /d . 
., /d. at 1481-82, 406 N.E.2d at 1027. 
•• /d. at 1483, 406 N.E.2d at 1028. 
•• /d. The prosecution also contended that the defendant had voluntarily waived his Miran-
da rights in order to face the Massachusetts charges out of a fear that he would be subject to 
homosexual attacks in Florida state prisons. The Court ruled, however, that the burden was on 
the Commonwealth to establish that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the Commonwealth had failed to do so. Id., 406 
N.E.2d at 1027-28. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2031, 410 N.E.2d 704. 
•• /d. at 2034, 410 N.E.2d at 706. 
•• /d. at 2032, 410 N.E.2d at 706. 
"/d. 
" /d. 
" /d . 
•• /d. 
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Gallant consequently was indicted on charges which included robbery, 
assault, and battery. ss At a pretrial hearing, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the inculpatory statements made by him to the Amesbury police. 56 
Concluding that Gallant's right to cut off questioning was not scrupulously 
honored, the motion judge allowed the motion to suppress the defendant's 
incriminating statements. 57 On appeal, 58 the Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed the motion judge's ruling, citing its decision in Commonwealth v. 
Brant as controlling. 59 
In its decision, the Court noted that the statement of Gallant's brother 
was revealed to Gallant for the "obvious purpose of eliciting a response. " 60 
Under Brant, such conduct constitutes an interrogation. 6 ' Turning to the 
circumstances under which the interrogation was resumed, the Court found 
that a one-minute interval was an "insufficient passage of time between 
events to constitute a scrupulous observance of the d.efendant's right to cut 
off questioning. " 62 Consequently, the Court ruled, the incriminating 
statements Gallant made as a result . of the unconstitutional interrogation 
were properly suppressed. 63 
The foundation of the Brant and Gallant decisions rests in notions of pro-
tecting a suspect's fifth amendment rights. In Miranda, the Supreme Court 
concluded that without proper safeguards, the process of a custodial inter-
rogation contains "inherently compelling pressures" which serve to under-
mine the individual's will to resist and "compel him to speak where he 
" /d. at 2031, 410 N.E.2d at 705. Specifically, Gallant was charged with robbery, assault 
with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and 
battery. /d. 
'' /d. at 2032, 410 N.E.2d at 705. 
" /d. at 2033, 410 N.E.2d at 706. 
" The motion judge granted the Commonwealth's application for leave to appeal in-
terlocutory orders suppressing certain evidence to the Supreme Judicial Court. /d. at 2031,410 
N.E.2d at 705. See also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15(b)(2). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2031, 2033, 410 N.E.2d at 705, 706. 
•• !d. at 2034, 410 N.E.2d at 707. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2034, 410 N.E.2d at 707. 
" /d. at 2038, 410 N .E.2d at 708. Gallant's alleged accomplice in the variety store crimes, a 
man named Searles, had moved that an inculpatory statement he had made be suppressed also. 
/d. at 2032, 410 N .E.2d at 706. The Amesbury chief of police had interrogated Searles concern-
ing the robbery. /d. at 2033, 410 N.E.2d at 706. Although the interrogation complied with the 
Miranda procedures, Searles claimed as error the revelation by the chief of Gallant's in-
culpatory statement. /d. at 2035, 410 N.E.2d at 706. The motion judge ruled that since Searles' 
admissions were obtained as a consequence of his having been shown admissions illegally ob-
tained from Gallant, Searles' statement should be suppressed as well. /d. at 2033,410 N.E.2d 
at 707. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the ruling, holding that the wrongful method of 
obtaining Gallant's statement in no way tainted the procedures followed in questioning 
Searles. Id. at 2037, 410 N.E.2d at 707. 
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would not otherwise do so freely. " 64 In order to ensure that the individual 
has a full opportunity to exercise his right against self-incrimination, the 
Court held that the suspect must be adequately informed of his rights, "and 
the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. " 6 ' The Court stressed 
that it was psychological, as well as physical coercion, which the decision 
was directed against, noting that " 'the blood of the accused is not the only 
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' " 66 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision that an interrogation had been 
conducted in both Brant and Gallant mirrors the United States Supreme 
Court's commitment to uphold the rights of the accused. In Rhode Island v. 
Innis, the Supreme Court stated that when it appears that the authorities 
should have known that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect, such conduct constitutes an inter-
rogation. 67 Brant and Gallant rest on the sensible proposition that just as 
direct interrogation must cease once an accused asserts his Miranda rights, 
so too must other, more subtle forms of eliciting a response come to a halt. 
In Brant, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the officials "hoped and 
expected'' that informing Brant of Kampen's confession would provoke an 
incriminating response. 68 Similarly, the Court in Gallant found that 
Gallant's brother's statement was shown to the defendant for the "obvious 
purpo.se" of eliciting a response. 69 The infringement of a suspect's right to 
remain silent is in no way less offensive simply because the coercion exerted 
is of a clever, subtle nature. 70 
Just as the definition of "interrogation" applied by the Supreme Judicial 
Court is in keeping with the policies of Miranda, so too does the Court's 
discussion of when and how an interrogation may be resumed reflect a con-
cern for protecting the rights of the accused. Echoing the words of the 
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 71 the Court spoke of the need for an 
immediate halt to questioning upon a suspect's assertion of his right tore-
main silent. 72 Only after the passage of a significant period of time, as well 
•• 384 U.S. at 467. 
" !d. (emphasis added). 
" !d. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)). 
" 446 U.S. at 301. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1480, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2034, 410 N.E.2d at 707. 
70 While courts may have been tardy in recognizing that methods other than direct question-
ing can be an effective means of eliciting a response from a suspect, other elements of society 
have long recognized such approaches. It was in the sixteenth century that Hamlet declared, 
"The play's the thing, wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King." W. SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET, Act II, Scene II. No matter what method of "questioning" is used in a custodial in-
terrogation, the suspect's constitutional rights are due proper respect. 
71 423 u.s. 96 (1975). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1481, 406 N.E.2d at 1026-27. 
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as the provision of a fresh set of Miranda warnings, may questioning be 
resumed. 73 In addition, the interrogation must be concerned with a crime 
not the subject of the first interrogation. 74 None of these conditions were 
met in the Brant or Gallant cases. Instead, some form of interrogation 
resumed almost immediately after the suspects had invoked their right to re-
main silent. 75 In both cases, the second interrogations concerned the subject 
of the original interrogation, and only in Gallant was the interrogation pre-
ceded by a fresh set of Miranda warnings. 76 Such activity cannot be charac-
terized as conduct which scrupulously honors the defendant's right to cut 
off questioning. 77 
In summary, Brant and Kampen do not mark an expansion of the Miran-
da doctrine by the Supreme Judicial Court. Rather, the decisions were 
necessary in order to properly implement the policies enunciated in Miran-
da. If authorities are allowed to engage in subtle forms of coercion and 
disregard a suspect's attempts to halt an interrogation, as in Brant and 
Gallant, then the Miranda warnings become nothing but an empty reminder 
of individual rights once held to be inviolable. 
§ 4.14. Investigation of Potential Jurors -Interviewing of Neighbors.* 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court directly addressed, for 
the first time, the pre-empanelment investigation of prospective jurors. In 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 1 Allen and his codefendants2 were indicted for 
conspiracy to commit arson and conspiracy to defraud an insurer. 3 Prior to 
trial in the Superior Court for Suffolk County, 4 the trial judge ordered the 
issuance of summonses for two special venires of 100 persons each. s Em-
panelment of the jury began six weeks later. 6 The voir dire consisted of 
73 /d. 
74 /d. 
" !d. at 1481-82, 406 N.E.2d at 1027; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2034, 410 N.E.2d at 706. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1427, 406 N.E.2d at 1024; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2032, 410 
N.E.2d at 706. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1479, 406 N.E.2d at 1025; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2034, 410 
N.E.2d at 706. 
*By Thomas J. Raubach, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETfS LAW. 
§ 4.14 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 400 N.E.2d at 229. 
' On October 13, 1977, four men were indicted. !d. at 175, 400 N.E.2d at 231. Only three, 
however, stood trial together; one of the original co-indictees appeared only as a witness and 
later pleaded guilty in accordance with a plea bargaining arrangement. /d. at 175-76, 400 
N .E.2d at 231. Subsequent references to the "defendants" are to the three men who were tried 
together. 
' Commonwealth v. Allen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1819, 1819-20, 392 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-29 
(This case is where the Supreme Judicial Court first considered the Allen case in ruling on a 
stay of execution.). See Commonwealth v. Allen, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 175, 400 N.E.2d at 
231. 
• Commonwealth v. Allen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1820, 392 N.E.2d at 1029. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178, 400 N.E.2d at 232. 
6 !d. 94
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questions specified by chapter 234, section 28 7 and of additional questions 
relating to various matters including the jurors' attitudes about arson and 
insurance companies and the jurors' exposure to media coverage of arson 
charges. 8 Twenty-two jurors had been questioned and three had been seated 
when counsel for the commonwealth informed the trial judge during a lob-
by conference that investigators for the defendants had been interviewing 
neighbors of the prospective jurors. 9 
In response to questions by the judge, defense counsel admitted that in-
vestigators were observing the type of neighborhood in which a juror lived 
and that the investigators were interviewing neighbors. 10 The judge ex-
pressed concern that a juror might be inhibited if that juror became aware 
that he was being investigated by the defendants. 11 On two occasions, the 
judge stated, however, that he would not act until he knew all the facts. 12 
Defense counsel then informed the judge of actions taken to end any in-
vestigation.13 After further discussions, defense counsel requested the judge 
to rule on the record in regard to the investigation of potential jurors. 14 The 
' Id. at 178, 400 N.E.2d at 232. G.L. c. 234, § 28 provides: 
Upon motion of either party, the court shall, or the parties or their attorneys may 
under the direction of the court, examine on oath a person who is called as a juror 
therein, to learn whether he is related to either party or has any interest in the case, or 
has expressed or formed an opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, therein; and 
the objecting party may introduce other competent evidence in support of the objection. 
If the court finds that the juror does not stand indifferent in the case, another shall be 
called in his stead. 
For the purpose of determining whether a juror stands indifferent in the case, if it ap-
pears that, as a result of the impact of considerations which may cause a decision or 
decisions to be made in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, including, 
but not limited to, community attitudes, possible exposure to potentially prejudicial 
material or possible preconceived opinions toward the credibility of certain classes of 
persons, the juror may not stand indifferent, the court shall, or the parties or their at-
torneys may, with the permission and under the direction of the court, examine the 
juror specifically with respect to such considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or 
any other matters which may, as aforesaid, cause a decision or decisions to be made in 
whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the issues in the case. Such examination may 
include a brief statement of the facts of the case, to the extent the facts are appropriate 
and relevant to the issue of such examination, and shall be conducted individually and 
outside the presence of other persons about to be called as jurors or already called. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178, 400 N.E.2d at 232-33. 
• /d. at 178-79, 400 N.E.2d at 233. 
•• /d. at 179-80, 400 N.E.2d at 233. Although, at first, defense counsel admitted that in-
vestigators were interviewing neighbors, id. at 179, 400 N.E.2d at 233, during the same con-
ference, counsel expressed ignorance as to whether such interviews had been conducted, id. at 
179-80, 400 N.E.2d at 233. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court subsequently stated that 
later in the day defense counsel "repeated that the neighbor interviews had been conducted 
without the express direction of counsel. ... " /d. at 182, 400 N.E.2d at 234. 
" Id. at 180, 400 N.E.2d at 233. 
" Id. at 180, 181, 400 N.E.2d at 233, 234. 
" /d. at 181, 400 N.E.2d at 234. 
,. /d. at 182, 400 N.E.2d at 235. 95
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judge declined to issue any order and observed that he was only inquiring 
into the integrity of the jury. 15 
Before a full jury had been empanelled, the first venire was exhausted. 16 
The judge asked all seated jurors if they were aware of any investigation in 
their neighborhood. 17 None responded affirmatively. 18 Defense counsel 
represented that no juror from the second venire had been investigated and 
asserted that investigation of potential jurors had been stopped in response 
to the court's actions.U The judge then stated that he had issued no order 
preventing any investigation. 20 After empanelment concluded, the defense 
moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the judge had interfered with the 
selection of the jury by inhibiting the investigation of potential jurors. 21 The 
judge denied the motion, 22 and all three defendants subsequently were con-
victed. 23 The defendants appealed to the Appeals Court and the Supreme 
Judicial Court removed the case on its own initiative. 24 
On appeal, the defendants contended that the judge's statements during 
the empanelment were, in effect, a ruling which forbade using investigators 
in neighborhoods of the jurors, or at least prohibited interviewing any 
neighbors. 25 The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed. 26 The Court first 
distinguished the case at bar from the situation where an attorney is 
threatened with a summary contempt citation. 27 The Court stated that, in 
the instant case, there is at most "a possible inference that the judge may 
have considered the possibility of a plenary hearing on the question of con-
tempt at the end of the trial. " 28 The Court noted that the statements of the 
judge in no way prevented the defendants from investigating the jury and 
that defense counsel were left to make their own decision. 29 Thus, any 
" ld. 
" ld. at 183, 400 N.E.2d at 235. 
17 ld. 
" Id. 
" ld. at 183-84, 400 N.E.2d at 235. 
20 Id. 
" Id. at 184, 400 N.E.2d at 235. 
22 Id. 
" /d. at 176, 400 N.E.2d at 231. 
" ld. See G.L. c. 211A, § lO(A). Other appellate proceedings of this case involved stays of 
execution pending appeal. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 1979 Mass. Ad. Sh. 1819, 392 N.E.2d 
1027; Commonwealth v. Allen, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 147, 385 N.E.2d 532. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 184, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
" Id. at 185, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
" ld. at 184-85, 400 N.E.2d at 236. The defendants had cited Sussman v. Commonwealth, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 754, 374 N .E.2d 1195, where the Court held that an attorney must be ade-
quately warned before a judge may impose a summary contempt citation for pursuing a certain 
line of questioning on cross examination. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 184-85, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
" Id. at 185, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
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discontinuation of investigation was defense counsel's own voluntary deci-
sion which could not be challenged on appeal. 30 Therefore, the Court held 
that the trial judge's denial of the motion for mistrial was proper. 31 
Because it concluded that the defendants had been free to investigate pro-
spective jurors, the Court refrained from considering whether a prohibition 
of investigation would have deprived the defendants of their rights to effec-
tive counsel and an impartial jury. 32 Nevertheless, the Court observed that it 
had never directly addressed the topic of investigation of prospective jurors 
and then "proceed[ed] to do so by way of dictum for guidance of the 
Bar. " 33 
In its discussion, the Court stressed the importance of both peremptory 
challenges and challenges for cause. 34 The Court commented that the 
availability of both challenges implies the right of reasonable investigation 
in order to exercise these challenges intelligently. 35 Although prior decisions 
of the Court had allowed direct contact with prospective jurors and their 
families, 36 the Court observed that such contact is now prohibited by statute 
and by rule of the Supreme Judicial Court. 37 The Court further noted that 
" Id. at 185-86, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
" /d. at 186, 400 N.E.2d at 236. 
32 /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 186-87, 400 N.E.2d at 237. 
" /d. at 187, 400 N.E.2d at 237. 
•• See id. at 187 & n.5, 400 N.E.2d at 237 & n.5. Among such cases are Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 350 Mass. 600, 601-03, 215 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (1966); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 
294 Mass. 379, 384-86, 2 N.E.2d 477, 481 (1936); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 
281-82, 1 N.E.2d 189, 194-95 (1936); Commonwealth v. Cero, 264 Mass. 264,274-76, 162 N.E. 
349, 353-54 (1928). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 187,400 N.E.2d at 237. The Court cited G.L. c. 234, §§ 24, 24A; 
S.J.C. Rules 3:22, DR 7-108(A), (F), and 3:22A, PF 10, DF 11. G.L. c. 234, § 24, provides for 
serving jury summonses personally or by leaving written notice at the venireman's residence. 
G.L. c. 234, § 24A, provides for the alternative summoning method of service by mail. Both 
sections provide that after service has been effected, "no person shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, question any [person summoned for jury duty] for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation as to his background in connection with his jury duty." 
S.J.C. Rule 3:22, DR 7-108, provides, in part: 
(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with 
or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a member of the 
venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the case. 
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to communications 
with or investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a juror. 
S.J.C. Rule 3:22A provides, in part: 
PF 10. Relations with Jury. 
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to communicate privately with per-
sons summoned for jury duty or impaneled as jurors concerning the case prior to or 
during the trial. The prosecutor should avoid the reality or appearance of any such im-
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investigation of potential jurors is limited by the nature of an efficient 
judicial system, by the trial judge's protection against abuses, by other 
statutes, and by the right of privacy of the potential jurors. 38 In addition, 
the Court suggested that current statutes be amended t0 provide for a de-
tailed questionnaire to be sent to potential jurors. 39 In the Court's view, 
allowing counsel access to the results of such questionnaires might obviate 
the need for further investigation and would be particularly valuable to 
litigants of limited means. 40 
With the exception of statutes and court rules prohibiting direct contact 
with potential jurors and their families, 41 the Court found no rule pro-
hibiting interviewing other persons. 42 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized 
that investigators must not "by design or effect, influence, solicit, in-
timidate or propagandize either the persons interviewed or, indirectly, the 
prospective juror. " 43 In order to minimize the chance of any improper in-
fluence, the Court presented three guidelines. 
First, the investigators should be persons who are not closely related 
or associated with a litigant or his family. Second, the investigators 
should, where possible, avail themselves of sources of information 
proper communications. 
A juror improperly approached by counsel or any other person should communicate 
the circumstances to the judge promptly. A prosecutor or a defense lawyer receiving 
such a report should refer the juror to the judge forthwith. 
DF 11 provides similarly for defense counsel. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 187-88, 400 N.E.2d at 237. 
•• /d. at 188, 400 N.E.2d at 237-38. 
G.L. c. 234A, § 18, provides that, in Middlesex County, counsel may have access to substan-
tial information about jurors contained in a questionnaire. G.L. c. 234A, § 18, provides, in 
part: 
Enclosed with the summons shall be a juror questionnaire. The information elicited 
by the questionnaire shall be such information as is ordinarily raised in voir dire ex-
aminations of jurors, including the juror's name, sex, age, residence, marital status, 
number and ages of children, educational level, occupation, employment address, 
spouse's occupation, spouse's employment address, previous service as a juror, present 
or past involvement as a party to civil or criminal litigation, spouse's present or past in-
volvement as a party to civil or criminal litigation, relation to a police or law enforce-
ment officer, spouse's relation to a police or law enforcement officer, and such other in-
formation as the jury commissioner deems appropriate .... Unless the court orders 
otherwise, the clerk of court or an assistant clerk shall provide copies of the appropriate 
completed questionnaires to the trial judge and counsel for use during voir dire. Except 
for disclosures made during voir dire or unless the court orders otherwise, the informa-
tion inserted by prospective jurors in the questionnaires shall be held confidential by the 
court, the clerk or assistant clerk, the parties, trial counsel, and their authorized agents. 
Upon completion of voir dire, the parties and their counsel shall return all copies of the 
completed questionnaires to the clerk or the assistant clerk .... 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188-89, 400 N.E.2d at 237-38. 
•• See note 37 supra. 
42 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 189, 400 N.E.2d at 238 . 
• , /d. 
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other than third-party interviews, if such sources are likely to provide 
the desired data. Third, ideally investigators would be employed on a 
mutual or cooperative basis between parties, with the resulting infor-
mation available to both sides. 44 
Although the Court avoided discussing the access of one party to the results 
of an investigation sponsored by another, 45 the Court commented that if an 
investigation is not undertaken by all the parties to a case, the investigators 
should not reveal for whom they are working. 46 
After delineating these precautions, the Court considered two limitations 
on all pre-empanelment investigations that also could prevent undue in-
fluence of prospective jurors. First, the Court noted the power of the trial 
judge to issue orders in regard to an investigation. 47 In addition to imposing 
sanctions for any impropriety in an investigation, 48 a trial judge may at-
tempt to forestall any impropriety by requiring any party undertaking an in-
vestigation to submit to the court the names of the investigators, the infor-
mation sought, the procedures to be followed and the questions to be 
asked. 49 Second, the Court observed that the nature of an efficient trial 
system may serve to limit investigations of potential jurors. 50 Such investi-
gations may have to be restricted where an available venire is unexpectedly 
exhausted and a special venire or even talesmen must be summoned. 5 1 
Although the Court discussed the limitations on pre-empanelment in-
vestigations and suggested precautions to prevent abuse of those investiga-
tions, the Court did not develop two of the issues raised by its opinion. The 
Court did not fully consider to what extent, if any, the results of an in-
vestigation undertaken by one party should be available to another party. It 
also left unresolved how a juror's right to privacy might affect the parties' 
right to pre-empanelment investigations. Nevertheless, the Court did supply 
some indication of its leanings on each issue. 
The first issue not fully explored by the Court is the availability to one 
party of the results of an investigation sponsored by another party. 
Although the Court noted that in the ideal situation an investigation would 
be undertaken on a mutual or cooperative basis, 52 this observation was 
•• /d. at 189-90, 400 N.E.2d at 238-39 (footnotes omitted). 
" /d. at 190 n.12, 400 N.E.2d at 239 n.12. See text at notes 52-75 infra. 
•• Id. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 239. 
" /d. 
" /d. As possible sanctions, the Court suggested G.L. c. 234, §§ 32, 33 (providing for setting 
aside a verdict and awarding a new trial); G.L. c. 268, §§ 13, 138 (providing for fines and 
prison sentences for corruption or intimidation of jurors, among others); and contempt or 
ethical sanctions. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190 n.13, 400 N.E.2d at 239 n.13. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 239. 
,. /d. 
" /d. at 190-91, 400 N.E.2d at 239. See G.L. c. 234, §§ 12, 27, 42 (providing for a court's 
power to summon special venires and talesmen). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 239. 
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made with regard to the goal of avoiding improper influence. 53 The Court 
also stated, however, that in an investigation sponsored by fewer than all 
parties, this objective would be advanced if the investigator did not reveal 
who his sponsor was. 54 In a footnote, the Court declined to consider 
whether the results of a juror investigation are subject to discovery. ss Never-
theless, the Court referred to an earlier cases 6 in which it stated its belief that 
the results of an investigation of potential jurors conducted by the police 
should be equally available to the prosecution and the defendant. s' The 
Court's rationale for this view was that it would be improper for the police 
to be available to only the prosecution for investigation of potential 
jurors. ss Thus, the Court implied that it might require that results of such 
investigations be equally available to all parties. 
Although some case law from other jurisdictions supports equal access to 
police investigation of potential jurors, s9 most jurisdictions have rejected 
such equal access. 6° Courts accepting the doctrine of equal access have 
relied on the concept of fundamental fairness. 61 These courts reason that it 
would not be fair to allow the government to use the police and its other 
resources to investigate potential jurors while denying the results of any in-
vestigation to the defendant. 62 In the case of People v. Aldridge, 63 for in-
stance, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on both the trend toward 
more liberal discovery and the concept of fundamental fairness to support 
equal access. 64 The court stated that disclosure of investigatory information 
will aid in a trial's search for truth. 6s 
" See id. at 189, 400 N.E.2d at 238. 
" !d. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 239. 
" !d. at 190 n.12, 400 N.E.2d at 239 n.12. 
" !d. (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 350 Mass. 600, 215 N.E.2d 897 (1966)). 
" Commonwealth v. Smith, 350 Mass. 600,603,215 N.E.2d 897,901 (1966). This statement 
is dictum as the Court found that the defendant did not show prejudice in failing to receive in-
formation, did not move to dismiss the jury, and did not challenge for cause a juror testifying 
to knowledge of the investigation. /d. at 602, 215 N.E.2d at 900. 
" !d. at 604, 215 N.E.2d at 901. 
" See, e.g., Losavio v. Mayber, 178 Colo. 184, 190, 496 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1972); People v. 
Aldridge, 47 Mich. App. 639, 650, 209 N.W.2d 796, 801-02 (1973). 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
906 (1970); Martin v. United States, 266 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Costello, 
255 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 
131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951); People v. Quicke, 71 Cal.2d 502, 
523, 455 P.2d 787, 799, 78 Cal. Rptr. 683, 695 (1969); Monahan v. State, 294 So.2d 401, 402 
(Fla. App. 1974); Robertson v. State, 262 So.2d 692, 692-93 (Fla. App. 1972); Commonwealth 
v. Foster, 219 Pa. Super. 127, 133, 280 A.2d 602, 604-05 (1971). 
" See, e.g., Losavio v. Mayber, 178 Colo. 184, 188, 190, 496 P.2d 1032, 1034, 1035 (1972); 
People v. Aldridge, 47 Mich. App. 639, 649, 209 N.W.2d 7%, 801 (1973). 
" See note 61 supra. 
" 47 Mich. App. 639, 209 N.W.2d 796 (1973). 
" /d. at 649, 209 N.W.2d at 801. 
" !d. 
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In a subsequent case, People v. Mcintosh, 66 the Supreme Court of 
Michigan disagreed with the Aldridge court. It held that defendants should 
not have equal access because they had no constitutional or statutory right 
to investigatory information. 67 The Mcintosh court stated that if policy 
considerations supported equal access, then the situation should be ad-
dressed by a court rule. 68 The reasoning of the Mcintosh court is similar to 
that employed by other courts. Some courts have noted the absence of a rule 
or precedent permitting equal access as a sufficient reason for denying such 
access. 69 Many courts have held that the denial of equal access does not 
result in a prejudiced jury, and therefore that a defendant may not com-
plain. 70 One court characterized the use of peremptory challenges as a "re-
jective, rather than a selective, process. " 71 Thus, this court noted, the result 
of the prosecution's exclusive possession and use of investigatory informa-
tion could have been only the striking of jurors unduly biased in favor of 
the defendant. 72 
The argument that the absence of equal access does not result in a preju-
diced jury is a refutation of the fundamental fairness argument. The due 
process clause requires only those procedures essential to a fair system of 
justice73 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. " 74 Because equal ac-
cess to investigatory information is not such a procedure, there is no consti-
tutional requirement for it. Equal access must be supported by statute or 
rule of court as it has no constitutional basis. Although criminal discovery 
has become more liberal, it is still of limited scope not covering investiga-
tory information. 75 
The second observation not fully developed by the Allen Court was that 
the right to acquire information to exercise juror challenges is limited 
" 400 Mich. 1, 252 N.W.2d 779 (1977). 
" /d. at 8, 252 N.W.2d at 782. 
" /d. at 8-9, 252 N.W.2d at 782. 
•• See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 266 F.2d 97,99 (5th Cir. 1959); Best v. United States, 
184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951); People v. Quicke, 71 
Cal.2d, 502, 523, 455 P.2d 787, 799, 78 Cal. Rptr. 683, 695 (1969); Monahan v. State, 294 
So.2d 401,402 (Fla. App. 1974); Robertson v. State, 262 So.2d 692, 692-93 (Fla. App. 1972); 
Commonwealth v. Foster, 219 Pa. Super. 127, 133, 280 A.2d 602, 605 (1971). 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
906 (1970); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 
(1958); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 
(1951). 
" United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958), 
quoted in United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 
(1970). 
72 /d., quoted in United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930,933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
906 (1970). 
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), 
,. !d., quoted in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). 
" See Commonwealth v. Foster, 219 Pa. Super. 127, 133, 280 A.2d 602, 605 (1971). 
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"ultimately by the jurors' right to privacy."" The Court, however, made 
no attempt to define what it meant by a juror's right to privacy. It did, 
however, cite a Utah case, Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg, 77 in this regard. In 
Piepenburg, the defendant was charged with exhibiting an obscene film in 
violation of a city ordinance. 71 The majority and concurring opinions did 
not consider prosecutorial misconduct in acquiring juror information, but a 
dissenting opinion examined it in great detail. 79 The primary concern of the 
dissent was that jurors had become aware of the involvement of the Mor-
mon Church in supplying information on their backgrounds. 10 The Piepen-
burg dissent reasoned that this knowledge, combined with the knowledge 
that the Mormon Church had taken a strong anti-pornography stand, con-
stituted an outside influence on the jurors. 11 The dissent found that jurors, 
as a result of this influence, felt as if they were expected to render a certain 
verdict. 12 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the jury was neither im-
partial nor independent. 83 
In addition to citing Piepenburg, the Allen Court also cited United States 
v. Barnes.14 That case involved a trial in New York City of defendants 
charged with narcotics violations. 15 The Barnes court considered the history 
of violence in the area, as well as pretrial publicity of violence allegedly 
committed by the defendants. 16 The court held that, under these cir-
cumstances, the trial judge did not err in refusing to release the names or ad-
dresses of any of the jurors where adequate voir dire had taken place. 17 The 
court concluded that by maintaining the anonymity of the jurors, the jurors 
would be relieved of any fear of retaliation. 11 
Although arguably concerned with a juror's right of privacy, both the 
Piepenburg dissent and the Barnes decision focused on maintaining the in-
tegrity of the jury. These two issues are distinct. Courts considering pre-
empanelment investigation have concentrated on protecting jurors from 
any improper influence. Indeed, such maintenance of the jury's integrity is 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188, 400 N.E.2d at 237. 
" 571 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977), cited in 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 191 n.15, 400 N.E.2d at 239 
n.15. 
" 571 P.2d at 1299. 
" Id. at 1309-13 (dissenting opinion). 
•• Id. at 1310. 
" Id. at 1311. 
12 Id. 
"/d. 
,. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980), cited in 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 191 n.15, 400 N.E.2d at 239 n.15. 
" 604 F.2d at 130. 
" /d. at 141. 
"Id. 
II /d. 
" 1980 Mass, Adv. Sh. at 189, 400 N.E.2d at 238. 
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the thrust of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Allen. The goal 
sought to be achieved is ensuring that jurors consider only evidence relevant 
to the merits of the case in their deliberations. The question of juror privacy 
is, however, another matter. Juror privacy protects the individual's interest 
in freedom from unwarranted intrusions into his or her private life. Thus, it 
is difficult to see how a juror would have a less or a greater right to privacy 
than any other citizen. A person's zone of privacy should extend as far 
whether it is juxtaposed with a defendant's right to know or any other 
possibly conflicting right. Any concern that a juror might be influenced or 
intimidated is not really a concern with jurors' right to privacy, but a con-
cern for maintaining the integrity of the jury. 
The Supreme Judicial Court iri Allen, although limiting its holding to af-
firming the trial judge's conduct and rulings, specified three precautions for 
investigation of potential jurors in order to safeguard a jury's impartiality. 
First, an investigator should not be closely associated with any party. 89 Sec-
ond, interviews of third parties should be avoided where the desired infor-
mation may be obtained from other sources. 90 Third, investigators should 
not convey to an interviewee that the investigation is being sponsored by 
fewer than all the litigants. 91 This third precaution may be fulfilled either by 
not disclosing who is sponsoring the investigation or by having the in-
vestigation sponsored by all parties in a case. 92 The Court noted that 
whether its precautions are heeded, counsel must take the responsibility to 
protect against abuses in the investigation of potential jurors. 93 Apparently 
the Court believed that counsel should tell an investigator precisely what is 
to be done during the investigation. Decisions concerning the scope or 
methods of an investigation should be those of counsel, as it is he who must 
answer to the court for any abuses. In its decision, the Supreme Judicial 
Court left open the question of whether parties should be granted equal ac-
cess to the results of an investigation undertaken by another party. In addi-
tion, the Court failed to explore how the jurors' right to privacy affects the 
defendant's right to conduct pre-empanelment investigations. Although it 
failed to discuss adequately these two questions, the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Allen did give guidance to the trial bar regarding investigation of 
potential jurors. 
§ 4.15. Underrepresentation of Young Persons on Jury Lists.* During 
the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a criminal 
defendant could challenge the composition of jury lists on the basis of 
" /d. at 189-90, 400 N.E.2d at 238. 
" /d. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 239. 
" /d. 
93 /d. at 190, 191 n.15, 400 N.E.2d at 239 & n.15. 
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underrepresentation of persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
four. 1 The Court rejected a defendant's right to such a challenge by holding 
that the group of those persons was not "identifiable" or "distinctive" for 
constitutional purposes. 2 Nevertheless, the Court recommended that 
changes be made in the jury selection process. 3 In Commonwealth v. 
Bastarache, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in superior 
court. 4 In a pretrial motion to that court, the defendant unsuccessfully 
challenged the underrepresentation of eighteen to thirty-four year olds on 
the jury lists from which his grand and petit juries were drawn. s The 
challenges were based on state statutes and the federal constitution. 6 On ap-
peal, the Appeals Court reversed the defendant's conviction on several 
grounds. One of these grounds was that the jury lists that were employed to 
derive the defendant's grand and petit juries were composed in an un-
constitutional manner.' The commonwealth appealed the Appeals Court's 
reversal to the Supreme Judicial Court. 8 Although that Court affirmed the 
reversal of the conviction, 9 it rejected the defendant's challenges to the com-
position of the jury lists. 10 In his appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
defendant attacked the jury lists on the basis of state statutes, the United 
States Constitution, and the state constitution. 11 
Before considering the defendant's contentions, the Court summarized 
the facts surrounding the challenge of the jury lists and the statutory pro-
cedure used to generate the jury lists. 12 It cited 1970 United States census 
figures which indicated that about 360Jo of the population of Franklin 
County eligible for jury duty were persons between eighteen and thirty-
four, inclusive. 13 During the times relevant to the case, this age group 
represented only about 18.50Jo of the persons on the jury lists. 14 The trial 
* By Thomas J. Raubach, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.15 ' Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2465, 414 N.E.2d 984. 
' /d. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
' /d. at 2480-82, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
• Id. at 2465, 414 N.E.2d at 987. 
' Id. at 2466, 414 N.E.2d at 987 . 
• /d. 
' Id. Among the other reasons relied on by the Appeals Court in reversing the conviction 
was admission of irrelevant evidence and incorrect instructions to the jury. Commonwealth v. 
Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1729, 1739-43, 409 N.E.2d 796, 803-05. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2466, 414 N.E.2d at 987. 
• The Court held that the trial judge's instructions to the jury on involuntary manslaughter, 
wanton and reckless action, and flight as admission of guilt were erroneous. /d. at 2482-85, 414 
N.E.2d at 9%-97. 
10 Id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
" /d. at 2466-67, 414 N.E.2d at 987. 
" Id. at 2467-71, 414 N.E.2d at 988-90. This description does not apply to Middlesex Coun-
ty, whose procedures are prescribed by G.L. c. 234A. See id. at 2467 n.2, 414 N.E.2d at 988 
n.2. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
14 Id. 
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judge found that under the key man system the persons selecting the poten-
tial jurors had not discriminated consciously against any age group, in-
cluding the eighteen-to-thirty-four-year-old group. 15 The judge also found 
that any failures to adhere to statutory requirements were minimal, uninten-
tional and inadvertent, and that there was no evidence that jurors were not 
selected at random.' 6 The judge further found that those under the age of 
thirty-five were reasonably represented in the jury pools and that the grand 
and petit juries were drawn from a jury pool representative of a fair cross 
section of the community.'' In addition, the judge found that the eighteen 
to thirty-four age group possessed no inherent characteristics distinguishing 
it from other age groups. 18 Finally, the trial judge found that the differences 
in representation of younger persons between those in jury pools and those 
eligible to serve on juries resulted from random influences and the statutes 
that control jury selection.' 9 
Noting that a trial court's findings of fact are binding to the extent that 
they are supported by the evidence, 20 the Supreme Judicial Court accepted 
the trial judge's finding that the eighteen-to-thirty-four age group had no 
inherent or common characteristics distinguishing it from other age 
groups. 2 ' The Court observed, however, that younger people often would 
bring different values to jury service and would react differently than would 
older people. 22 Thus, while denying the existence of distinctive characteris-
tics between younger and older age groups, the Court did acknowledge dif-
ferences between the groups. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that, in 
this case, there was no evidence of intentional bias against younger people 
in selecting potential jurors. 23 
Having summarized the trial judge's findings, the Court proceeded to 
describe the statutory procedure for compiling municipal jury lists. 24 The 
Court noted that, in general, anyone qualified, though not necessarily 
registered, to vote for state legislators is liable to serve as a juror. 25 Persons 
having custody of and being responsible for the daily supervision of a child 
under fifteen years of age, and persons at least seventy years old, may elect 
to be exempt from jury service. 26 In addition, certain public officials and 
court, law enforcement, fire, religious, academic and medical personnel are 
" Id. 
" Id. at 2468, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
" /d. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
" Id. at 2468, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
19 ld. 
20 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)). 
" ld. at 2468, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
22 ld. 
" Id. 
" ld. at 2468-71, 414 N.E.2d at 9~8-90. 
" Id. at 2468-69, 414 N.E.2d at 988. See G.L. c. 234, § 1. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 24fi9, 414 N.E.2d at 989. See G.L. c. 234, § 1. 105
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exempted. 27 Those who actually serve on a jury are exempted for a period of 
two or three years. 28 
The method of choosing jurors by community representatives is known as 
the "key man" system. 29 Under this sysem, in each town a list of potential 
jurors is prepared by the board of selectmen. 30 The selectmen are directed to 
choose those residents who are statutorily qualified, not exempt, and "of 
good moral character, of sound judgment and free from all legal excep-
tions, ... as they think qualified to serve as jurors. " 31 The names of the 
jurors are then written on separate "ballots" and placed in a box. 32 To fill a 
venire, jurors' ballots are drawn at random from the box. 33 
As one of several arguments, the defendant advanced a statutory argu-
ment that the impartial and random procedures prescribed by statute for the 
drawing of jurors' names 34 implied similar requirements in the initial com-
pilation of municipal jury lists. 35 The Court rejected this argument. 36 
Although noting that selectmen may not engage in arbitrary, capricious or 
unconstitutional action, the Court held that there was no statutory require-
ment that selectmen use a random selection process or any process that 
results in jury lists with a proportionate distribution of age groups. 37 
After rejectil:~g the defendant's statutory argument, the Court then ad-
dressed the defendant's federal constitutional challenges. The Court first 
observed that such challenges to underrepresentation of younger age groups 
"have been uniformly unsuccessful" in the Supreme Judicial Court. 38 The 
defendant's challenges based on the United States Constitution arose from 
two amendments. On the basis of the sixth amendment, the defendant at-
tacked the composition of the lists that generated the petit jury that con-
victed him. 39 In contrast, because the fourteenth amendment does not re-
" See G.L. c. 234, § l. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2470, 414 N.E.2d at989. See G.L. c. 234, § 2. Only in Nantucket 
and Dukes counties are jurors obligated to serve two years after service. G.L. c. 234, § 2. 
29 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2470, 414 N.E.2d at 989. 
•• Id. See G.L. c. 234, § 4. In cities, either the board of election commissioners or the board 
or registrars of voters prepares the lists. G.L. c. 234, § 4. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2470, 414 N.E.2d at 989; G.L. c. 234, § 4. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2470-71, 414 N.E.2d at 989. 
" /d. at 2471, 414 N.E.2d at 989-90; G.L. c. 234, § 19. 
,. The defendant referred to procedures prescribed for drawing a venire from the "ballots," 
G.L. c. 234, § 19, and for drawing jurors from the venire at empanelment, G.L. c. 234, § 25. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2471, 414 N.E.2d at 990. 
" /d. 
,. Id. at 2472, 414 N.E.2d at 990. 
" /d. 
" Id. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 372 Mass. 319, 321-22, 361 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (1977); 
Commonwealth v. Lussier, 364 Mass. 414, 423-24, 305 N.E.2d 499, 505 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 507, 269 N.E.2d 687, 692 (1971); Commonwealth v. 
Slaney, 350 Mass. 400, 402, 215 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1%6). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 991. 
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quire a state to obtain a grand jury indictment prior to pursuing criminal 
charges, 40 the defendant could not base his challenge of the grand jury lists 
on sixth amendment grounds, but had to rely solely on the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 41 
Evaluating the defendant's grand jury equal protection claim first, 42 the 
Court used the test stated in the Supreme Court case of Castaneda v. Par-
tida. 43 That case enumerated three elements which the criminal defendant 
must satisfy in order to show that the jury selection procedure employed 
resulted in substantial underrepresentation of an identifiable group to 
which he belongs. 44 First, the criminal defendant must establish that his 
group "is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment 
under the law, as written or as applied. " 4 ' Second, the defendant must 
prove a disproportionate underrepresentation of the group over a signifi-
cant period of time. 46 Third, the presumption of discrimination raised by 
the statistics must be supported by a selection process that is susceptible of 
abuse or not neutral. 47 Once a defendant has established his prima facie 
case, the state then bears the burden to rebut by dispelling the inference of 
intentional discrimination. 48 
Before considering whether the defendant had satisfied the Castaneda re-
quirements, the Court examined the test to be employed to determine the 
validity of the defendant's sixth amendment claim that the source of his 
petit jury was not fairly representative of the community. With regard to 
this claim, the Bastarache Court looked to the criteria articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri. 49 The Duren test requires that the 
defendant show three elements for a prima facie case: (1) that the allegedly 
excluded group is a "distinctive" group in the community, (2) that the 
group's representation in venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the 
group's number in the community, and (3) that the underrepresentation of 
the group is due to systematic exclusion of it in the jury selection process. ' 0 
In order to rebut such a prima facie case, the state must show adequate 
justification for any disproportionate representation.,. This justification 
may be in the form of a showing that those aspects of the selection process 
40 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. !116, 538 (1884). 
41 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2467, 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 987-88, 991. 
., /d. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
4
' 430 u.s. 482 (1977). 
44 /d. at 494. 
4 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 991 (quoting Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). 
46 /d. (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). 
47 /d. 
41 Id. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 991-92 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497-98). 
4 ' Id. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 992 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)). 
•• /d. at 2474-75, 414 N.E.2d at 992 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). 
" /d. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68). 
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that result in disproportionate representation manifestly and primarily ad-
vance a significant interest. 52 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Bastarache compared the first criteria of 
the Partida and Duren tests -whether a group is identifiable for equal pro-
tection purposes, or is distinctive, for sixth amendment purposes. 53 The 
Court noted that the two criteria might produce different results. 54 Never-
theless, the Court concluded that classifications based on age alone were 
neither identifiable nor distinctive groups. 55 The Court stated that "virtual-
ly every Federal case" considering the issue was in agreement. 56 In addition, 
the Court cited the Supreme Court case of Hamling v. United States51 as 
suggesting that age groups are not identifiable or distinctive groups. 58 
Because the Bastarache Court concluded that age groups were not iden-
tifiable or distinctive for federal constitutional purposes, the Court held 
that the defendant's challenge to the validity of both the petit and grand 
jury lists under the United States Constitution failed. 59 
Because it concluded that the defendant had failed to establish the re-
quisite first element of either test, the Supreme Judicial Court did not 
discuss the second and third elements of either the equal protection or sixth 
amendment tests in the context of the case at bar. Instead, the Supreme 
Judicial Court proceeded to consider the state's rebuttal. Under equal pro-
tection principles, the state may rebut a prima facie case by demonstrating 
the absence of intent to discriminate. 60 The Court stated that the actions of 
the local officials evidenced no intentional discrimination against young 
people. 61 In order to rebut a sixth amendment claim, the state may show 
that significant interests are being advanced. 62 In Bastarache, the Court 
postulated that the selectmen may have known that certain young people 
were away at school or military service or were employed elsewhere while 
maintaining residence with their parents. 63 The Court noted that it would be 
" Id. (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68). 
" /d. 
" I d. The Court observed that the equal protection clause has focused on groups historically 
discriminated against- on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or natural origin- whereas 
the sixth amendment is based on the requirement that juries be selected from a source fairly 
representative of the community. /d. 
" Id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
" ld. at 2476, 414 N.E.2d at 992. The Court listed the cases. Id. at 2476 n.10, 414 N.E.2d at 
992 n.10. 
" 418 u.s. 87 (1974). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2477, 414 N.E.2d at 993 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 135-38). 
" ld. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
" Id. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 991-92 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497-98). 
" Id. at 2478, 4!4 N.E.2d at 993. 
" Id. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68). 
" Id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 994. 
108
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/7
§ 4.15 CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 221 
proper for selectmen to consider these facts in order to create lists of those 
who would be able to serve as jurors. 64 Thus, in addition to dismissing the 
defendant's federal constitutional challenges on the basis that young per-
sons were not an identifiable or distinctive group, the Court found that the 
state had rebutted both the equal protection and sixth amendment 
challenges. 
The Court next turned its attention to the defendant's challenges based 
on the state constitution. The Court held that it need not consider this claim 
because the defendant had not raised it below. 65 Nevertheless, the Court 
stated that even if the challenge had been raised properly, it would have 
failed. 66 The Court underscored its special concern about discrimination 
against those groups enumerated in article 1 of the Declaration of Rights, as 
amended by article 106 - "sex, race, color, creed or national origin. " 67 
The Court observed .that even unintentional discrimination against any of 
these groups would raise a constitutional issue. 68 In the instant case, 
however, the defendant claimed discrimination against young people, a 
group not described in article 1 of the Declaration of Rights. 69 In addition, 
it had been demonstrated that there was no intentional discrimination 
against people under age thirty-five. 70 The Court thus found that 
Bastarache had failed to show that he had been denied " 'the judgment of 
his peers.' " 71 
After rejecting all of the defendant's statutory and constitutional 
challenges, the Supreme Judicial Court proceeded to discuss its supervisory 
powers. Acknowledging its obligation to oversee the courts, 72 the Court 
stated that its power to review the administration of justice was broader 
than the mere enforcement of statutory and constitutional dictates. 73 The 
Court observed that the defendant's case demonstrated the "undesirable 
consequences" of the jury selection system employed. 74 Noting that this 
"key man" system is susceptible of abuse, 75 the Court stated that there were 
benefits in adopting a random jury selection process. 76 These benefits would 
" /d. at 2478-79, 414 N.E.2d at 994. 
" Id. at 2479, 414 N.E.2d at 994 . 
.. /d. 





"Id. at 2480,414 N.E.2d at 995. See G.L. c. 211, § 3. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
74 /d. 
" /d. 
76 /d. at 2481, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
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include improving the appearance of fairness, increasing confidence in the 
jury system, and providing a more even distribution of service on juries. 77 
In order to gain the benefits of a random jury selection process, the Court 
asked the attorney general to devise procedures for such a process in cities 
and towns that were not yet using a random selection system. 78 The Court 
stated that the new procedure should be implemented as soon as is prac-
ticable or as warranted. 79 Further, the Court suggested that the legislature 
consider the expansion of the random selection procedures used in Mid-
dlesex County. 80 The Court emphasized the need for prompt consideration 
of the issue. 81 In order to ensure the reform of jury selection procedures, the 
Court commented that "[a]fter the passage of a reasonable time, judges of 
the Commonwealth should look with favor on proven claims that the jury 
lists from which grand and particularly petit jurors are derived were not 
compiled by a substantially random process, subject, of course, to ap-
propriate statutory exemptions. "n The Court concluded by explaining that 
it was still affirming the Appeals Court reversal of the conviction, on other 
grounds. 83 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the defendant's conviction 
on account of improper jury instructions, the significance of Bastarache lies 
in the Court's discussion of defense challenges to the jury selection process. 
To support its conclusion that the group of persons eighteen to thirty-four 
years of age is not an identifiable or distinctive group for federal constitu-
tional purposes, 84 the Court relied on federal precedent as well as its own in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court case of Hamling v. United States•' to 
counter the reasoning of the Appeals Court. In addition, the Supreme 
Judicial Court criticized the Appeals Court's reliance on the First Circuit 
case of United States v. Butera. 16 In Butera, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that young adults twenty-one to thirty-four years of age were a 
71 !d. 
71 !d. 
,. Id . 
.. !d. 
81 !d. 
" !d. at 2481-82, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
" !d. at 2482-85,414 N.E.2d at 995-97. The Court affirmed the reversal because it ruled that 
the trial court erred on two counts: (1) by instructing the jury that wanton and reckless conduct 
by the defendant would warrant a finding of involuntary manslaughter where the Supreme 
Judicial Court found no evidence to support that instruction, id. at 2482, 414 N.E.2d at 996, 
and (2) by incorrectly instructing the jury on the law of self-defense, id. at 2482-83,414 N.E.2d 
at 996. In addition, the Court noted that "[t]here was little evidence warranting an instruction 
that flight could be an 'admission of guilt.' "!d. at 2485, 414 N.E.2d at 997. 
" See id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
" See id. at 2476-77, 414 N.E.2d at 992-93 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
135-38 (1974)). 
•• 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), cited in Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. 1729, 1737, 409 N.E.2d 796, 802. 110
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group cognizable under the Constitution. 87 The Appeals Court adopted the 
reasoning of Butera, finding that young adults must be found a cognizable 
group lest discrimination against such a large class of persons would go un-
corrected. 88 In addition, Butera stated that because the attitudes of younger 
and older adults appeared to be distinct, the government must supply some 
justification for excluding either class from jury pools. 89 Nevertheless, the 
Butera court denied the defendant relief because it found sufficient 
justification. 90 The Supreme Judicial Court noted, however, that Butera has 
been called a "judicial rarity"9' and cited a dozen federal appellate and 
district court cases denying the constitutional cognizability of groups based 
on age. 92 Courts refusing to acknowledge young persons as a cognizable 
group have cited reasons including that young people are not distinct from 
the rest of society, 93 that there is no cohesiveness of attitudes among young 
people, 94 and that any demarcation of groups on the basis of age would be 
arbitrary.9s Indeed, many cases have noted the singularity of Butera's con-
clusion.96 
In addition to relying on Butera, the Appeals Court also had justified its 
finding of cognizability based on its sense that recent Supreme Court cases 
have expanded the sixth amendment's fair cross section requirement. 97 In 
contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court cited Hamling v. United States as sug-
gesting that age groups are not identifiable or distinctive. 98 The Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that the Supreme Court's reluctance to find 
" ld. at 570. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that this finding of Butera was not essential 
to that decision because the Butera court found that the government had successfully rebutted 
the defendant's case. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2476 n.lO, 414 N.E.2d at 992 n.lO. See Butera, 
420 F.2d at 574. 
" Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1736, 409 N.E.2d at 801 (quoting Butera, 
420 F .2d at 570). 
" Butera, 420 F.2d at 570. 
•• ld. at 573. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2476 n.10, 414 N.E.2d at 992 n.lO (citing Foster v. Sparks, 506 
F.2d 805, 824 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
" ld. at 2476 n.10, 414 N.E.2d at 992 n.10. 
" E.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 
550 F.2d 577, 591 (lOth Cir. 1976); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1971). 
" E.g., United States v. Potter, 552 F .2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 
F.2d 577, 591 (lOth Cir. 1976). 
"E.g., United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901,905 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 
F.2d 577, 591 (lOth Cir. 1976); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 145 (7th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1968). 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901,905 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 
550 F.2d 577, 591 (lOth Cir. 1976); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); United States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 
1973). 
" Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1738, 409 N.E.2d at 802. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2477, 414 N.E.2d at 993 (citing Hamling). 
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groups based on age cognizable as well as the existence of a number of lower 
federal court cases rejecting claims of cognizability for such groups sup-
ported its denial of the defendant's challenges under the federal constitu-
tion. 99 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the defendant's challenges 
to the compilation of grand and petit jury lists, the Court did express con-
cern regarding the operation of the jury selection system. 100 The Court 
noted that even though underrepresentation of young persons was not a 
ground for reversing a conviction, some of the consequences of such under-
representation were "undesirable. " 101 The Court pointed out the decreasing 
popularity of "key man" systems among the various states and the in-
creased adoption of random jury selection procedures. 102 The Court noted 
that in 1968 Congress replaced the key man system in the federal courts with 
a random selection process. 103 Convinced of the preferability of random 
selection procedures, the Court requested the attorney general and the legis-
lature to act to cause the speedy implementation of such procedures. 104 In 
order to ensure jury selection reform, the Court directed the lower courts, 
after a reasonable time, to entertain favorably claims showing that substan-
tially random procedures were not used to compile jury lists. 105 
Interestingly, s.oon after the Supreme Judicial Court issued the 
Bastarache opinion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire took action 
similar to that taken in Bastarache, but the New Hampshire court went one 
step further. 106 In State v. Elbert, the defendant's challenges included a 
claim that the selection of the grand jury that indicted him impermissibly 
excluded young people eighteen to thirty-four years old. 107 The New Hamp-
shire court refused to recognize young people as a cognizable class, and held 
that the representation of young people was adequate for constitutional 
purposes. 108 In addition, the Elbert court concluded that selectmen did not 
intentionally exclude young persons. 109 Consequently, the court denied 
relief to the defendant. 110 Nevertheless, the court exercised its supervisory 
powers and went on to order that all future New Hampshire jury lists be 
•• /d. at 2477-78, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
100 /d. at 2480-81, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
101 /d. at 2481, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
102 /d. at 2480 & n.l4, 414 N.E.2d at 995 & n.14. 
103 /d. at 2480, 414 N.E.2d at 995 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1976)). 
104 /d. at 2481, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
10
' Id. at 2481-82, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
106 See State v. Elbert, 121 N.H. __ , 424 A.2d 1147 (1981). 
10
' Id. at __ , 424 A.2d at 1148. 
101 /d. at __ , 424 A.2d at 1149. People between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four 
represented 38.40Jo of the relevant general population, and only 11.40Jo of the jurors. /d. 
10
' /d. at __ , 424 A.2d at 1150. 
110 /d. 
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chosen randomly under the direction of the clerks of court. 111 The court 
noted that this action would be superseded by orders or rules of the court or 
by a suitable statute. 112 Thus, another court, while denying relief to the 
complaining criminal defendant, has not only decided that jury selection 
procedures should be more random but has taken affirmative steps toward 
securing this end. 
While the Elbert court fully exercised its supervisory powers, the 
Bastarache Court did not. The Bastarache Court did, however, leave the 
potential for future court action on several grounds. In its decision, the 
Court stressed the finding that there was no intentional discrimination 
against younger people, 113 implying that a state claim might succeed on a 
demonstration of such intentional discrimination. 114 Although of undeter-
mined significance, the Court observed that in the case at bar, "there was 
no tension based on differences in age between defendant and victim." 115 
Finally, the Court ordered the lower court to accept proven challenges that 
jury lists were not compiled by substantially random procedures. 116 The 
only provisos articulated by the Court were that such challenges could suc-
ceed only after lapse of a reasonable time and that the randomness of selec-
tion procedures may be affected by appropriate statutory exemptions. 117 
Ill /d. 
112 /d. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh., at 2467, 2468, 2479, 414 N.E.2d at 988, 994. 
'" See id. at 2479, 414 N.E.2d at 994. 
'" /d. 
'" /d. at 2481-82, 414 N.E.2d at 995. 
117 /d. 
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